What a big question. A question that I wager almost all of us have struggled with at some time. I certainly do not intend to probe the full depth of this question here – at least not in one article. And nor do I think I would be capable of doing it justice, as to study this question only raises a multitude of others that need to be addressed – Who/What is bad? Who/What is good? Why should we expect only good things to happen to good people? Is suffering bad? Is there an objective purpose to our existence? And the list goes on.

Instead, my goal here is far more modest. To share with you a reflection that was motivated by a brief conversation with a friend of mine. A non-Christian as far as I know – yet not someone who I have any reason to think is at all averse to a Christian world view – who, due to some recent personal events, found herself asking, “Why do terrible things happen to the very best of people?”

And I thought, what a question! And then I thought, what an opportunity! And so I began to wonder, if I’m going to respond to that, I don’t merely want to sympathise with her or provide shallow comfort – I suck at that anyway. Instead, I wanted her to think about the question she asked in a deeper way. I don’t know if this is the best way to put it, but as Christians, I think we do have deeper answers to these questions than non-believers. We have a way of looking at the world that many others haven’t considered.

So I rephrased her question from a broader perspective. “Or, why do bad things happen, at all?” I suggested.

“Too true,” she agreed.

At this point another of her friend’s weighed in. “I completely agree. There’s no rhyme or reason,” she said. “The jails are full of much better candidates for some of this stuff. It seems unfair.”

I took this as an opportunity to offer some deeper observations.

“To reflect on events as being good or bad kind of implies that there’s a purpose to life, I think. So when we despair over bad things happening to nice people, we are implying that their purpose is not being fulfilled. In other words, we have an idea that life does have an objective purpose and that death or suffering unfairly prevents us from achieving that purpose. And that, to me, is quite an interesting reflection to explore.”

But I didn’t want to leave it at that. And so I continued. “Do human beings actually have an objective purpose in life, one that is marred by suffering and death? Or is our purpose merely subjective or illusory?”

Presupposing a certain discomfort with the questions, I apologised. “Sorry, I didn’t mean to get all deep on you guys. I just find these natural intuitions that human beings have to be a curious thing, and yet many of us are unable to make sense of them.”

At this point I think the gig was up. Duane was getting all religious again. Well, I wasn’t really. But I didn’t quite know how else to interpret the silence. Perhaps they were concerned where I was heading with this. I’d like to think it was because of the gravity of their thoughts. But I let it rest at that, praying for another opportunity to take every thought captive, in the hope that they may be put into service to point the way to our Lord and Saviour.

As a small number of you may be aware, I have been engaging in discussions with some visitors at The Gospel Coalition in the comments section of Pastor Tim Keller’s recent article, “Sinned in a literal Adam, raised in a literal Christ.” While I disagree with Dr. Keller’s view of the creation account in Genesis, I fully agree with him that belief in a literal, historical Adam is vitally important to a biblical theology of salvation, so the point of this article is not to respond to Dr. Keller. But neither is it to respond to the young-earth creationists who have lit up the comments section at the audacity (or heresy) of Dr. Keller not believing in young-earth creationism.

Rather, the point of this article is to respond to Sola Ratione (the internet moniker of a person who does not reveal a name, gender, location, or anything else) who proposed that since the scientific evidence for evolution is overwhelming Christians are forced to contend with “a serious problem of evil.” [1] His argument is that if both Christianity and evolution are true then a serious problem of evil is generated by the evidence of hundreds of millions of years worth of suffering. Since an omniscient God know that such suffering would take place, an all-loving and benevolent God would have been repulsed by it, and an all-powerful or omnipotent God could have used a different method, “the evidence for evolution renders Christian theism highly unlikely.”

An interesting problem of evil argument, but no different than any other and just as intellectually bankrupt.

First let us get a trivial point out of the way. Whether God created the world millions of years ago through natural processes (theistic evolutionism) or thousands of years ago through special creation (young-earth creationism), the very same problem exists either way. When it comes to the nature of God (who is perfect in knowledge, power, and love), there is no meaningful difference between millions or thousands of years worth of suffering; namely, it is not as though millions of years worth of suffering is inconsistent with God’s nature but thousands of years of suffering is fine. So whether the Christian is a flat-earth geocentrist young-earth creationist on one end of the spectrum or a theistic evolutionist who is practically deistic on the other or anywhere in between those two, the same problem of gratuitous suffering exists. In other words, contrary to Sola Ratione’s point, the truth or falsehood of evolution is quite irrelevant to the problem he proposes. Whether millions or thousands of years the alleged problem remains the same: the existence of God versus the existence of suffering.

As I pointed out to Sola Ratione, his argument holds only if suffering is gratuitous. And by gratuitous we mean unwarranted or without a just purpose. In other words, suffering is not inconsistent with God’s nature if it is warranted or has a just purpose. So in order for his argument to hold, he must prove that suffering is gratuitous.

It is illegitimate for him to ask Christians to assume for the sake of argument that it is gratuitous, for that commits the fallacy of begging the question; that is, it asks us to assume the very thing to be proved, that the biblical God does not exist. It is invalid for an argument to assume in one of its premises the very conclusion it aims to prove. So how does it beg the question? Quite simply: since gratuitous suffering and the biblical God are mutually contradictory states of affairs, assuming one as possible necessarily involves the other being impossible; for example, in a world where an Immoveable Object is possible, in that world an Irresistible Force is impossible (and vice versa). So then if the question before us regards the possible existence of the biblical God, it is question-begging to enter the question assuming that it is not possible.

Therefore reason prohibits Sola Ratione from assuming arguendo that suffering is gratuitous; that is, reason demands that he prove it is gratuitous. And we should note that pointing to cases of suffering does not by itself prove that it is gratuitous. Both he and Christians agree that suffering exists; where we disagree is that it is gratuitous. So by pointing to cases of suffering he has not somehow made his case. To do that he must prove it is gratuitous.

He might try contending that we are justified in assuming that suffering is gratuitous until proven otherwise, shifting the burden of proof onto the Christian, by pointing out that in some cases the presumption of truth is a valid move. To this we may respond by noting that it is an invalid move if doing so ends up begging the question—as it does here with his argument. So reason denies him this avenue, persisting in its demand that he prove that gratuitous suffering exists.

So by reason alone Sola Ratione must prove that gratuitous suffering exists. It cannot be either assumed for the sake of argument nor assumed until proven otherwise, since either is a case of begging the question. So he must shoulder this burden of proof that his argument demands of him. Or he can dismiss the whole matter with a wave of his hand, describing it as “flogging a dead horse,” and go about his business thinking that he has won the day. Since it leaves Christianity entirely unscathed, we may let him enjoy that cookie. It does not reflect well on him, but that matters little to us.

Suffering exists, but given the God we worship we know it is never gratuitous; by the very nature and word of God we are promised that. And people like Sola Ratione have yet to make a coherent and rational case to the contrary, their every attempt being denied by the very logic they supposedly esteem.

As a final remark I want to address a point he raised in his closing comment. I had said to him that if the biblical God is the “open question” before us, then it begs the very question to assume arguendo that the biblical God is impossible (which is exactly what the assumption of gratuitous suffering does and why he must instead prove it). To this he replied that the possible existence of God being the open question before us means that “God may or may not exist” (emphasis his). What he does not seem to realize is that this is not any kind of rebuttal, since that is precisely what “possible” means in the first place! In other words, the question is not God’s necessary existence but rather his possible existence. I think biblical Christianity firmly establishes that the existence of God is necessary, not merely possible, but I have to be willing to set that aside in order to enter the question Sola Ratione proposed. And I did. However, my criticism still stands: assuming arguendo that any suffering is gratuitous assumes necessarily that the biblical God is impossible, which is question-begging when the possible existence of God is the very question. I think Sola Ratione should be grateful for this allowance, since if I were to confront his argument on the grounds of real biblical Christianity his case would be even worse. What I am showing is that even in its weakest case biblical Christianity has nothing to worry about from such problem of evil arguments.

[1] Sola Ratione (2011, June 10). Comment to Keller’s article. See also his own article “An evolutionary problem of evil.”

References:

Sola Ratione (2011, January). “An evolutionary problem of evil.” Sola Ratione [blog].
http://rationesola.blogspot.com

Tim Keller (2011, June 6). “Sinned in a literal Adam, raised in a literal Christ.” The Gospel Coalition [blog].
http://thegospelcoalition.org

I wish I could say that Justin at Consider Atheism has posted some more of his thoughts on the Problem of Evil and how to refute my defeater of it, but unfortunately they are the embarrassingly weak responses of Dawson Bethrick. I suppose that is at once both good and bad. On the one hand, it is good that such a train wreck didn’t come from his own brain. But it is bad, on the other hand, that he didn’t approach the problem with critical thinking of his own, despite my hope that he would, choosing instead to publish Bethrick’s response (but mostly in Justin’s own words).

Originally Bethrick tried to save Justin’s argument by using Isaiah 45:7 to prove that evil is indeed something God creates. Justin was rather enlivened by this passage and brought it to my attention in the comments area of my first article. And I proceeded to show him why he should probably not get too excited about arguments that Bethrick uses by showing him what the passage is actually talking about. And as to be expected, Bethrick responded (at Justin’s site). I was going to send Justin a private email about this and tell him that he would score critical thinking points if he could identify what was wrong with Bethrick’s response. But it seems I didn’t get off work soon enough, for by the time I got home Justin had uncritically regurgitated the train wreck in a new blog post, so now this gets to be done in public instead. Readers of the Aristophrenium know that I don’t mind dismantling logically bankrupt arguments from atheists who pretend to esteem reason—to put it kindly—but I was really hoping to save Justin the embarrassment because I like him. “Before you invest yourself in Bethrick’s response,” I was going to write him, “evaluate it critically for logical flaws.” Anybody can teach people what to think, but I want to teach people how to think, and few things achieve that goal quite like learning how to critically evaluate an argument.

But if he wishes to do this publically, I’m willing to oblige him. Let’s have a look.

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Justin, a young man from Canada, started a brand new blog called Consider Atheism. Although I don’t remember how I stumbled upon his blog, it has garnered my interest for two reasons: he is Canadian and purports to defend Atheism. (And there is also the fact that he is young, which means he is still teachable.)

One of the first posts to elicit a response from me regarded the Problem of Evil (which most people know is my favourite subject). The following is the sum of our discussion.

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Clever animation that aptly delivers the linkages of human freedom with worldly evil and of God’s paired characteristic of justice and love in response.

While I think the animation is perfect, theologically we could discuss a few of the film’s claims. Ryft knows what I’m talking about ;)

Originally seen over at CrossExamined Blog.

With regard to my following reasoning, I address some questions raised.

(1) To affirm that Gratuitous Evil has a probability greater than zero is to affirm that Gratuitous Evil is possible, by definition.

(2) To affirm that Gratuitous Evil is possible is to affirm that the Biblical God is impossible, by definition.

(3) To affirm that the Biblical God is impossible (implicitly or explicitly) within a premise of an argument against the existence thereof commits the fallacy of begging the question.

Well then the problem is that, under Christian presuppositions, gratuitous evil doesn’t exist; and your argument is sound under such presuppositions.

That being the case—and it is—one might notice that he forgot to mention who it is a ‘problem’ for. And if I may point out the obvious: “Not for Christians.” As a matter of fact, that is substantively the basis upon which the Christian can trust in the loving providence of God through painful or troubled times; i.e., given the God in whom we place our love, trust, and obedience, no evil that befalls us could ever be gratuitous (Eccl. 7:14; Rom. 8:28; Ps. 71:20; Heb. 12:7-11; 1 Pet. 5:7-10; and so forth).

However, in reality there are gratuitous evils—such as natural disasters.

Pointing to some natural disaster and asserting that it is a gratuitous evil is just that: an assertion; and according to generally accepted standards of sound reasoning, bare assertions are not rationally decisive. To possess rational merit, his assertion must be turned into a conclusion with premises that at least validly support it. We have his assertion that natural disasters are gratuitous evils but not any reason to think that is true, while under the Christian view we have an abundance of reason to think it false.

I have no sufficient reason to believe that [natural disasters] are the result of rebellion against God (cf. definition of evil). That being so, the Christian God then isn’t consistent with reality.

It is a stark error in reasoning to go from “I have no sufficient reason to believe X” and conclude that “therefore X is false” (i.e., contrary to reality). The fact that you do not have sufficient reason to believe X says something about your research diet but it says nothing about the truth or falsehood of X itself—for thinking that something is false or contrary to reality on the basis that it has not been proven true is the argumentum ad ignorantiam error. Remember, an absence of sufficient reason is good support for your not believing X, but it is bad support for you thinking that X is false (“isn’t consistent with reality”).

And perhaps just as important to note: the fact that you don’t have sufficient reason is a rather different matter from whether or not sufficient reason exists to be had. Do you have good reason? It seems not, if we take your word. Does that mean good reason does not exist? Non-sequitur; i.e., the one does not follow from the other. I can sympathize that you don’t have good reason, but remember: that’s autobiographical information. It does not mean that good reason doesn’t exist to be had. So then this is an opportune time to ask the easily neglected question: “Exactly what have you done to acquire that sufficient reason you need?” If little or nothing, then it would make sense why you do not have it.

Do you have evidence that natural disasters happen because of rebellions against God?

A fair amount, actually, yes. For example, the rebellion of Korah and his men, plus several thousand Israelites who had taken their side: an earthquake and fire destroyed Korah and his men, and a plague killed those who sided with their rebellion.

By having defined morality in reference to the nature and character of God, Ryft effectively precluded any possible existence of evil (by implying that everything God does is non-evil by definition). So then if God is the standard of morality, no evil can exist—gratuitous or otherwise.

Incorrect. The character and commands of God does not preclude the existence of evil by definition; on the contrary, it allows for and explains evil. However, it does preclude gratuitous evil by definition; given the God of Christian theism, it is impossible for any evil to be unwarranted or purposeless.

Introduction

When it comes to arguments for atheism, that is, arguments for the non-existence of God, [1] none are considered so compelling as the Problem of Evil category of arguments—not only by atheists but for some reason also by many Christians. It is my contention that such a state of affairs exists for one overriding reason: that much of the general public (atheists and Christians alike) have not been taught how and therefore don’t know how to evaluate arguments critically. Starting around the turn of the last century and persisting to present day, as a society we all at once fell for the seductive allowances of postmodernism, shifted our obligations from family and society to radical individualism, and laid out a minefield of political correctness that a person dares trespass only on pain of being ostracized. “To argue for truth today is to stir an immediate debate,” noted Ravi Zacharias, “as if a heresy of devilish proportions has been invoked.”

So critical thinking skills, as instruments of evaluating truth claims and arguments, have incrementally lost value as items for our mental toolbox—especially since almost by definition they imply the existence of objective truths. If truth claims don’t or can’t describe reality objectively, always falling short of the task for one reason or another, then the tools for discerning objective truth claims grow rusty from disuse. Much more can be said on this, however I don’t wish to digress.

But for those who know what ‘validly’ means and how to reason accordingly, those who can tell the difference between an assumption and a conclusion, who are familiar with and can recognize errors in reasoning (fallacies), the more we interact with arguments for atheism the more we discover that none of them validly prove the non-existence of God, including the Problem of Evil versions. For a constellation of other reasons, I think this is why Greg Koukl, in his most recent Mentoring Letter, encouraged subscribers to engage criticisms head-on. “Sometimes it’s better to move towards an objection rather than away from it, to embrace a charge rather than run from it,” he writes. “In other words, don’t run from the problem; run towards it and defuse it. Don’t evade; invade.  Embrace it, undermine its relevance, and take the wind out of its sails.” [2]

In an effort to evaluate my position under the fire of critical scrutiny, I have recently begun engaging in a series of debates on Problem of Evil arguments for atheism, where my opponent is invited to defend whatever version thereof he or she feels best proves the non-existence of God. This article shall examine the first of these debates, which took place at the Debate.org web site. [3] As these debates conclude, at that site or some other location (e.g., message board, email, etc.), I will post another article here at the Aristophrenium evaluating the results thereof. Until it is defeated—assuming it even can be—I will continue to maintain my resolution, that “there are literally no versions of the Problem of Evil argument that succeed at proving the non-existence of God.”

Note: In all my arguments, on this and any other matter, the term ‘God’ always refers to God as revealed in Christian scripture canon (viz. the 39 books of the Old Testament and 27 books of the New Testament) and possessing all the commonly recognized attributes thereof (e.g., trinitarian, omnipotent, righteous, sovereign, etc.). I have no interest in defending, nor do I even recognize the legitimacy of, any deity other than the God of Christian theism.

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This evening I was surprised to find myself being referenced and commented on at a blog I had never heard of before, Anglican Origins Discussion, and by a person who for some reason chose to not engage my argument here at this site. Instead he chose to email the owner of the blog privately (they are friends), who then published a post about the contention in an article titled “Evil and its problems.”

It seems this friend took issue with my argument that assertions of “gratuitous evil” are illicit, by virtue of being assumptions that beg the question against God. “If there exists a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent,” I had said, “then there cannot exist gratuitous evil or suffering, for the two are mutually exclusive in the same way that an Irresistible Force and an Immovable Object are.” Against my view, this friend had written the following in response:

It’s the omni-point and gratuitous evil stuff that is sick. Ryft forgets there is a fall and thus there is gratuitous evil. His convenient enthymematic premiss is that God ordained the fall, an admission which would have atheists rejecting Christianity outright.

There are a couple of problems I have with the statements that he made, things that I find a bit troubling as cutting against the biblical grain.

First of all, notice that he simply asserts that “there is gratuitous evil.” No attempt is made to prove biblically that some evils are gratuitous, nor to counter the argument that I had presented. Again, given the very definitions of the terms involved, it follows necessarily that if God is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent, then it is logically impossible for any evil to be gratuitous (unjustified, purposeless).

And no, there is no need to posit that God “ordained the Fall,” for even if he had not so ordained things, God is nevertheless omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent. That is, even if we grant that God does not know the free choices of man before they are made (as per Open Theism), he knew that Eve was reaching to partake of the forbidden fruit and had the power to do something about it. (Even the Open Theists will confess that God knows what a person is thinking.) But he did not stop her. He knew what she was doing and could have stopped her, but he let both her and Adam fall. Why? It would be my contention that God had a purpose in it, and there is a large host of scriptures that can be called to support that view. Would this friend disagree, and assert that God did not have a purpose in it (gratuitous)? If so, can he produce any scriptures which show that God is ever purposeless? And can he provide a coherent and sound exegesis of all the scriptures that state otherwise (e.g., 2 Kings 19:25; Isaiah 10:6; cf. Amos 3:6)?

As for the classical and orthodox theology of God being omnipotent and omniscient, he dismisses it with a wave of his hand as being “sick,” which presents itself as a wholly inadequate response. Throughout the centuries of church history, the catholic faith has regarded these attributes as theological orthodoxy across every tradition, from Catholic to Eastern Orthodox to Protestant. In every age theologians have treated the doctrines as a ‘given’, that is, something which is so obvious in the scriptures as to be commonly received. That is, until about the end of the 20th century when the likes of Pinnock, Hasker, Boyd, Sanders, etc., introduced Open Theism. If this friend wishes to deny that God is omniscient and omnipotent, more than just a wave of his hand will be required of him by those who search the scriptures for truths about God.

And finally, atheists already reject Christianity outright. While it is true that pressing upon them the penetrating reach of God’s nature, the implications of his holiness, the lost condition of man in his sinfulness, the exclusive and sovereign jurisdiction of God over all things, man’s inescapable moral culpability to God, etc., will certainly enflame their anger and enmity to God, that is by no means an argument to hold back on such vital truths, ever, which we are commanded to preach unto all the world. As servants of our Lord and Savior, our allegiance is to him—and him alone. We owe to unbelievers nothing but the debt of love—and even that is not for the unbeliever’s sake, but for the sake of Christ and the glory of God. Our faithful commitment is to God in Christ alone, and that covenant relationship we must never allow any man to come between.

As Horatius Bonar put the matter,

For we know that the unrenewed will is set against the Gospel; it is enmity to God and His truth. The more closely and clearly truth is set before it and pressed home upon it, its hatred swells and rises. … It is the Gospel that he hates; the more clearly it is set before him, he hates it the more. It is God that he hates; the more vividly God is set before him, the more does his enmity awaken and augment. … How, then, is this resistance to be over-come, this opposition made to give way? How is the bent of the will to be so altered as to receive that which it rejected? Plainly by his will coming in contact with a Superior one, a will that can remove the resistance … The will itself must undergo a change before it can choose that which it rejected. And what can change it but the finger of God?