Despite what he might think, Jim Gardner has a long way to go before he understands presuppositional apologetics. Although I think he is making important strides in grappling with what is being argued, it is clearly evident that he is nowhere near to finding the source of that curious odor under his bed.^[1] While I certainly appreciate the kind words he had to say about me and our recent conversation, I have to expose a fundamental confusion he apparently struggles under.

Gardner admits that he does not understand how I can draw an inference from what science explains about nature to not only the existence of God but also that the proof of his existence is contained in Scripture.^[2] I can explain that for him very succinctly:

“I don’t.”

Despite how clearly I had said it, for some reason it has not yet sunk in. As I had said in that conversation, so will I state very clearly again: the truth of God and his word is a presupposition we reason from, not a conclusion we reason to. Gardner simply must accept what is being argued if he wants to interact with it rationally and honestly. When he describes his opponent’s position in a way that is unrecognizable to his opponent, that is a clear indication that he has not understood the position; and he is not going to understand the position until he is prepared to accept what his opponent is so clearly stating, which is again:

• The truth of God and his word is a presupposition we reason from, not a conclusion we reason to.

All attempts by Gardner and Alex Botten to treat that as if it is a conclusion instead of a presupposition are doomed as straw man failures, insofar as they are arguing against a position that is different from or weaker than the one their opponent actually holds. A person cannot be expected to defend a position they do not hold. What more can one do beyond what I have done here, which is, after digesting Gardner’s 2,000-word post, to simply respond with a two-word rebuttal.

Gardner demonstrates how poorly he understands presuppositional apologetics when he says things like, “Presuppositional apologetics … [says] that everything which stems from God—including Christianity and the Bible—is a statement about the real world but not a statement about God.”^[3] Presuppositionalism is Reformed theology applied to the enterprise of apologetics, and one of the most often cited passages of Scripture in that enterprise is Romans 1:18–21:

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of people who suppress the truth by their unrighteousness, because what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, because they are understood through what has been made. So people are without excuse. For although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give him thanks, but they became futile in their thoughts and their senseless hearts were darkened.

In case Gardner has missed it, verse 20 directly contradicts his statement—as does a host of other passages (e.g., Psa 19:1–3). In Reformed theology there are two sources of revelation: general revelation (nature) and special revelation (Scripture); it all speaks to the nature and character of God. One must bear in mind, however, that Scripture is ultimate and authoritative, such that general revelation is subordinate to special revelation. As it says in the 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith (1.1),^[4]

The Holy Scriptures are the only sufficient, certain and infallible rule for saving knowledge, faith, and obedience. Although the light of nature and the works of creation and providence give such clear testimony to the goodness, wisdom and power of God that they leave people without excuse, yet they are not sufficient to give the knowledge of God and his will that is necessary for salvation. Therefore it pleased the Lord to reveal himself at various times and in different ways, and to declare his will to his church. To ensure the preservation and propagation of the truth, and to establish and support the church against human corruption, the malice of Satan, and the world, he committed his complete revelation to writing. The Holy Scriptures are therefore absolutely indispensable, for God’s former ways of revealing his will to his people have now ceased.

But how poorly he understands presuppositional apologetics is made all the more clear when he portrayed it as being some kind of cosmological argument. He seems to think the argument goes something like this: the universe cannot come from nothing so it must have come from Something, and atheists willfully deny that the nature and character of that Something constitutes proof of God; moreover, atheists are unable to account for their own existence without implicitly acknowledging that Something (which is somehow God).^[5] I have a one-word response to that:

“Lolwut?”

I have no idea where Gardner got this from. Neither Sye nor Dustin have ever argued anything even remotely similar to this, nor can anything like that be found in the writings of Cornelius Van Til, Greg Bahnsen, Gordon Clark, Michael Butler, Vincent Cheung, John Frame, K. Scott Oliphint and so forth—all of them presuppositionalists of one camp or another (q.v. Van Tilian vs. Clarkian presuppositionalism). Gardner so poorly understands what is being argued that we can safely say that he does not understand it at all, much less poorly. His attempt at describing the presuppositional argument is utterly unrecognizable. It might be what a person would get if he threw William Lane Craig’s kalam cosmological argument and presuppositionalist jargon into a blender and hit purée—an epic mess that nobody would recognize. It is not what a presuppositionalist argues, it is not what an evidentialist argues, it is not what Craig would argue, it is not what an atheist would argue; literally nobody would recognize that reconstruction Gardner attempted.

I think Gardner needs to first understand what he is objecting to before he attempts objecting to it. He might detect a curious odor, but he has no idea where it is coming from, much less has he determined that it is a stray sport sock or plucked it out to give it a wash.

~ * ~

There is one thing I would like to know. Gardner said quite frankly, “There is no God to deny or accept.”^[6] That is a very interesting truth claim, and I would really like to see the argument which produces it. I challenge Gardner to provide the premises which lead to that conclusion.

Gardner also said that he struggles to understand how people “who are so clearly capable of researching and understanding all of this for themselves still somehow manage to come to such obviously flawed assumptions about the validity [or even] the intellectual honesty of their own position.”^[7] That is another interesting truth claim, that my presupposition is invalid and intellectually dishonest. Is Gardner up to the challenge of providing the premises which lead to that conclusion?

1. ^[1] Jim Gardner, “I think Jim is getting closer to becoming a Christian,” How Good Is That? [blog] (2011, October 30). ↩
2. ^[2] Gardner, para. 4. ↩
3. ^[3] Ibid., para. 8. ↩
4. ^[4] Andrew Kerkham, 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith, 2nd edition (2001). ↩
5. ^[5] Gardner, op cit., para. 11. ↩
6. ^[6] Ibid., para. 6. ↩
7. ^[7] Ibid., para. 7. ↩

There is this older lady on the Dalnet IRC network who for many years has exhibited a seething antipathy for Reformed theology, and has somewhat more recently been trying to understand the presuppositionalism by which those who are Reformed tend to argue their worldview. Although I often do not bother engaging her on such subjects (given certain reasons that experience has produced), tonight I acquiesced. Since who she is on IRC is not relevant, I have chosen to give her the name “Lisa” in the following conversation.

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This argument arose on Internet Relay Chat (IRC) in the #ChristianDebate chat room on the Dalnet network. Since I was engaged with another fellow in a rather in-depth conversation on issues pertaining to the gospel, this following argument proposed by the gentleman below did not receive any attention from me at the time. I assured him that I would respond to him the next time we saw each other; but since I am having a difficult time staying connected to IRC lately, I decided that I would respond to him here and simply provide him a link to this article the next chance I get.

On Saturday evening (17:39 PDT) Grey_Fox said that my presupposing the truth of the Bible as the word of God

does not meet the definition of axiom as “the fundamental starting point” because you were not born believing the Bible. There must have been some line of reasoning that caused you to originally believe that the Bible was the word of God, and that line of reasoning was, if not the fundamental starting point, at least closer to it. 

First, when I say “fundamental starting point” I am not somehow talking about beliefs people are born with, so that issue is not relevant to this (however interesting it might otherwise be). I am talking about that which must be the case in order for something else to be the case, that is, the relationship between some Q and the P upon which it necessarily depends. Irrespective of whether we were born with them or not, we all have axiomatic starting points upon which the rest of our mental furniture depends, the necessary P from which we argue for Q.

Second, the suggestion that there was “a line of reasoning” by which I arrived at the belief that the Bible is true simply assumes without warrant that my presupposition is not an axiomatic starting point—which is a fallacious move that begs the question against my view. An axiom by definition is not something a person reasons to; rather it is something a person reasons from. If you want to claim that my belief is something that I reasoned to, not from, then you will have to shoulder the burden of proof and make your case—but without begging the question.

This evening I had my attention directed back to the article that Joshua Whipps had written at his web site, “On old-earth presuppositions.” [1] Since I had already read his article previously (and responded to it), [2] I decided to scroll down to the comments area to see what sort of discussion had taken place. While reading Whipps’ response to one of his visitors I found a couple of comments of his that I wanted to reply to.

In his an explanation of the presupposition which all “secularist evolutionists, theistic evolutionists, and old-earth creationists” share in common in one particular area (that is to say, “that which governs their theory of fact”), he asked the following question of his visitor: Where did the old-earth creationist “get the idea that he was supposed to be driving this direction?” In other words, where did he get the idea that facts should ever be governed “by naturalistic principle” at any point? [3] (Since he said that all three groups share the same presupposition, and the only presupposition he identifies is the “naturalistic principle,” I understand him to be saying that this is the metaphorical car they are all driving in.) Did the old-earth creationist get this idea from his own interpretation of the facts or from God’s via Scripture?

First, if a presupposition by definition is not a conclusion, then it cannot be something that an old-earth creationist derived from his own interpretation of the facts; not to put too fine a point on it but a “theory of fact” is precisely what governs the interpretation in the first place. So wherever he got it from, it was something that he brought to the interpretation, not something he got from the interpretation. Thus, the idea that he should be driving in this direction, that a naturalistic principle should be presupposed at any point in his world view, is something he got from God’s word as authoritative or from somewhere else which he autonomously deemed authoritative.

Second, and more importantly, I submit that Whipps committed the question-begging Loaded Question rhetorical device. Namely, just as the question, “Have you stopped beating your spouse?” assumes that you actually have beaten your spouse, in the very same way his question assumes that the old-earth creationist actually shares the same idea in common with those evolutionists. Consequently, just as someone who has never beaten their spouse would take issue with the assumption lurking within the question about spousal abuse, so an old-earth creationist such as myself would take issue with the assumption lurking within Whipps’ question about old-earth presuppositions. The table could be turned with a sharp question for Whipps himself: “If you are assuming that all old-earth creationists possess this naturalistic presupposition at some point in their view with respect to creation, then what is your justification for doing so?” This assumption of his, after all, is either with or without warrant. And it certainly doesn’t follow that a naturalistic presupposition necessarily operates to some degree at bottom of all old-earth creationists, since I maintain an old-earth view of creation with biblical presuppositions grounding all inquiry including that one. I firmly stand on the very same ground that Whipps himself does; namely, all of Scripture, as well as its Author, is my presupposition. Are there old-earth creationists whose theory of fact and view of creation are in some way grounded in a naturalistic presupposition? Perhaps. We may grant that Whipps has encountered any number of such persons. However, that does not have any bearing on the fact that an old-earth view of creation may arise from the presupposition of Scripture and its Author and studying the texts exegetically. With respect to such old-earth creationists, his Loaded Question is deeply problematic. Just as his visitor pointed out, autonomous reasoning is not driving their conclusions.

~ * ~

Whipps claims that he doesn’t bring any ideas to the text in Genesis that are foreign to it, that the text not only states that the days of creation are six consecutive 24-hour periods but also demands that we believe it. To teach contrary to this, he says, is to deny the teaching of Scripture and impose autonomous man’s assertion of authority over the text. [4] I take no issue with this. I fully agree with him on this point. But he actually does bring an idea to the text that is not derived from it, that is foreign to it; namely, the idea that in the Genesis creation account God is bringing the world into material existence. He is assuming that creation in this text is a material activity, and I say that he is assuming it because nowhere does he perform any exegesis of the text to establish that concept. It is something he brought to the text (eisegesis), not something he derived from it (exegesis). If we receive the text as authoritative, then surely it is a grave error to claim of the text something it never intended to say. He needs to show using sound exegesis of the text that the creation in Genesis is a material activity, not simply assert it. And his appeal to “the history of the church” and “the confessions we adhere to” should be secondary, coming after he has made his case on an exegesis of the text grounded in the presupposition of Scripture and its Author.

1. Whipps, J. (2010, September 17). "On old earth presuppositions." RazorsKiss [blog]. http://razorskiss.net (19 April 2011).
2. Smart, D. (2010, September 19). “On old earth vs. young earth debate.” Aristophrenium [blog]. http://aristophrenium.com (19 April 2011).
3. Whipps, comment 24 September 2010, para. 1.
4. Ibid, para. 2 and 3.

Usually I don’t bother paying any attention to The Bahnsen Burner, a blog run by an Atheist named Dawson Bethrick, and it would take less than five minutes at his site for a person to see why. It has almost nothing to do with the actual merits of his arguments and everything to do with the fact that locating and identifying an argument within his landslide argumentum verbosium is just too laborious a task. I share the same view as Joshua Whipps over at Choosing Hats: until Bethrick decides to express arguments or criticisms with succinct perspicuity instead of proof-by-verbosity, [1] I simply can’t be bothered to engage his material. It requires more time than I have available.

The only reason that I am even aware Bethrick had recently tackled my “Arrogance of Atheism” articles [2] is because one of our staff members, Mathew Hamilton, directed me to it. I would have otherwise never known. And so for Hamilton’s sake alone I have reviewed Bethrick’s piece, shouldering the laborious task of locating and identifying his arguments in order to respond to them. I shall not repeat this endeavour (even though Bethrick will probably be unable to resist carving out an entertaining albeit verbose Chewbacca Defense), as this response will suffice to demonstrate that there is nothing new under the sun when it comes to the bankruptcy of Atheist objections.

And no, Bethrick, our staff will not publish your loquacious tomes in the Comments field to this (or any other) article. Comments must be composed with succinct perspicuity. If you want to do a verbal dump, there is always The Bahnsen Burner—where no one has to see it unless they masochistically want to. I will return to ignoring you, although you are free to continue directing traffic here by writing about our articles.

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Several years ago, long before this site ever existed and once hosted somewhere long since dead, I had written a very pointed and brief thought-piece about “The Arrogance of Atheism.” It had garnered the attention of Austin Reed Cline, a Regional Director for the Council for Secular Humanism and editor of the Atheism section of the About.com web portal, who had published an excoriating and profoundly inaccurate review of my article. Some time last year I decided to resurrect that piece and republish it here, and to include not only Cline’s rebuttal but my response to him as well.

Around that same time I extended an invitation for Cline to interact with me on the response I had composed. His response can be found in the comments to the relevant article at his portal here, and the remainder of this article is my answer to him.

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LAST UPDATED: 7 September 2009

PREFACE: The following article was originally published in three different places, two which died internet deaths and one that still exists as an inactive blog. [1] Shortly after publication it caught the attention of Austin Reed Cline, a Regional Director for the Council for Secular Humanism and editor of the Atheism section of the About.com site, who published an excoriating and profoundly inaccurate review thereof. [2]

I invited Cline to interact with me on the subject because I intended to compose a rebuttal and wanted his input before publication; I also asked if he would be willing to provide a link to my rebuttal. On both counts he refused, and with some rather insulting remarks. So I had to complete my rebuttal without any input from Cline. Unfortunately that rebuttal was published at one of those now-dead locations, a web site that died when my hosting company went out of business.

I am republishing the original article here along with a new rebuttal against Cline (which I will finish by this weekend) for the thoughtful consideration of our readers and members. Please feel free to weigh in with your thoughts on my original point, on Cline’s review, and on my rebuttal.

Original Article (27/Jan/2005):

The really frustrating thing about most atheists, at least those who enjoy debating against Christian theism, is that they presuppose the truth of their system of belief and then tacitly insist their Christian opponent work within the framework of that system. In other words, the Christian is expected to provide arguments in defense of Christian theism which accord with the atheist’s epistemology in particular and world view in general. This is implicitly demonstrated in challenges such as, "Provide evidence that God exists." The relevance of evidence, and even what constitutes evidence, are defined by his system of thought.

However, if it is permissible for the atheist to presuppose the truth of his system of thought and expect the Christian to work within the framework of that system, then it is also permissible for the inverse of that situation. Otherwise, the atheist would shoulder the epistemic responsibility for explaining why the only presuppositions permitted in the field of debate are his own—and I would not anticipate a rational argument for that.

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