As a small number of you may be aware, I have been engaging in discussions with some visitors at The Gospel Coalition in the comments section of Pastor Tim Keller’s recent article, “Sinned in a literal Adam, raised in a literal Christ.” While I disagree with Dr. Keller’s view of the creation account in Genesis, I fully agree with him that belief in a literal, historical Adam is vitally important to a biblical theology of salvation, so the point of this article is not to respond to Dr. Keller. But neither is it to respond to the young-earth creationists who have lit up the comments section at the audacity (or heresy) of Dr. Keller not believing in young-earth creationism.

Rather, the point of this article is to respond to Sola Ratione (the internet moniker of a person who does not reveal a name, gender, location, or anything else) who proposed that since the scientific evidence for evolution is overwhelming Christians are forced to contend with “a serious problem of evil.” [1] His argument is that if both Christianity and evolution are true then a serious problem of evil is generated by the evidence of hundreds of millions of years worth of suffering. Since an omniscient God know that such suffering would take place, an all-loving and benevolent God would have been repulsed by it, and an all-powerful or omnipotent God could have used a different method, “the evidence for evolution renders Christian theism highly unlikely.”

An interesting problem of evil argument, but no different than any other and just as intellectually bankrupt.

First let us get a trivial point out of the way. Whether God created the world millions of years ago through natural processes (theistic evolutionism) or thousands of years ago through special creation (young-earth creationism), the very same problem exists either way. When it comes to the nature of God (who is perfect in knowledge, power, and love), there is no meaningful difference between millions or thousands of years worth of suffering; namely, it is not as though millions of years worth of suffering is inconsistent with God’s nature but thousands of years of suffering is fine. So whether the Christian is a flat-earth geocentrist young-earth creationist on one end of the spectrum or a theistic evolutionist who is practically deistic on the other or anywhere in between those two, the same problem of gratuitous suffering exists. In other words, contrary to Sola Ratione’s point, the truth or falsehood of evolution is quite irrelevant to the problem he proposes. Whether millions or thousands of years the alleged problem remains the same: the existence of God versus the existence of suffering.

As I pointed out to Sola Ratione, his argument holds only if suffering is gratuitous. And by gratuitous we mean unwarranted or without a just purpose. In other words, suffering is not inconsistent with God’s nature if it is warranted or has a just purpose. So in order for his argument to hold, he must prove that suffering is gratuitous.

It is illegitimate for him to ask Christians to assume for the sake of argument that it is gratuitous, for that commits the fallacy of begging the question; that is, it asks us to assume the very thing to be proved, that the biblical God does not exist. It is invalid for an argument to assume in one of its premises the very conclusion it aims to prove. So how does it beg the question? Quite simply: since gratuitous suffering and the biblical God are mutually contradictory states of affairs, assuming one as possible necessarily involves the other being impossible; for example, in a world where an Immoveable Object is possible, in that world an Irresistible Force is impossible (and vice versa). So then if the question before us regards the possible existence of the biblical God, it is question-begging to enter the question assuming that it is not possible.

Therefore reason prohibits Sola Ratione from assuming arguendo that suffering is gratuitous; that is, reason demands that he prove it is gratuitous. And we should note that pointing to cases of suffering does not by itself prove that it is gratuitous. Both he and Christians agree that suffering exists; where we disagree is that it is gratuitous. So by pointing to cases of suffering he has not somehow made his case. To do that he must prove it is gratuitous.

He might try contending that we are justified in assuming that suffering is gratuitous until proven otherwise, shifting the burden of proof onto the Christian, by pointing out that in some cases the presumption of truth is a valid move. To this we may respond by noting that it is an invalid move if doing so ends up begging the question—as it does here with his argument. So reason denies him this avenue, persisting in its demand that he prove that gratuitous suffering exists.

So by reason alone Sola Ratione must prove that gratuitous suffering exists. It cannot be either assumed for the sake of argument nor assumed until proven otherwise, since either is a case of begging the question. So he must shoulder this burden of proof that his argument demands of him. Or he can dismiss the whole matter with a wave of his hand, describing it as “flogging a dead horse,” and go about his business thinking that he has won the day. Since it leaves Christianity entirely unscathed, we may let him enjoy that cookie. It does not reflect well on him, but that matters little to us.

Suffering exists, but given the God we worship we know it is never gratuitous; by the very nature and word of God we are promised that. And people like Sola Ratione have yet to make a coherent and rational case to the contrary, their every attempt being denied by the very logic they supposedly esteem.

As a final remark I want to address a point he raised in his closing comment. I had said to him that if the biblical God is the “open question” before us, then it begs the very question to assume arguendo that the biblical God is impossible (which is exactly what the assumption of gratuitous suffering does and why he must instead prove it). To this he replied that the possible existence of God being the open question before us means that “God may or may not exist” (emphasis his). What he does not seem to realize is that this is not any kind of rebuttal, since that is precisely what “possible” means in the first place! In other words, the question is not God’s necessary existence but rather his possible existence. I think biblical Christianity firmly establishes that the existence of God is necessary, not merely possible, but I have to be willing to set that aside in order to enter the question Sola Ratione proposed. And I did. However, my criticism still stands: assuming arguendo that any suffering is gratuitous assumes necessarily that the biblical God is impossible, which is question-begging when the possible existence of God is the very question. I think Sola Ratione should be grateful for this allowance, since if I were to confront his argument on the grounds of real biblical Christianity his case would be even worse. What I am showing is that even in its weakest case biblical Christianity has nothing to worry about from such problem of evil arguments.

[1] Sola Ratione (2011, June 10). Comment to Keller’s article. See also his own article “An evolutionary problem of evil.”

References:

Sola Ratione (2011, January). “An evolutionary problem of evil.” Sola Ratione [blog].
http://rationesola.blogspot.com

Tim Keller (2011, June 6). “Sinned in a literal Adam, raised in a literal Christ.” The Gospel Coalition [blog].
http://thegospelcoalition.org

Fundy Atheists Say the Darndest Things

“You don’t seem to get it. Atheists don’t assert a positive claim, so they don’t shoulder any burden of proof.”

This is true—and it is false. It depends on what the person means because it is actually an incomplete sentence: a positive claim about what?

If this is said by an agnostic atheist and what he means is that his view does not assert a positive claim about the non-existence of God, then in that sense the statement is true. But in a more important way the statement is false because for all atheists (including agnostic ones) a positive claim actually is being asserted: that “God is not required.” And so when an atheist is being asked to shoulder the burden of proof (i.e., to show the proof or rationale for atheism), that’s the positive claim he’s being asked to defend. He is not being asked to prove that God doesn’t exist—unless he makes such a claim—but he is being asked to prove that God is not required; i.e., that things like truth or knowing or morality, etc., can be comprehended intelligibly under a godless framework while corresponding with and explaining the facts of human experience .

But it’s also amusing to note that both “assert” and “positive claim” actually mean the same thing. It is actually an awkward way of saying that atheists make no assertions (e.g., “Atheists do not assert an assertion”)—which is how he ought to phrase it, because then the inherent problem with this objection would be more apparent to the atheist, one would think.

Back in December of 2009, Mitchell LeBlanc of UrbanPhilosophy.net composed what he thought to be a possible disproof of the existence of God. The following day I had posted a rebuttal in response to his disproof. Given the exquisitely complex manner in which he formulated his argument, it isn’t really surprising that many people struggled to wrap their head around what exactly his argument was positing. As it usually goes in these things, the argument made good sense to LeBlanc himself, who said he was “amazed at the misunderstanding” that resulted. I’ve been in those shoes myself at times, when an argument is perfectly clear to me but the way I shared it with others left them baffled and confused. As I’ve said elsewhere, that is one of the primary reasons I blog; it allows me to constantly refine how I articulate myself, so that it becomes accessible to a larger and larger audience. I am always searching for ways to bring my language down from the mountain peaks of philosophy to the valleys of English. (I’m getting better, but I’ve still got a long way to go.)

The argument

To briefly refresh our minds, allow me to repeat what his argument had been. (And we must keep in mind that it targeted the biblical God.)

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune.

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune.

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist.

As I pointed out in my rebuttal, this argument does not belong to LeBlanc so much as it belongs to atheologist Michael Martin, [1] with LeBlanc substituting “triune” for every instance that Martin used “omniscient.” Given the doctrine of divine simplicity, such a substitution should be acceptable for the Christian.

What Martin was trying to show, and by extension LeBlanc, is that the existence of God is disproven by reason of logical contradiction; i.e., that God cannot exist. He takes two particular attributes of God and attempts to show that a contradiction results. In the case of this argument, those attributes are omnipotence and triunity.

As indicated in my aforementioned rebuttal, (1) and (2) are not contested since they reflect orthodox Christian doctrine. With regard to (3), LeBlanc later informed me that “a being that is not necessarily triune” would be some human, such as Bob who in some way caused flooding in Toronto (e.g., “Ryft on ‘A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence’”). Consequently, my previous rebuttal loses its traction, since I hadn’t understood that a secondary being was playing a relevant role (i.e., I’d thought God was the only being employed in his argument). But his argument is not saved by this clarification, since the derailment occurs now at (4) instead.

The analysis

We can accept (1) and (2), and it seems we can also accept (3) if it is predicated on God bringing about a state of affairs that was brought about by Bob. However, it’s not at all clear how (4) should follow. If God should bring about (principal cause) a state affairs that is brought about by Bob (instrumental cause), [2] how does it follow that God’s nature is thereby identical to Bob’s nature? That is, how did God become not triune by virtue of Bob being not triune? LeBlanc does not say, nor is it immediately obvious.

Perhaps LeBlanc rejects there being any distinction between types of causes, such that God is said to be the instrumental cause of all effects. If that is the case, then I think it becomes obvious how (4) follows. But if God is the instrumental cause of all effects, then all effects (or states of affairs) amount to “God in motion”—which in essence amounts to panentheism and is dramatically antithetical to God as revealed in the Bible (who the argument is intended to address, i.e., it qualifies as a straw man). So if that notion and its presuppositions are what is proposed by (4), then it must run afoul of such doctrines as aseity, necessary being, divine simplicity, transcendence and so forth, which tell us that necessarily nothing of God’s nature is identical to his creation. What God ordains should come to pass (principal cause) is a product of his nature; however, the means by which it comes to pass (instrumental cause) is a product of his creation which he exists independent of. So Bob by nature is not necessarily triune, but this has no bearing on whether or not God by nature is triune.

Hopefully I have not misunderstood his argument still. We’ll have to wait and see how he responds to find out if I’ve grasped his point aright.

References

1. Michael Martin. Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Temple University Press, 1990. p. 310 (as cited by LeBlanc).

2. Bob: instrumental cause that is itself an effect; contingent. God: principal cause that is not itself an effect; necessary. So, not identical; i.e., distinguishable types of causes.

With regard to my following reasoning, I address some questions raised.

(1) To affirm that Gratuitous Evil has a probability greater than zero is to affirm that Gratuitous Evil is possible, by definition.

(2) To affirm that Gratuitous Evil is possible is to affirm that the Biblical God is impossible, by definition.

(3) To affirm that the Biblical God is impossible (implicitly or explicitly) within a premise of an argument against the existence thereof commits the fallacy of begging the question.

Well then the problem is that, under Christian presuppositions, gratuitous evil doesn’t exist; and your argument is sound under such presuppositions.

That being the case—and it is—one might notice that he forgot to mention who it is a ‘problem’ for. And if I may point out the obvious: “Not for Christians.” As a matter of fact, that is substantively the basis upon which the Christian can trust in the loving providence of God through painful or troubled times; i.e., given the God in whom we place our love, trust, and obedience, no evil that befalls us could ever be gratuitous (Eccl. 7:14; Rom. 8:28; Ps. 71:20; Heb. 12:7-11; 1 Pet. 5:7-10; and so forth).

However, in reality there are gratuitous evils—such as natural disasters.

Pointing to some natural disaster and asserting that it is a gratuitous evil is just that: an assertion; and according to generally accepted standards of sound reasoning, bare assertions are not rationally decisive. To possess rational merit, his assertion must be turned into a conclusion with premises that at least validly support it. We have his assertion that natural disasters are gratuitous evils but not any reason to think that is true, while under the Christian view we have an abundance of reason to think it false.

I have no sufficient reason to believe that [natural disasters] are the result of rebellion against God (cf. definition of evil). That being so, the Christian God then isn’t consistent with reality.

It is a stark error in reasoning to go from “I have no sufficient reason to believe X” and conclude that “therefore X is false” (i.e., contrary to reality). The fact that you do not have sufficient reason to believe X says something about your research diet but it says nothing about the truth or falsehood of X itself—for thinking that something is false or contrary to reality on the basis that it has not been proven true is the argumentum ad ignorantiam error. Remember, an absence of sufficient reason is good support for your not believing X, but it is bad support for you thinking that X is false (“isn’t consistent with reality”).

And perhaps just as important to note: the fact that you don’t have sufficient reason is a rather different matter from whether or not sufficient reason exists to be had. Do you have good reason? It seems not, if we take your word. Does that mean good reason does not exist? Non-sequitur; i.e., the one does not follow from the other. I can sympathize that you don’t have good reason, but remember: that’s autobiographical information. It does not mean that good reason doesn’t exist to be had. So then this is an opportune time to ask the easily neglected question: “Exactly what have you done to acquire that sufficient reason you need?” If little or nothing, then it would make sense why you do not have it.

Do you have evidence that natural disasters happen because of rebellions against God?

A fair amount, actually, yes. For example, the rebellion of Korah and his men, plus several thousand Israelites who had taken their side: an earthquake and fire destroyed Korah and his men, and a plague killed those who sided with their rebellion.

By having defined morality in reference to the nature and character of God, Ryft effectively precluded any possible existence of evil (by implying that everything God does is non-evil by definition). So then if God is the standard of morality, no evil can exist—gratuitous or otherwise.

Incorrect. The character and commands of God does not preclude the existence of evil by definition; on the contrary, it allows for and explains evil. However, it does preclude gratuitous evil by definition; given the God of Christian theism, it is impossible for any evil to be unwarranted or purposeless.

Introduction

When it comes to arguments for atheism, that is, arguments for the non-existence of God, [1] none are considered so compelling as the Problem of Evil category of arguments—not only by atheists but for some reason also by many Christians. It is my contention that such a state of affairs exists for one overriding reason: that much of the general public (atheists and Christians alike) have not been taught how and therefore don’t know how to evaluate arguments critically. Starting around the turn of the last century and persisting to present day, as a society we all at once fell for the seductive allowances of postmodernism, shifted our obligations from family and society to radical individualism, and laid out a minefield of political correctness that a person dares trespass only on pain of being ostracized. “To argue for truth today is to stir an immediate debate,” noted Ravi Zacharias, “as if a heresy of devilish proportions has been invoked.”

So critical thinking skills, as instruments of evaluating truth claims and arguments, have incrementally lost value as items for our mental toolbox—especially since almost by definition they imply the existence of objective truths. If truth claims don’t or can’t describe reality objectively, always falling short of the task for one reason or another, then the tools for discerning objective truth claims grow rusty from disuse. Much more can be said on this, however I don’t wish to digress.

But for those who know what ‘validly’ means and how to reason accordingly, those who can tell the difference between an assumption and a conclusion, who are familiar with and can recognize errors in reasoning (fallacies), the more we interact with arguments for atheism the more we discover that none of them validly prove the non-existence of God, including the Problem of Evil versions. For a constellation of other reasons, I think this is why Greg Koukl, in his most recent Mentoring Letter, encouraged subscribers to engage criticisms head-on. “Sometimes it’s better to move towards an objection rather than away from it, to embrace a charge rather than run from it,” he writes. “In other words, don’t run from the problem; run towards it and defuse it. Don’t evade; invade.  Embrace it, undermine its relevance, and take the wind out of its sails.” [2]

In an effort to evaluate my position under the fire of critical scrutiny, I have recently begun engaging in a series of debates on Problem of Evil arguments for atheism, where my opponent is invited to defend whatever version thereof he or she feels best proves the non-existence of God. This article shall examine the first of these debates, which took place at the Debate.org web site. [3] As these debates conclude, at that site or some other location (e.g., message board, email, etc.), I will post another article here at the Aristophrenium evaluating the results thereof. Until it is defeated—assuming it even can be—I will continue to maintain my resolution, that “there are literally no versions of the Problem of Evil argument that succeed at proving the non-existence of God.”

Note: In all my arguments, on this and any other matter, the term ‘God’ always refers to God as revealed in Christian scripture canon (viz. the 39 books of the Old Testament and 27 books of the New Testament) and possessing all the commonly recognized attributes thereof (e.g., trinitarian, omnipotent, righteous, sovereign, etc.). I have no interest in defending, nor do I even recognize the legitimacy of, any deity other than the God of Christian theism.

Read the rest of this entry

Mitchell LeBlanc, owner of UrbanPhilosophy.net and Philosophy of Religion student at University of Toronto, has recently proposed “A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence,” which is basically a slight reformulation of an argument presented by Michael Martin about twenty years ago, [1] wherein LeBlanc simply replaces all instances of “omniscient” with “triune” instead. In this argument he attempts to prove that God does not exist—indeed cannot exist—by reason of a logical contradiction. Whether or not his argument achieves its aim shall be the subject of this brief article.

Although I will not be analyzing Martin’s argument directly here, I will be doing so indirectly since LeBlanc’s argument is essentially identical to it; therefore, any criticism that applies to one will apply to the other. The argument LeBlanc constructs is as follows:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune.

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune.

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

What LeBlanc is attempting to argue for here is that God possesses attributes which logically contradict each other. To fashion an argument which proves that God cannot exist is something of a Holy Grail to many atheists, and continues to be every bit as elusive as that mysterious chalice. In this argument LeBlanc reaches out to grasp it but finds only air, for his argument commits a substantial error in reasoning.

Given the first two premises (which must be given, as we are confronting orthodox Christian theism), his third premise ought never obtain; i.e., in order to obtain (3) LeBlanc is forced to contradict (1) and (2)!

How so? Consider what it is that (3) asserts: that God necessarily can bring about some X such that it was brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune. But given (2) which defines omnipotence as being able to “bring about any logically possible state of affairs,” and given (1) which defines God as “necessarily triune” (it is not logically possible for God to not be triune), we therefore observe that (3) contradicts these very premises—so that it is not God who vanishes in a puff of contradiction but rather LeBlanc’s argument.

[1] Martin, Michael. Atheism: A philosophical justification (1990), pg. 310, as cited by LeBlanc.