Transcendental Argument for God: Mitchell LeBlanc, Pt. 1
Posted by RyftDec 13
Over at UrbanPhilosophy.net is a Philosophy of Religion student from the University of Toronto, Mitchell LeBlanc, who has been endeavouring to make a case against presuppositional apologetics. Coursing a new direction from his original first three drafts, [1] perhaps due to the daunting scope of such a task or perhaps due to the criticisms from Chris Bolt and others at ChoosingHats.com, [2] the final draft version of the article [3] targets the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) as argued for by the late philosopher Greg L. Bahnsen from Covenant Media Foundation.
As did his mentor Cornelius Van Til, Bahnsen defended the transcendental argument as singularly the only cogent and self-consistent Christian apologetic method by virtue of being uniquely grounded upon the distinctive presuppositions of revelational epistemology. [4] Van Til’s extensive work is considered by some to be a contribution to Christian philosophy of Copernican dimensions, [5] wherein he demonstrated by indirect proof the existence of God as the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of reality and the human experience thereof, such that God, as affirmed by Christian orthodoxy, is not a conclusion drawn from rational argument (evidentialism) but is logically prior to any reasoning at all (presuppositionalism). [6] As Van Til framed the matter in his An Introduction to Systematic Theology, “Unless God exists as ultimate [and] self-subsistent, we could not even know anything; we could not even reason that God must exist, nor could we even ask a question about God.” [7]
LeBlanc at this point holds a considered view that the TAG is not merely debatable but in fact false, taking as his point of evaluation the fundamental laws of logic, concluding that they “cannot depend on the Christian God” and therefore the TAG “is not sound”—and must remain so “pending further defense” thereof. His bold conclusion notwithstanding, we may inquire with skepticism whether or not LeBlanc really has successfully defeated the TAG as it already stands, never mind its further defense.
The TAG syllogism
LeBlanc constructs the TAG in the following logical form—
(1) P
(2) If ¬Q, then ¬P
(3) Therefore, Q
—where the logical symbol P stands for the proposition “logic exists” and Q stands for the proposition “God exists.” In this way the argument posits that God is the necessary precondition for the reality and nature of logic. Since his form seems a strange complication of the argument, I suggest a more perspicuous form, modus ponens—
(4) If P, then Q.
(5) P.
(6) Therefore, Q.
—where the symbols stand for the same propositions, so that it argues—
(4’) If logic exists, then God exists.
(5’) Logic exists.
(6’) Therefore, God exists.
In order to explain how the argument works, LeBlanc uses the example of the famous ‘cogito’ from Rene Descartes, the well-known “I think; therefore, I am.” If we change the symbols so that P stands for the proposition “I am thinking” and Q stands for “I exist,” then we can see that the logical form modus ponens corresponds well with the analysis that he has proposed. As we can observe, and LeBlanc honestly concedes, the TAG is formally valid. So he questions, then, whether or not it is sound, and concludes that it is not. Let us see if his argument is itself valid and sound.
The critique of the TAG
LeBlanc centers his criticism on the first premise, as he is not about to deny the reality of the laws of logic (such as the law of non-contradiction). So how does he go about defeating the first premise?
Unfortunately, he does so by engaging in a vein of question-begging that John Frame obviated in his informal debate with Michael Martin and the “Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God” (TANG). Just as Martin did, LeBlanc simply assumes the truth of the very thing he said he would prove, a feat that is neither impressive nor rational to any thinking person. He takes as his tool of analysis an hypothetical world view called Fristianity, [8] which is supposedly identical to Christianity in every respect but one, viz. that God “is a quadrinity rather than a trinity.” The problem should be immediately obvious: the TAG argues that it is God as affirmed by Christian orthodoxy who is the necessary precondition for the reality and nature of logic. What LeBlanc did was simply beg the question on the first premise, asserting that God as such is not the necessary precondition thereof. It would seem that he is unaware of the fact that if something is almost identical to Q, then it is not identical to Q (i.e., ¬Q), a fact which proves the error in his reasoning straight away:
(7) If P, then ¬Q.
(8) P.
(9) Therefore, ¬Q.
As Frame noted to Martin, who asserted that one can deny the God of Christian orthodoxy while affirming the law of contradiction: “True in regard to these two statements taken in themselves. But if logic cannot exist without God, then to deny that God exists while affirming the law of contradiction is like denying the existence of the sun while affirming the existence of its rays. Of course, you will deny my view that logic cannot exist without God. But that is what we are debating, and you should not therefore beg that question” (emphasis mine). Because LeBlanc’s argument is based upon such an elementary fallacy it may be dismissed as plainly invalid.
A logical Euthyphro dilemma
LeBlanc later turns his attention to Martin’s TANG and a certain rebuttal from Frame toward it, setting up what he considers to be an equivalent of the Euthyphro dilemma on the issue of logic and constructed as follows:
Does God think in a certain way because it is logical to do so, or is thinking in a certain way logical because God does it? If the first horn of the dilemma holds, it seems clear that logical principles exist independently of God. If the second horn of the dilemma holds, logical principles seem to be under the whim of God, meaning that God could change them.
Here again LeBlanc wanders into fallacious territory by again ignoring Frame while stuffing his argument full of straw. In the face of Frame identifying the “eternal nature” of the God of Christian orthodoxy (cf. divine simplicity) as the ground of logical order, LeBlanc nevertheless suggests that it is possible for God to change his nature, by which he therefore invokes a ¬Q straw man. That is bad enough in itself, but worse still if it gets pressed into service because that would, as identified a moment ago, simply beg the question of our debate (i.e., by asserting as logically possible that God could change his nature, LeBlanc is assuming the truth of the very thing to be proved, namely, that logic can be contemplated independently of God).
But perhaps LeBlanc has done the Christian philosopher a favour by comparing this dilemma to that discussed between Socrates and Euthyphro. In the same way that the Euthyphro dilemma commits the bifurcation fallacy on the moral question, [9] so too does LeBlanc’s dilemma here because it fails to present or account for a third option, which may be stated in the following way: “Logical order is grounded in the very nature and character of God and expressed revelationally in his works and word”—harkening our attention back to the controlling fact that the TAG is uniquely based upon the distinctive Christian presuppositions of revelational epistemology.
The asymmetric relationship
LeBlanc draws upon a counterfactual semantic that he cites from Matthew Davidson which states that “any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition.” But for some reason he interprets this to mean that since the proposition “logical principles do not exist” is necessarily false, this somehow “counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.” But is this so? Evidently not, for that necessarily false proposition does not counterfactually imply the proposition “Steve orders pizza every Tuesday.” Rather, a logical counterfactual is properly understood as a logically inverted proposition, such that ¬P being necessarily false counterfactually implies P.
Ironically, this is a way of describing the impossibility of the contrary and makes the case further for the TAG. Michael Butler and others have argued that the TAG does not establish the necessity of the God of Christian orthodoxy by somehow “inductively refuting each and every possible non-Christian world view” (such as ¬P1, ¬P2, …n) but instead contends that any world view which “denies the Christian view of God” (that is, any ¬P) is shown to be impossible by an internal critique of its own self-defeating, arbitrary, and inadequate terms when it comes to satisfying the criteria of a precondition. As Butler notes along with Bahnsen and others, “There is, at bottom, one non-Christian world view and this world view is easily reduced to absurdity” (emphasis mine). [10] That one non-Christian world view, ¬P, is of course the denial of Christian presuppositions of revelational epistemology, or the Christian view of God. Corresponding to the counterfactual semantic that LeBlanc drew our attention to,
(10) Either it is the case that P, or it is the case that ¬P.
(11) It is not the case, necessarily, that ¬P.
(12) Therefore, it is the case that P.
LeBlanc could move to deny the first premise; but, as Butler indicates, in order to do so he must show that the first premise might not be a disjunction of a contradiction, which seems an enormously difficult task given the self-evident strength of the laws of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction. Consider the point carefully: any denial of the proposition P, no matter how it is constructed, if it is “not identical to P,” then it is necessarily “¬P.”
Incidentally, LeBlanc argues that “if logical principles did not exist, neither would God; thus, God depends on logical principles for his existence.” But that is a brutal straw man mistake, for the TAG argues that logical order is grounded in the very nature and character of God and expressed revelationally in his works and word. In other words, the reason why God would not exist if logical principles did not is because the latter is grounded in his very nature and character, making LeBlanc’s point here tantamount to arguing that “not identical to P” can somehow be “identical to P.”
If logical principles did not exist, then God would not exist, for logical principles are grounded in the very nature and character of God (without which God would be not-God); i.e., God depends on himself for his existence (cf. aseity).
References:
[1] LeBlanc, Mitchell. “The Case Against Presuppositionalism” (13/Oct/09), “Part II” (23/Oct/09), and “Part III” (30/Oct/09). UrbanPhilosophy.net.
[2] Bolt, Chris. “No Place to Stand” (7/Dec/09). ChoosingHats.com. See also: “No Place to Stand, Part II” (8/Dec/09), “Lost in a Sea of Subjectivism” (8/Dec/09), and “A Brief Word on the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God” (10/Dec/09).
[3] LeBlanc, Mitchell. “The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God” (8/Dec/09). UrbanPhilosophy.net.
[4] Van Til, Cornelius. “Survey of Christian Epistemology.” In Defense of the Faith, Vol. II (1969); Bahnsen, Greg L. Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (1998); Pratt, Richard L. Every Thought Captive: A Study Manual for the Defense of Christian Truth (1979); Oliphint, K. Scott and Lane G. Lipton eds., Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics (2007).
[5] Frame, John M. “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” in Gary North ed., Foundations of Christian Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective (1979), as noted by Ian Clary in his “Introduction to Presuppositionalism.”
[6] Collett, Don. “Van Til and Transcendental Argument,” in K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Lipton eds., Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics (2007). This book is highly recommended. In addition to Collett, there are such contributors as John Frame, Richard Gaffin and Moises Silva.
[7] Van Til, Cornelius. An Introduction to Systematic Theology (1974).
[8] Choi, Sean. “The Transcendental Argument,” in Norman Geisler and Chad Meister eds., Reasons for Faith: Making a Case for the Christian Faith (2007), as cited by LeBlanc.
[9] See my article “The Euthyphro Dilemma.”
[10] cf. Förster, Eckart. “How Are Transcendental Arguments Possible?” in Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl eds., Reading Kant: New perspectives on transcendental arguments and critical philosophy (1989).
For further reading:
The following are articles I have discovered and read over the years on presuppositional apologetics and may prove useful to readers of The Aristophrenium:
Anderson, James N. “If Knowledge, Then God: The epistemological theistic arguments of Plantinga and Van Til.” Calvin Theological Journal 40:1 (April 2005), 49-75. PDF copy at Proginosko.com.
Anderson, James N. “The Theistic Preconditions of Knowledge: A thumbnail sketch.” Proginosko.com.
Anderson, James N. “Van Til: Frequently Encountered Misconceptions.” VanTil.info.
Henebury, Paul M. “Presuppositional Apologetics: An Introduction, Part 1,” “Part 2” and “Part 3.” These articles were published at Henebury’s blog (DrReluctant) at WordPress.com.
Clary, Ian. “Introduction to Presuppositionalism.” This was a paper submitted by Clary for his apologetics course under Professor Stephen Wellum at Toronto Baptist Seminary.
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10 comments
Pingback by Ryft Braeloch’s Response To Mitch LeBlanc Regarding TAG | Choosing Hats on 13 Dec 2009 at 14:41
[...] Braeloch at The Aristophrenium has written Part 1 of a response to Mitch LeBlanc’s article “The Transcendental Argument for the [...]
Comment by ZaoThanatoo on 13 Dec 2009 at 16:31
A very succinct but thorough criticism of a rather sophomoric misapprehension of Van Tillian presuppositionalism. Cheers!
Pingback by Ryft on “The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God” | Urban Philosophy on 13 Dec 2009 at 23:03
[...] Smart, who goes by the handle Ryft Braeloch at The Aristophrenium has authored a response to my paper, “The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God.” In his response he [...]
Comment by Dawson Bethrick on 17 Dec 2009 at 09:52
In my analysis of the presuppositionalist claim that logic presupposes the Christian god (either its existence, its nature, or both), I have found no good reasons to suppose that this is the case, and I’ve detailed a number of reasons why it is not and cannot be the case. If my analysis is correct (and I’ve seen no responses to it, not even a bad one), then the logic version of TAG has been summarily refuted.
Regards,
Dawson Bethrick
Comment by Ryft on 18 Dec 2009 at 03:07
Really, Bethrick? Because your argument has not been proven false, it is therefore true? That is what you are going with? From the fact that your argument has not been proven false, one can conclude only that it has not been proven false—given one who is reasoning logically, of course.
Comment by Dawson Bethrick on 18 Dec 2009 at 05:06
Ryft: “Because your argument has not been proven false, it is therefore true?”
I nowhere argued this. That you interpreted my statement in this manner says quite a bit.
Regardless, I have answered the logic version of TAG. How would you defend against it?
One of the issues I point out in my analysis is the fact that logic is a conceptual method, and therefore that an account for logic requires a theory of concepts. Christianity has no theory of concepts. How can Christianity account for a conceptual method when it has no theory of concepts in the first place? There are numerous other problems that I raise as well. They are not even anticipated in the literature.
I’m glad these aren’t my problems.
Regards,
Dawson
Comment by Ryft on 18 Dec 2009 at 22:15
You did argue this, Bethrick. The TAG has been refuted only if your argument is correct. And you are observed as stating here that the TAG has indeed been refuted, which means your argument must be correct.
But is it? Since you have not seen any responses to it, not even bad ones, how is it that your argument is found to be correct, such that the TAG has been refuted? The only way such a conclusion can follow is by argumentum ad ignorantiam—it is correct by virtue of having not been proven false—a very basic fallacy.
Comment by Dawson Bethrick on 18 Dec 2009 at 22:47
Kindly show where I *argued* this.
Indeed, there are numerous arguments in my piece. I hold that they are correct, and I argue for them in my analysis. Where is your refutation? None that I see.
My arguments stand on their own merits. I give detailed reasons in support of my verdicts.
Again, let me ask: how can you account for logic when you have no theory of concepts? Perhaps you have no answer to this and are trying to deflect the issue. Since this question has been posed to you now, what is your answer? How do you account for concepts? Or do you?
Yes, it is.
An argument does not need attempted refutations in response to it in order for one to recognize that its conclusion has been soundly established. I’d think that even you would understand this. But perhaps not. At any rate, the answer to your question is in my analysis. Have you read it?
If my argument were “TAG is false because no one has refuted my answer to it,” you might be able to claim this. But that’s not my argument, and you’ve not shown where I’ve presented such an argument. All I did in my initial comment was observe that I’ve seen no responses to my analysis. That you interpret this to constitute an argument ad ignorantiam only tells me that you’re afraid to deal with the issues I raise in my analysis. Otherwise, you wouldn’t be evading them like this.
Regards,
Dawson
Comment by Ryft on 19 Dec 2009 at 01:04
First, unfortunately Bethrick chooses to simply ignore my rebuttal. Despite having taken the time to show where and how he committed the fallacy indicated, Bethrick pretends I did not and asks me to show the very thing I already showed. Since I am confident that our readers took note of and understood my rebuttal, I shall not bother to entertain his tiresome round-and-round. One can lead a man to reason but one cannot make him think.
Second, Bethrick said that his argument “does not need attempted refutations in response to it in order for one to recognize that its conclusion has been soundly established” (emphasis mine). Despite this impressive estimation Bethrick has of his own argument, the rational person must firmly disagree with him here. Is his argument even valid, much less sound? Without any critical analysis to speak of, there is nothing whatever available to us but a brute ipse dixit from Bethrick that it is both. However, it is not to be found anywhere in philosophical literature that his bald say-so is the criterion for establishing validity or soundness. So the rational person must disagree with him: a critical analysis of his argument is precisely what is needed in order to recognize that it is sound. (As our readers probably realize, an argument is ‘sound’ when, first, it is formally valid and, second, its premises are true. With nothing but Bethrick’s say-so, how is one to know that it is either?)
The TAG is refuted only if Bethrick’s extensive argument is correct, an argument which, in the absence of any critical analysis thereof, we have no reason to think is either valid or sound other than his pointing to its mere existence and his brute ipse dixit that it is both. Does that strike any reader as compelling reason? I certainly hope not.
Third, give some attention to the sort of rhetoric that Bethrick employs in his responses here. For instance, with regard to his ‘concepts’ argument that I have ignored, he injects such bellicose remarks as “perhaps you have no answer” and that I am “trying to deflect the issue”—as though it has ever been a live debate between us. Also, with regard to my identifying the indicated fallacy, he says this tells him that I am “afraid” to confront his cited argument against the TAG—again, as though it has ever been a live debate between us. Surely the readers of The Aristophrenium never mistake such bellicose rhetoric for rational discourse.
Bethrick will no doubt respond to this. However, unless his anticipated response contains something relevant, substantive, and rational, I am going to let him have the last word. Also, if any of our readers need some point or issue to be addressed from the aforementioned dialogue, please feel free to submit it below and I will address it. Barring either of these two things, I am finished with this.
Comment by Dawson Bethrick on 19 Dec 2009 at 22:35
Ryft, or whatever your name is, you have not shown that I *argued* that my analysis is correct *because* I’ve seen no responses to it. If that’s how you interpreted my initial comment, you were wrong. I’ve read my initial comment again and do not see how you could have honestly gotten the impression that I was seriously proposing such an argument. You do admit when you’ve been wrong, do you not?
I do not know what your other readers will see, but what I see is that you have chosen to focus on your own misrepresentation of a statement I have made, treating a parenthetical observation of mine as if it were my primary argument, instead of examining my detailed analysis of the presuppositionalist claim that logic presupposes the Christian god. So far, like other presuppositionalists who’ve been told about my interaction with the logic version of TAG, you have offered no challenge to my many criticisms. So much for your elenctic apologetics.
You express sharp disagreement with the view that “an argument does not need attempted refutations in response to it in order for one to recognize that its conclusion has been soundly established.” Specifically, you stated that “the rational person must firmly disagree with” this. Can you cite any logic text which states that an argument does need attempted refutations in response to it in order for one to recognize that its conclusion has been soundly established? I’ve consulted several and have found no such requirement affirmed in any of them.
You ask whether or not my arguments are “valid, much less sound.” If you and/or your readers truly want an answer to the question that you pose here, my analysis is available for all to review.
You then state that “Without any critical analysis to speak of, there is nothing whatever available to us but a brute ipse dixit from Bethrick that it is both.” But I have provided this critical analysis that you require. Have you examined it? To suggest that I’m resting on “a brute ipse dixit” ignores the fact that I’ve produced my arguments for my verdicts in the site that I’ve linked. Is it a habit of yours to ignore opposing arguments in this manner?
Apparently so, for you then stated that “it is not to be found anywhere in philosophical literature that his bald say-so is the criterion for establishing validity or soundness.” Indeed, I have not rested my verdicts about the logic version of TAG on my “bald say-so.” I’ve already linked you to my arguments for those verdicts.
You then state: “a critical analysis of his argument is precisely what is needed in order to recognize that it is sound.” And by providing the link to my analysis, I have invited you to conduct such an analysis. Of course, you do understand that there’s a difference between an analysis and an attempted refutation, do you not?
Then you stated: “As our readers probably realize, an argument is ‘sound’ when, first, it is formally valid and, second, its premises are true.” Indeed, this is true. Notice that you yourself have not included attempted refutations as a criterion for soundness.
Then you state: “With nothing but Bethrick’s say-so, how is one to know that it is either?” But you have more than my mere say-so. I have provided you with a link to my arguments. Perhaps you did not see this link originally? It’s unclear how else to explain your kicking against the pricks here.
You go on, saying: “with regard to his ‘concepts’ argument that I have ignored, he injects such bellicose remarks as ‘perhaps you have no answer’ and that I am ‘trying to deflect the issue’.” Yes, I did notice that you have ignored my ‘concepts’ argument. But that won’t make it go away. Maybe you don’t have an answer. I suspect you don’t, and that’s why you’re ignoring it. But really, how do you expect to account for aspects of conceptual cognition such as logic when your worldview has no theory of concepts? Pointing to something that is merely imaginary will not suffice. Also, pointing to something that is internally self-contradictory, as the doctrines of the incarnation and the trinity prove themselves to be, as the basis for logic, is simply ludicrous.
I’m guessing that in spite of your flurry of self-embarrassing remarks, you’ll still look for a way to ignore my rebuttal to presuppositionalism’s case for logic depending on the Christian god while seeking to disparage me personally. After all, that is the presuppositionalist’s stock and trade.
Regards,
Dawson