As for Aristotle, let me ask you three questions to stimulate your thinking, stemming from three problems dogging his theory. First, how does he escape the naturalistic fallacy (see G.E. Moore), of attempting to prove a claim about ethics by appealing to a definition of “good” in terms of one or more natural properties (in this case, eudaimonia or human flourishing)?

Second—and a related problem—does Aristotle tell us how to convert a descriptive sociological statement into a prescriptive moral statement (framed as the ‘is-ought’ problem; see David Hume)? You are probably aware that Aristotle never bothered with proving eudaimonia as the highest good (prescriptive moral statement; ‘ought’); he simply assumed it as such, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy admits, thinking that “everyone will agree” that it fits the bill (descriptive sociological statement; ‘is’).

Third, how does Aristotle’s theory avoid spiraling into individual subjectivist ethics? Even if taken as an absolute formal principle, eudaimonia in itself does not provide the content necessary to serve as a material principle or action guide. When material content is given to flesh out this notion, “the resulting action guides become relative to the values, interests and desires of each individual,” notes James Moreland. The notion of happiness and flourishing is that which “each individual freely, autonomously chooses for himself or herself.” The action guide formed by giving material content (what it is to have or pursue eudaimonia) to the formal principle (eudaimonia itself) spirals into subjectivism on account of being determined by individual preferences, in virtue of there being no way to evaluate objectively some understandings of eudaimonia over others.

Incidentally, I have not said that “no atheistic system of metaethics is logically valid.” I have said they are in various ways either unintelligible or inconsistent. I am not concerned with the logical form of their arguments (validity) so much as the coherence thereof, with either the terms being used and their relationships to each other or the general ability of their theories to describe and account for real human experience. For example, the following argument is logically valid but incoherent: (1) All cats are amphibians. (2) All amphibians are made of wood. (3) Therefore, all cats are made of wood. “Logically valid” is a rudimentary concern at best.

As to the critique of Aristotle, it certainly does make the claim you suggest, viz. that an act is good because it attains happiness, and that happiness is good. This does not rest on a hidden assumption, as you seem to suggest, but rather an argument is presented for the idea of happiness as the highest good.

Specifically, Aristotle outlines the idea that a good is that which is sought, and the highest good is that for the sake of which all other things are sought and which is never sought for the sake of another thing. This is more or less consistent with the view many hold of ethics; i.e., that ethics is relative to a goal. Aristotle takes this a step further by claiming that, in spite of this, there is a goal which is universally sought—that being the highest good, happiness.

I suspect you’re already aware of the arguments he gives to support that particular choice for the highest good, and I’m unsure about the flaw you suggested (that we do not know the value of the consequent). He presents an argument for the value of the consequent. I may be misunderstanding your criticism, however.

An additional point stands, in that your assertion that no atheistic system of metaethics is logically valid seems at this point to stand on the ground of (a) refuting every known particular counterfactual and (b) assuming that there are no others. Unless there’s a logical argument for the universal claim that atheistic metaethical systems are inherently flawed, I can’t see this argument ending in a convincing way.

I can, however (now that I think about it), see the possible goal of arguing that a theistic metaethics is the only coherent metaethics that we know of, and pragmatically adopting it on this basis—as floundering around on the assumption that there may be some other theory is absurd. However, this seems like a weaker conclusion than you are pursuing.

Now, about this particular issue. Despite my tremendous admiration of Dallas Willard, I find myself in the uncomfortable position of having to respectfully disagree with his assessment. Willard and his recommended reading has given you the impression that a theory of metaethics does not have to be theistic. Well, that is true in a way—as you said, theists do not have “a monopoly on viable metaethical systems.” I would interject with the clarifying point that only one theism holds such a monopoly, that of Christ Jesus. Not theists generically. You used to believe that, and you were right.

Myself, I would not criticize Willard too sharply because I realize that his area of expertise is epistemology, which is a rather different field than metaethics. He is right, in that metaethics is non-existent without metaphysics, because a purely naturalist worldview inescapably results in Nihilism. But he is mistaken in his assessment that it does not have to be theistic. It does; specifically, Christian theism. As a result of your study, you feel that “there are logically valid systems of ethics” that are not theistic, and for an example you pointed at a consequentialist theory (happiness/eudaimonia). But it is actually not logically valid.

Under this theory, an action is said to have the value of its consequent. If some action produces in Smith a feeling of happiness—e.g., paying him a compliment—that informs us about Smith’s emotive state only. It tells us nothing about the value of the action, because we have not justified the value of his emotive state. Ponder this a moment. We want to say that X is good because it makes Smith happy. But what is the value of Smith being happy? Well, it has not been addressed. The problem that inheres in consequentialist theories is that it does not help us decide the moral value of the consequent: (a) if an action is said to have the value of its consequent, (b) and we do not know the value of the consequent, (c) then we cannot know the value of the action that produced it. And the value of the consequent must be justified, because it is not logically valid to beg the question.

As for why Christianity has “a better answer” to Euthyphro, it is because its theory of metaethics avoids both horns of his dilemma. It does not assert that a thing is good in virtue of God commanding it (which is arbitrary and therefore meaningless), nor does it assert that God commands a thing in virtue of it being good (implying a moral law that God himself is subject to). Rather, Christianity asserts that the ground of moral order is found in the very nature of God, which he expresses prescriptively in his commands. (And the force of the argument is amplified by the fact that God is also eternal, pure actuality, and unchanging.) When the Scriptures assert that God is good, it is providing an ontological statement, not a moral analysis.

Just thought I’d weigh in as a philosopher and Christian. I don’t mean to be divisive or betray the unified front or suchlike, but I figure we can all benefit from a discussion of the truth, even where we disagree on some parts.

I don’t think theists have a monopoly on viable metaethical systems, to be honest. I did a few years back, and was actually interested in writing up a logical proof of why any properly justified ethical system had to be theistic. Not having a proper grasp of the terminology at the time, I went to my professor—a fairly well-known Christian by the name of Dallas Willard—hoping for some discussion of the idea, and started by saying, “So, isn’t it true that any proper system of ethics must be based on metaphysics?”

He replied, “Yes, certainly. You can’t make statements about what you should do without having some knowledge about the nature of being. However, it doesn’t have to be theistic metaphysics. I suggest you go read Aristotle and some of the Stoics, such as Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, for an effective ethical system that doesn’t rely on theism.”

So I went to read those, in the hopes of picking apart their arguments. To be honest, I didn’t find much in the way of careful logical reasoning in the works of the Stoics I read (although I do like their conclusions), but in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics he gives a rather good argument for happiness (Gk. eudaimonia) as the foundation of ethics. I actually agree with him on this, and suspect it coincides with God’s commands—God’s actions are dictated by nothing but his own character, which is Love. Because He loves us, he seeks true happiness for us. However, that’s something of a side note. The point is that there are logically valid systems of ethics which aren’t founded necessarily in theism.

I’d also be interested in hearing why you feel Christianity has a better answer to the Euthyphro dilemma than other religions. You may well be right; I’m just curious because I hadn’t heard it before and would love to know more.

Now that all that disagreement and questioning is out of the way, I do agree that many atheists do not personally have a system of metaethics, even though it is logically possible for them to. However, I suspect this is less a matter of their ethical positions being actually less tenable, and more a matter of not having looked too closely at their own position. People can, to some extent, get away with not thinking too carefully about a clearly codified system of metaethics that they subscribe to. It has been reasoned out, just not by them. An atheist will often not be subscribing to any pre-existing system, and their own personal system may not have considered all the details.

But where complications enter and create significant problems is when metaethics (meta+ethics) gets addressed, which is what my criticism targets; namely, the system that allows both questions to be answered intelligibly, by supplying the content that gives moral statements meaning. Without a valid and coherent metaethic, one’s moral positions are tantamount to superstition (which Wikipedia defines basically as “a belief or notion not based on reason or knowledge”), such that a moral statement or stance is arrived at as if by magic. They have no explanation for where it came from—it is intellectually unintelligible—and there are those who are content to live superstitiously, indifferent to living rationally.

Now if someone does have a theory of metaethics, then there is an even thornier concern of dissonance if it is systemically inconsistent with their moral stance, such that an evaluation of their theory produces results that actually do not square with their moral sense, which it was supposed to account for. For example, they act as though certain things are bad in an objective way, yet their proposed theory does not produce an objective morality (dissonance).

When it comes to most non-Christian positions (whether religious or not), one of those two issues plague them, while some non-Christian positions (e.g., Judaism and Islam) might have an otherwise coherent metaethic if it were not for Euthyphro’s two-horned dilemma that derails them. Utilitarianism, which you mentioned, provides a broad and convenient narrative, but it is dogged by problems so serious that it fails to qualify as a coherent metaethic—the naturalistic fallacy, for starters, and it gets worse from there.

P.S. I can’t wait to see this essay you’ve been contemplating.

I am very glad to hear you say that atheism (noun) isn’t a worldview, but that worldviews can be atheistic (adjective). I think I can go along with that a long way. Speaking for myself (which is really the only thing I can do), I’m very concerned with morality. What I mean is, I’m very concerned about being moral, and that others are moral too, and I’m less concerned with why I should be. I am interested in it, and I subscribe to a utilitarian (?) philosophy of morality, but I freely and frankly admit that I have nowhere near the philosophical chutzpah to firmly ground that.

P.S. Yes, we should get back to that argument. Recall, I admitted tentative defeat and conceded to you that the argument from the problem of evil compelled me on other than purely rational grounds, so I’m genuinely not sure if it’s a rational argument or not. More on this in an upcoming essay I’ve been chewing in my mind for the past few days.

First, if we take into consideration the fact that I have studied multiple religions of the world and philosophy at some length, and have engaged in numerous debates on this and other subjects, I think you can be assured that that my statement was not glib; although without the benefit of seeing such homework, I can see how one might think it was.

I can think of a number of worldviews that attempt to account for morality, but I stand by my statement that none enjoy the success that Christian theism has. To the extent that I have examined other worldviews on this question, they all suffer from one of three problems: their explanation either fails to adequately account for morality qua morality (for any one of several reasons) or it gets snagged by one of the two horns of Euthyphro’s confounding dilemma.

Second, I have not imputed only one worldview on the non-believer. Not by any means. I fully realize and acknowledge that there are countless worldviews non-believers can adhere to. However, I do claim that the non-believer’s worldview—in whatever form it takes—fails to account for morality qua morality. On the one hand, their worldview may attempt a moral theory or, on the other hand, it may simply ignore the moral question altogether (e.g., I personally know several atheists who don’t feel any pressing need to find an explanation for their moral compass); either way fails the test. Precisely how it fails depends rather directly on which worldview is under examination.

Third, my argument never, ever considers ‘atheism’ as one of these worldviews—because atheism is not a worldview. Although worldviews can be atheistic, atheism in itself is not a worldview.

P.S. I’m still looking forward to the day we can go back to the Problem of Evil (or Suffering) argument and why on earth you think it has rational force. (I readily concede its irrational force.) I have never had a conversation more enjoyable than that one with you.

Second, you propose that Christians are the only ones who can (intelligibly?) account for morality, becuase Christians think we (humans) are created in the image of God. Perhaps this was glib of you. Can you think of no other group of people (excluding atheists, of course) who can account for morality?

Thirdly, you are quite right (I think) when you say that “at the same time they seem unaware that such beliefs are not produced by their worldview, a cognitive deficit brought into sharp focus when they attempt to defend their moral stance by reaching into their worldview for the necessary currency and finding none”. However, I think you are making a mistake by (implicitly) imputing only one worldview on the non-believer. An atheist may also be a number of other things. For instance, I think morality is immensely important, and although I can’t give an explanation in terms of absolutes and ultimates, I can explain it in terms of suffering (physical, psychological, sociological): That which increases suffering is probably evil, that which descreases suffering is probably good. So, while I cannot find moral coins by fumbling in my atheism purse, I have lots of other purses through which to fumble (and, fumbling as I do, the only purse I can think of that could conceivably do the job for me is my humanism purse).