LAST UPDATED: 7 September 2009

PREFACE: The following article was originally published in three different places, two which died internet deaths and one that still exists as an inactive blog. [1] Shortly after publication it caught the attention of Austin Reed Cline, a Regional Director for the Council for Secular Humanism and editor of the Atheism section of the About.com site, who published an excoriating and profoundly inaccurate review thereof. [2]

I invited Cline to interact with me on the subject because I intended to compose a rebuttal and wanted his input before publication; I also asked if he would be willing to provide a link to my rebuttal. On both counts he refused, and with some rather insulting remarks. So I had to complete my rebuttal without any input from Cline. Unfortunately that rebuttal was published at one of those now-dead locations, a web site that died when my hosting company went out of business.

I am republishing the original article here along with a new rebuttal against Cline (which I will finish by this weekend) for the thoughtful consideration of our readers and members. Please feel free to weigh in with your thoughts on my original point, on Cline’s review, and on my rebuttal.

Original Article (27/Jan/2005):

The really frustrating thing about most atheists, at least those who enjoy debating against Christian theism, is that they presuppose the truth of their system of belief and then tacitly insist their Christian opponent work within the framework of that system. In other words, the Christian is expected to provide arguments in defense of Christian theism which accord with the atheist’s epistemology in particular and world view in general. This is implicitly demonstrated in challenges such as, "Provide evidence that God exists." The relevance of evidence, and even what constitutes evidence, are defined by his system of thought.

However, if it is permissible for the atheist to presuppose the truth of his system of thought and expect the Christian to work within the framework of that system, then it is also permissible for the inverse of that situation. Otherwise, the atheist would shoulder the epistemic responsibility for explaining why the only presuppositions permitted in the field of debate are his own—and I would not anticipate a rational argument for that.


Critical Review by Austin Cline (09/Feb/2005):

Click here to read.

Rebuttal Against Cline: (16/Aug/2009)

THE NATURE OF THE ARROGANCE

It is both obvious and clear that Austin Cline grossly misunderstood my argument. For example, his opening paragraph begins with the question, "Are atheists arrogant for insisting that theists support their claims before accepting them as true?" Cline describes it as an "unusual" way to demonstrate the arrogance of atheism, proving that his attempted rebuttal missed the force of my argument entirely—which had nothing to do with atheists insisting that theistic claims be supported but rather how they insist those claims be supported.

That is to say, the arrogance of atheism is proven by atheists who "presuppose the truth of their system of belief and then tacitly insist their Christian opponent work within the framework of that system" while prohibiting by fiat any competing epistemic structure in the field of debate. The force of my argument is found in the following juxtaposition:

If it is permissible and valid for

the Atheist to presuppose the truth of his system of thought and expect the Christian to work within the framework of that system,

then it is equally permissible and valid for

the Christian to presuppose the truth of his system of thought and expect the Atheist to work within the framework of that system.

If an atheist disagrees with this—Cline included—then he shoulders "the epistemic responsibility for explaining why the only presuppositions permitted in the field of debate are his own," for which no rational argument can actually be anticipated.

When Cline says, "Ryft doesn’t like being held to the standard of having to provide evidence for his claims," he could not possibly get it more wrong. His rebuttal is an intellectual disaster. What I dislike is having an atheist shove his beliefs down my throat, which he does by pretending that his is the only legitimate epistemic structure while at the same time prohibiting, by his sacrosanct fiat, every other from the field of debate.

The epistemic structure of Christian theism has exactly equal validity as the one affirmed by the atheist. And the atheist cannot present an argument against this which presupposes the truth of his epistemic structure lest he commits the logical fallacy of Begging the Question.

THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE

Cline suggests that it is legitimate or fair to question the nature of evidence expected for some claim, and then attempts to assert that "trying to exempt one’s own personal god-claims from a standard used pretty much all the rest of the time in other situations is an example of the Special Pleading fallacy."

Wrong. This fallacy is committed only when "someone argues that a case is an exception to a rule based upon an irrelevant characteristic that does not define an exception" (FallacyFiles.org; emphasis added). Empirical claims require empirical evidence; however, God-claims are not empirical claims. To demand that empirical evidence be provided for non-empirical claims is to commit a gross categorical error. It is akin to someone demanding that the Law of Non-Contradiction (a non-empirical claim) be proved with empirical evidence. The nature of evidence must correspond to the nature of the claim.

CONCLUSION

The arrogance of atheism is not proven by atheists demanding that theists support their claims. It is proven by their vituperative denial that competing epistemic structures have exactly equal validity, whereby they shove their beliefs down other people’s throats by pretending that theirs is the only legitimate epistemic structure while at the same time prohibiting or disallowing—by empty fiat—every other from the field of debate.

And it is irrational to expect non-empirical claims to be substantiated by empirical evidence, for that commits a categorical error. The nature of evidence must correspond to the nature of the claim: empirical evidence for empirical claims, non-empirical evidence for non-empirical claims.

UPDATE: 16 August 2009

There is a Comments section to Cline’s article (click here), where I submitted a comment of my own. While it remains to be seen whether or not Cline authorizes it, I will publish my comment here:

David is correct, for what he is describing is the intellectual bankruptcy of the Argument from Ignorance fallacy; i.e., one cannot claim that a proposition is false on account that it has not been proven true. Kudos to David for possessing that insight.

Atheism is not a proposition that can be "true" or "false." Atheism is simply the absence of belief in gods.

Atheism is, in fact, a proposition whose truth value can be evaluated. Inherent to atheism of every conceivable stripe is the proposition that "God is not required." Atheism is the conscious rejection of theism; on the one hand, due to no compelling evidence (weak atheism), on the other hand, due to compelling evidence to the contrary (strong atheism). At the heart of either form of atheism lies the proposition that "God is not required" to account for anything—a proposition open to critical evaluation.

P.S. The invitation I extended to you, Mr. Cline, to interact with my rebuttal of your article is still open. Although I had to rewrite it, I would still value your input—as would your readers, I suspect.

UPDATE: 7 September 2009

Submitted rebuttal to comments section (here) for Cline’s consideration.

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