An associate of mine, who goes by the pseudonym Noc Nocterro, recently notified me and some others about an article he had published over at UrbanPhilosophy.net called “Love Knows No Gender.” The aim of the article was “a comprehensive analysis on the debate over the moral permissibility of homosexual behaviour,” in which he argues that homosexual activity is morally permissible when it is similar in circumstances to heterosexual activity that is morally permissible. I will leave it to Mathew Hamilton to address the sociological arguments when he returns from his sabbatical. My purpose in this response is to evaluate whether or not the arguments Nocterro presents withstand critical scrutiny. And his basic argument reasons in this way:

Premise 1: In cases where the good-making properties of a behaviour are much greater than the bad-making properties, then that behaviour is prima facie morally permissible.

Premise 2: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships where the good-making properties are much greater than the bad-making properties.

Premise 3: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships that are prima facie morally permissible.

Premise 4: If there is a prima facie support for the permissibility of some-thing, and there are no good reasons to support its impermissibility, then it should be deemed permissible.

Premise 5: There are no good reasons to suppose this subset of homosexual sexual relationships are impermissible.

Conclusion: This subset of homosexual sexual relationships is permissible.

His positive argument for homosexuality

Before we go any further one rather vital fact needs to be brought into the discussion, which is that the moral permissibility of anything is determined by the moral theory that one is operating from. The importance of this must not be missed. If there are no laws, then there is no such thing as ‘illegal’. The very concept of ‘illegal’ presupposes the existence of a law. The same thing applies here: an argument that involves moral permissibility presupposes some moral theory X. An act is immoral only under moral theory X insofar as it violates some precept thereof.

Now, have a look at Nocterro’s argument. It reasons from moral premises to a moral conclusion. But conspicuously missing from the presentation is any moral theory X. Throughout the entire argument, from the first premise to the conclusion, there is no moral theory X by which we might understand the terms he is using. So for example, the term “good-making” is rather meaningless because there is nothing to inform its meaning. We do not even know what ‘good’ itself means in his argument. He cannot reasonably take it for granted that these moral terms will mean for everyone else just what they mean for him. Since he is reasoning with moral terms and reaching a moral conclusion, a moral theory of some kind is being presupposed (just like ‘illegal’ indicates that a some specific law is in view); that is, some moral theory X is informing the terms “good-making” and “bad-making” with meaning as well as his conclusion, but nowhere in his argument do we find the issue argued. From start to finish, his moral truth claims are simply asserted. Are some homosexual activities morally permissible? Yes, if given the moral theory X which informs his premises and conclusion—which is not given, for that is the very issue in question. One cannot assume the very thing to be proved.

Observe how he has done this as we follow him deeper into his argument. He begins by indicating intimacy as a moral good. The point is not argued. It is simply asserted. He goes on to describe the benefits of intimacy as if they are moral goods, compounding his assertions without any argument. Then he points to marriage and indicates it as a moral good. Again the point is not argued. It is merely asserted. From one issue to the next (sexual identity, pleasure, anal sex, etc.) we observe him presenting a long series of bare assertions on the moral question, until finally reaching his conclusion which quite naturally follows. The reader should understand that when you assume the very thing to be proved, you have not actually argued at all.

To describe his argument as unconvincing would be very charitable, since the issue in question was not actually argued. And the remarkable irony is that near the end of his article he anticipates the Christian arguments against him and cautions that they will have to do better than presuppose their substantive points. It would seem that he failed to recognize he was guilty of doing that very thing.

His counter-arguments against Christians

However, he said he could undercut the Christian arguments against him even while granting the required assumptions. So let us examine whether or not he succeeded.

His counter-argument is two-fold: first, we have reason to think that God’s commands against homosexuality have changed; second, we have no good reason to think such commands against homosexuality benefit us in some way anymore.

While it is true that God’s commands sometimes change (e.g., sacrificial system), the issue here is not his commands per se but morality. Moral order is not grounded in his commands, so a change in his commands does not indicate a change in morality. It is always wrong to disobey his commands; however, the ground of moral order is not his divine fiat but rather his very nature. A change from command P to command Q will consistently reflect his unchanging nature X. So changes in God’s commands does not per se support the point Nocterro wishes to make with it. Does God sometimes change his commands? Yes, but so what?

Far more importantly, and relevant to the question at hand, God’s commands against homosexuality have not changed. It was proscribed and condemned not only in the old covenant but also the new (e.g., 1 Cor. 6:9-10 and Rom. 1:24-27). We might discuss the applicability of certain old covenant laws under the new covenant if they are not mentioned in the gospels or epistles (argument from silence), but when something is declared in the Old Testament and reaffirmed in the New Testament, the question finds itself answered. Nocterro claimed that we can determine whether some command still applies today by analyzing whether it still benefits us. That is certainly one criterion, but it stems from a humanist framework that ignores biblical exegesis and defies the sovereign rule of the Lawgiver who issued the command; that is, God decides whether a command still applies today, not us. Nocterro did say he was willing to grant certain assumptions of biblical Christianity, such as Scriptures being the revealed Word of God (2 Tim. 3:16, theopneustos), which would require him to reject his criterion in favour of the one supported by Christian presuppositions. God decides whether a command still applies, not us. Nocterro said that he is hard pressed to think of any benefits that a divine command against all homosexual activity would have, but that is because he abandoned the fundamental axioms of biblical Christianity immediately after having assumed them for the sake of argument. Had he not so abandoned them, he would find it trivially easy to think of the benefits such a command would have for us.

Notice how dramatically immediate it was. He said that he would assume for the sake of argument “that every single one of the above propositions is true” (which included the divine inspiration and authority of Scriptures). The very next paragraph abandons that by setting up an argument which defies biblical Christianity! The second premise asserts that “God’s commands prohibiting all homosexual acts no longer benefit us.” But according to Scriptures, it actually does: it alerts us to the sinful nature of sexual immorality and our need for repentance and faith in Christ our salvation, in whom we are redeemed from the wrath to come at God’s judgment. And the third premise also defies biblical Christianity, for God’s commands against all homosexual acts certainly does still hold: it was commanded against in the Old Testament and it still exists as a sexual sin in the New Testament. The fact that it is a sin means there remains a law against it (Rom. 3:20; Rom. 7:7; 1 John 3:4).

In conclusion

Some homosexual activities are morally permissible only given the moral theory X which informs Nocterro’s premises and conclusion—which cannot be given, of course, because that is the very issue in question. Unfortunately he never argued the moral issue, but simply assumed it in his argument and asserted it throughout his article. While some homosexual activities may be consistent with the moral theory operating in his worldview, whether or not they are morally permissible depends on the truth of his moral theory, which was simply assumed.

And if he wishes to address responsibly the objections of biblical Christianity, in order to undercut or defeat them, he must contend with what is actually taught and argued under biblical Christianity. It will not do for him to assume its basic presuppositions for the sake of argument, only to abandon that in the very next sentence and construct a series of straw man battles that do not represent what biblical Christianity holds.

Perhaps in his follow-up article (assuming he decides to write one) he could return his attention to the Christian objections as defended above but also visit the one objection he anticipated in his introduction but never addressed in the body of his article: that all homosexual activity qualifies as sexual immorality (as does adultery, fornication, prostitution, etc.) because it occurs outside the covenant of marriage. However, he must contend with what biblical Christianity actually holds regarding marriage. If he does not properly understand the biblical argument on marriage, that is perfectly all right. But if that is so, then I hope he can frankly and honestly admit it, rather than embarrass himself with irrelevant straw men.

Christian response to his argument

How should a Christian receive his premises, given the moral theory operating under a biblical worldview? Let us walk through them and have a look.

Premise 1: In cases where the good-making properties of a behaviour are much greater than the bad-making properties, then that behaviour is prima facie morally permissible.

The first premise stated that something is prima facie morally permissible when it has significantly more good-making properties than bad-making ones. The Christian can certainly agree with this, insofar as the nature and will of God determines whether a thing has good-making properties or not.

Premise 2: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships where the good-making properties are much greater than the bad-making properties.

The second premise stated that some homosexual activities have significantly greater good-making properties than bad-making ones. The Christian must reject this premise because it contradicts numerous biblical proscriptions and condemnations. When you examine what the Scriptures have to say about homosexual activity, the conclusion is inescapable: there are infinite bad-making properties and zero good-making ones.

Premise 3: There is a subset of homosexual sexual relationships that are prima facie morally permissible.

The third premise is thus denied via the falsehood of the second premise.

Premise 4: If there is a prima facie support for the permissibility of some-thing, and there are no good reasons to support its impermissibility, then it should be deemed permissible.

The fourth premise stated that if we have no good reason to suspect that something is morally prohibited, then we should be satisfied that it is morally permissible. I think this could imply the biblical teaching of moral conscience (e.g., Romans 14). Since it is through our conscience that the Holy Spirit convicts us, we must heed it. And because it is through his divine revelation (Scriptures) that God discloses his nature and will, we must allow that to inform our conscience and guide our reasoning. Relevant to his premise here, that means the Scriptures are the authoritative source for discovering good reasons to support the moral impermissibility of something.

Premise 5: There are no good reasons to suppose this subset of homosexual sexual relationships are impermissible.

The fifth premise is also denied via the falsehood of the second premise.

Conclusion: This subset of homosexual sexual relationships is permissible.

And therefore the conclusion is likewise denied.

Miscellaneous remarks

I have just a couple of miscellaneous remarks to something else Nocterro said (in his strange shot at Calvinism). He indicated 1 Tim. 2:4 which says that God “wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth.” Since it is obvious that not all people are saved, this must be accounted for. So far so good. I am confident that no one will seriously disagree with that.

But then he said something very weird. “Under non-Calvinistic theologies,” he said, “this is accounted for via libertarian free will.” Um, no, libertarian free will does not account for that. It attempts to, but fails miserably—for the issue is God, not man. In other words, if God wants all men to be saved, and if he is omnipotent and omniscient, then how come not all men are saved? Describing the nature of man’s will in terms of libertarian freedom does not answer the question if God is omnipotent and omniscient and wants all men to be saved. Man’s libertarian free will is an answer only if we deny some attribute or character of God (e.g., if God does not have power over man’s will then he is not omnipotent).

Nocterro says something else that is rather weird. “Since Calvinism does not admit libertarian free will,” he said, “[then] (pending other theodicies) either Calvinism is false or Christianity as a whole is false.” Does he not recognize the bifurcation fallacy here (false dilemma)? Let me suggest a third alternative which did not occur to him: “or libertarian free will is false.”

Other related Aristophrenium articles: