The following is an exchange between myself and an atheist—we shall call him Steve—over the nature of the laws of logic, also known as Aristotle’s classic laws of thought. Another individual (our own Emil) was trying to refute Steve’s belief, that the law of non-contradiction could be easily falsified, by explaining to him that one cannot refute the laws of logic without using them, which only further confirms them. So Steve tried to illustrate how one can refute the laws of logic without presupposing them:

The law of non-contradiction says that something cannot be both true and false at the same time, so the way to falsify this would be to find something that could be both true and false at the same time.

Well, if you are going to attempt falsifying the law of non-contradiction, it would better serve your effort if you addressed what the law actually states. For any reader who did not immediately notice the error in his statement of the law, let me illustrate (using his language): "something cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect"—the latter part being fundamentally important because something can be true in one respect and simultaneously false in a different respect.

But then he did admit,

The law of non-contradiction is descriptive, not prescriptive.

And this could be why Steve thinks the law is falsifiable, his statement here being clearly false. Observe the very language used to express the proposition: "something cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect." That is not a descriptive statement. Descriptives are expressed by "is/is not" statements. Prescriptives or normatives are expressed by "can/cannot" statements. The former relates to what we know through experience (a posteriori), and the latter to what we know independent of experience (a priori).



Update: 21 August 2009

The second law of thermodynamics is descriptive and can be written, "Heat generally cannot flow spontaneously from a material at lower temperature to a material at higher temperature."

I am ignoring the significant problem that plagues such a statement (trying to derive a prescriptive from a descriptive on a basis other than sheer fiat) for it is irrelevant at any rate to the point I had made—viz. that the law of non-contradiction is an a priori normative statement. It categorically is not a descriptive statement, for nothing a posteriori produces it. I offered him a challenge, to describe an a posteriori (empirical) test of the law of non-contradiction. Just by trying to conceive of such a test, it will soon become evident that this prescriptive cannot be written as a descriptive. We shall see how he responds.

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