God can't make this logically possible state of affair obtain because of P2. So, given this definition of omnipotence, we can conclude either that God does not exist, or that he is not necessarily triune.

Informally, we might ask how it's possible for God who is necessarily triune to bring about a state of affairs which has the property of being brought about by a being that is not-triune given that any time he attempted to do so his necessary triunity would supervene on the properties of that state of affair.

First, thank you for the response. Your input is highly valued.

Second, there are two reasons I did not draw people’s attention to the defeater of your argument: (i) the basis of that defeater was a definition of omnipotence different from the one I am using; (ii) you had said that the definition I’m using still falls prey to your disproof (viz. “God can do anything logically possible”). Under the former, the defeater is not relevant. And given the latter, the disproof is not defeated (as you stated).

(Notably, Wielenberg’s definition of omnipotence, at least with regard to impossibilities, fits well within how the term has been understood in classical theism; e.g., see my article on omnipotence. As Aquinas noted, “It is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it.”)

Third, you said that if it is logically possible for a state of affairs to have the property of being brought about by a non-triune being (Bob), then we have a state of affairs which God cannot bring about. What you have not said, at least with any clarity, is why this should follow. This is precisely where things are terribly muddied.

In your first response to me, you said that the being in (3) is not strictly God, that there is a secondary being, Bob, at play in the argument. However, if God should bring about a state affairs that is brought about by Bob, then how does it follow in (4) that God is not necessarily triune (A is ¬A) from the fact that Bob is not necessarily triune (¬A is ¬A)?

Here is what I'm getting:

* A = God.
* p1 = necessarily omnipotent.
* p2 = necessarily triune.
* S = Toronto flooded by some ¬A (Bob).

(1) If A is p1 and p2, then A can bring about S.
(2) If A can bring about S, then A is ¬A.
(3) Therefore, A cannot exist.

(P.S. You are now 'white-listed' so your comments can skip the moderation process entirely; i.e., your comments will be posted immediately.)

Here I suggest that while the argument is successful if one's accepts the definition of omnipotence to which it is formulated against, there is a better definition of omnipotence one should accept that doesn't fall victim to the argument.

I was not suggesting in the argument, however, that Bob's non-triunity somehow renders God non-triune but rather a state of affairs that has the property of being brought about by a non-triune being cannot be brought about by a necessarily triune God.

In fact, nowhere am I suggesting that God can even somehow cease to be triune (if he's necessarily triune), that would be absurd. You must look at the properties that the certain state of affairs has, and if a state of affairs can have a property of being brought about by Bob and thus, have the property of being brought about by a non-triune being, we have a logically possible state of affairs that God has no hope in bringing about.

I'll admit that the argument doesn't disprove God's existence, because I think the better route in this situation is to simply reject the definition of omnipotence that “God can do anything that is logically possible.” I do not think the definition is comprehensive enough and if you disagree with the conclusion of the aforementioned argument, it seems to me that you must reject this definition.

You stated:

” What God ordains should come to pass (principal cause) is a product of his nature; however, the means by which it comes to pass (instrumental cause) is a product of his creation which he exists independent of. “

It seems to me that under this view, God causes absolutely everything and we should not say, for instance, that Bob brings about X anymore than we say that a hammer brings about the shattering of a piece of glass. Though, I think this is a bit beside the point.

Thanks for the reply.