Mitchell LeBlanc and a Disproof of God
Posted by RyftMar 5
Back in December of 2009, Mitchell LeBlanc of UrbanPhilosophy.net composed what he thought to be a possible disproof of the existence of God. The following day I had posted a rebuttal in response to his disproof. Given the exquisitely complex manner in which he formulated his argument, it isn’t really surprising that many people struggled to wrap their head around what exactly his argument was positing. As it usually goes in these things, the argument made good sense to LeBlanc himself, who said he was “amazed at the misunderstanding” that resulted. I’ve been in those shoes myself at times, when an argument is perfectly clear to me but the way I shared it with others left them baffled and confused. As I’ve said elsewhere, that is one of the primary reasons I blog; it allows me to constantly refine how I articulate myself, so that it becomes accessible to a larger and larger audience. I am always searching for ways to bring my language down from the mountain peaks of philosophy to the valleys of English. (I’m getting better, but I’ve still got a long way to go.)
The argument
To briefly refresh our minds, allow me to repeat what his argument had been. (And we must keep in mind that it targeted the biblical God.)
(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune.
(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.
(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.
(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune.
(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist.
As I pointed out in my rebuttal, this argument does not belong to LeBlanc so much as it belongs to atheologist Michael Martin, [1] with LeBlanc substituting “triune” for every instance that Martin used “omniscient.” Given the doctrine of divine simplicity, such a substitution should be acceptable for the Christian.
What Martin was trying to show, and by extension LeBlanc, is that the existence of God is disproven by reason of logical contradiction; i.e., that God cannot exist. He takes two particular attributes of God and attempts to show that a contradiction results. In the case of this argument, those attributes are omnipotence and triunity.
As indicated in my aforementioned rebuttal, (1) and (2) are not contested since they reflect orthodox Christian doctrine. With regard to (3), LeBlanc later informed me that “a being that is not necessarily triune” would be some human, such as Bob who in some way caused flooding in Toronto (e.g., “Ryft on ‘A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence’”). Consequently, my previous rebuttal loses its traction, since I hadn’t understood that a secondary being was playing a relevant role (i.e., I’d thought God was the only being employed in his argument). But his argument is not saved by this clarification, since the derailment occurs now at (4) instead.
The analysis
We can accept (1) and (2), and it seems we can also accept (3) if it is predicated on God bringing about a state of affairs that was brought about by Bob. However, it’s not at all clear how (4) should follow. If God should bring about (principal cause) a state affairs that is brought about by Bob (instrumental cause), [2] how does it follow that God’s nature is thereby identical to Bob’s nature? That is, how did God become not triune by virtue of Bob being not triune? LeBlanc does not say, nor is it immediately obvious.
Perhaps LeBlanc rejects there being any distinction between types of causes, such that God is said to be the instrumental cause of all effects. If that is the case, then I think it becomes obvious how (4) follows. But if God is the instrumental cause of all effects, then all effects (or states of affairs) amount to “God in motion”—which in essence amounts to panentheism and is dramatically antithetical to God as revealed in the Bible (who the argument is intended to address, i.e., it qualifies as a straw man). So if that notion and its presuppositions are what is proposed by (4), then it must run afoul of such doctrines as aseity, necessary being, divine simplicity, transcendence and so forth, which tell us that necessarily nothing of God’s nature is identical to his creation. What God ordains should come to pass (principal cause) is a product of his nature; however, the means by which it comes to pass (instrumental cause) is a product of his creation which he exists independent of. So Bob by nature is not necessarily triune, but this has no bearing on whether or not God by nature is triune.
Hopefully I have not misunderstood his argument still. We’ll have to wait and see how he responds to find out if I’ve grasped his point aright.
References
1. Michael Martin. Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Temple University Press, 1990. p. 310 (as cited by LeBlanc).
2. Bob: instrumental cause that is itself an effect; contingent. God: principal cause that is not itself an effect; necessary. So, not identical; i.e., distinguishable types of causes.
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3 comments
Comment by Mitchell LeBlanc on 6 Mar 2010 at 13:06
First off, you didn't make a mention of my most recent post on the topic: http://urbanphilosophy.net/philosophy/a-possibl...
Here I suggest that while the argument is successful if one's accepts the definition of omnipotence to which it is formulated against, there is a better definition of omnipotence one should accept that doesn't fall victim to the argument.
I was not suggesting in the argument, however, that Bob's non-triunity somehow renders God non-triune but rather a state of affairs that has the property of being brought about by a non-triune being cannot be brought about by a necessarily triune God.
In fact, nowhere am I suggesting that God can even somehow cease to be triune (if he's necessarily triune), that would be absurd. You must look at the properties that the certain state of affairs has, and if a state of affairs can have a property of being brought about by Bob and thus, have the property of being brought about by a non-triune being, we have a logically possible state of affairs that God has no hope in bringing about.
I'll admit that the argument doesn't disprove God's existence, because I think the better route in this situation is to simply reject the definition of omnipotence that “God can do anything that is logically possible.” I do not think the definition is comprehensive enough and if you disagree with the conclusion of the aforementioned argument, it seems to me that you must reject this definition.
You stated:
” What God ordains should come to pass (principal cause) is a product of his nature; however, the means by which it comes to pass (instrumental cause) is a product of his creation which he exists independent of. “
It seems to me that under this view, God causes absolutely everything and we should not say, for instance, that Bob brings about X anymore than we say that a hammer brings about the shattering of a piece of glass. Though, I think this is a bit beside the point.
Thanks for the reply.
Comment by Ryft Braeloch on 7 Mar 2010 at 18:53
Mitchell,
First, thank you for the response. Your input is highly valued.
Second, there are two reasons I did not draw people’s attention to the defeater of your argument: (i) the basis of that defeater was a definition of omnipotence different from the one I am using; (ii) you had said that the definition I’m using still falls prey to your disproof (viz. “God can do anything logically possible”). Under the former, the defeater is not relevant. And given the latter, the disproof is not defeated (as you stated).
(Notably, Wielenberg’s definition of omnipotence, at least with regard to impossibilities, fits well within how the term has been understood in classical theism; e.g., see my article on omnipotence. As Aquinas noted, “It is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it.”)
Third, you said that if it is logically possible for a state of affairs to have the property of being brought about by a non-triune being (Bob), then we have a state of affairs which God cannot bring about. What you have not said, at least with any clarity, is why this should follow. This is precisely where things are terribly muddied.
In your first response to me, you said that the being in (3) is not strictly God, that there is a secondary being, Bob, at play in the argument. However, if God should bring about a state affairs that is brought about by Bob, then how does it follow in (4) that God is not necessarily triune (A is ¬A) from the fact that Bob is not necessarily triune (¬A is ¬A)?
Here is what I'm getting:
* A = God.
* p1 = necessarily omnipotent.
* p2 = necessarily triune.
* S = Toronto flooded by some ¬A (Bob).
(1) If A is p1 and p2, then A can bring about S.
(2) If A can bring about S, then A is ¬A.
(3) Therefore, A cannot exist.
(P.S. You are now 'white-listed' so your comments can skip the moderation process entirely; i.e., your comments will be posted immediately.)
Comment by Mitchell LeBlanc on 8 Mar 2010 at 15:42
The contradiction in the syllogism you posted occurs within (2). The premise should read, “if A can bring about S, then A is not-P2″ where S is some state of affairs that has the property of being brought about by a non-triune being.
God can't make this logically possible state of affair obtain because of P2. So, given this definition of omnipotence, we can conclude either that God does not exist, or that he is not necessarily triune.
Informally, we might ask how it's possible for God who is necessarily triune to bring about a state of affairs which has the property of being brought about by a being that is not-triune given that any time he attempted to do so his necessary triunity would supervene on the properties of that state of affair.