(a) reality consists of what our sensory apparatus
perceives

(b) reality is a simulated complex that fools our sensory
apparatus

“Given that these two competing conclusions are
empirically equivalent (i.e., the empirical data for both is exactly the same),
by what means can you test them for truth?”

If in fact the two scenarios are “empirically equivalent”
there would be no distinction between them and hence they would be the same. If
(a) is “empirically equivalent” to (b) then (a) would also be a simulated
complex just as (b). Likewise, if (b) is “empirically equivalent” to (a) then
(b) is just as ‘real’ as (a). With this being the case, in your scenario any
knowledge obtained in (b) would be the same as knowledge obtainable in (a). For
example, if I am sitting in my chair typing this in (b) then the fact that (a)
is “empirically equivalent (i.e., the empirical data for both is exactly the
same)” would dictate that I am also sitting in my chare typing this in (a).

Now, if you want to provide exceptions to your scenario
where they are not “empirically equivalent” but rather *empirically similar*
then we could go down that rout as well but we would need to identify what the
similarities are and what the differences are.

Thanks

Unfortunately the discussion never really ended, you weren’t around enough, and my abrasive style got me fired from the Atheist Forum … I don’t debate on blogs (they’re not built for that) but hey, feel free to visit me at Angry Atheism.

Kyu

Editor’s note: Added link, since Kyuuketsuki didn’t supply one.

This objection baffles me, such that it’s out of harmony with your typical ability to think clearly. I criticized Dawkins for pretending to be a philosopher, which his own writing proves him to be woefully unqualified for (as numerous scholars have already exposed); i.e., he writes philosophically on a much broader range of subjects than just the proofs for God’s existence (e.g., see his chapters on ethics). He makes a fool of himself when he pontificates outside of his field.

As for your challenge? I accept. But I have a request to make of you. I do not wish to waste my time dealing with inconsequential arguments (e.g., his critique of Unwin’s Bayesian argument was silly, since Unwin has virtually no philosophical footprint in apologetics literature), so list for me the three strongest critiques you thought Dawkins made and I will confront those in a future piece.

Just a quick addendum (I'm in a hurry right now). I think it's unfair to pick on The God Delusion for being poor in the philosophy department, as the chapter dealing with proposed proofs for God's existence takes up a very small portion of the book as a whole. (The God Delusion, by the way, is my least favorite of all his books, my favorite probably being Unweaving the Rainbow.)

In any case, I have a challenge for you. As a lay hobby-philosopher, I found Dawkins' refutations of the classical proofs for God's existence very satisfying, but obviously you disagree. Therefore, I jovially challenge you to write up a point-by-point post for this site where you go through the points with which you disagree with Dawkins. I would be very interested to read it. :-)

Second, he tells us that there is no such thing as ‘atheistic’ epistemology, insisting that it is more correct to call it ‘secular’. But his statement is absolutely false, for there is indeed such a thing. Any epistemology that is godless—i.e., either it doesn’t presuppose God or it posits that God is irrelevant—is by definition atheistic. As any self-respecting etymologist will tell you, that is precisely what ‘atheistic’ means; that is, something is atheistic when it is “godless” or “without God.” I am fairly sure that if one were to ask Dawkins and his ilk about epistemology, one would be presented with a view that is by definition atheistic.

Third, entomologists notwithstanding, asserting that God does not exist (“I only know that I exist, and that God doesn’t”) is what only ‘strong’ atheists do. Far more common are atheists who readily acknowledge the unmitigated failure of that proposition ever being supported validly. The proposition “God does not exist” can be supported only by logically fallacious reasoning (i.e., invalidly). Even Dawkins, the inept sod that he is, knows better than to attempt such a stance.

Fourth, he says that ‘atheistic epistemology’ is a redundant expression, by which he means to assert that epistemology is intrinsically godless because “we can’t know jack about whether deities exist or not.” Despite the atheistic variety, ‘epistemology’ in and of itself is not necessarily godless. (Good luck proving that basing epistemology on God creates a logical contradiction.) If one were to presuppose metaphysical naturalism, then it would follow that epistemology is inherently godless; but why presuppose such naturalism? (One should avoid begging the question when attempting to answer that.) Nevertheless, there are in fact theistic epistemologies, as verifiable by the works of such scholars as Frame, Willard, Oliphint, Collett, etc. On such a view, it is actually ‘theistic epistemology’ that is the redundant expression, insofar as knowledge is rendered unintelligible if not grounded in the biblical God; it is not so much about being given access to “additional information” (though we are) as it is about our being able to know anything at all.

Fifth, despite his feelings to the contrary, ‘scientism’ is not meaningless twaddle. He ought to familiarize himself with the relevant literature before embarrassing himself like this. (Although he does seem to happily do so). For example, Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation With Science (1994) by Dr. Tom Sorell. For the sake of our readers, ‘scientism’ in essence is the view that the natural sciences are authoritative over both metaphysics and epistemology, a view which thereby brutally defeats itself because science cannot even get off the ground without certain assumptions in place which are not themselves subject to scientific purview (e.g., that the laws of nature are uniform, that inductive inference is reliable, etc.). Science cannot ground the very things that ground science.

Finally, he asked if my problem with Dawkins is the fact that he teaches people things that only apply to reality. My answer shall be very brief: Dawkins is a biologist, not a philosopher; ergo, he is qualified to describe biology, not reality on the whole. His book The God Delusion demonstrates clearly that when he pretends to be a philosopher he makes a complete and utter fool of himself. Even a first-year philosophy student can see the embarrassing holes in his arguments; moreover, so can his atheist colleagues, such as Michael Ruse who said the book “makes me embarrassed to be an atheist.”

"Are we in a computer simulation? It doesn’t matter." Incredible. This sort of resigned indifference is an astonishing display of remarkable ignorance about the significance and importance of this issue. It actually matters a great deal because it regards your concepts of reality and truth, etc. Philosophers have for centuries recognized its enormous importance. If you have no basis upon which to ground metaphysics (reality, being, etc.) and epistemology (truth, knowledge, etc.), then to call your truth claims unmitigated magical thinking moves from pejorative to accurate.

Are we in a computer simulation? It doesn’t matter. Both are the same end result and so Occam’s Razor dictates we should work on the more simple assumption.

So the answer to the question is that, you can’t. But the practical answer is that it doesn’t matter as both situations are definable by our existing laws.

But I suspect this isn’t what you are after. The answer to the intended question is another question. If our science is based on our perceptions of this simulation, than the simulation, however imperfect or false it is, is our universe. It is our reality in every possible way, because we have never seen life outside of that reality.

There is a third option. If the simulation were based on a world that DOES exist, and the history and science of that world was used to inform this simulation. AND there were flaws in the simulation. Re-tracing these historical steps MIGHT expose our simulated universe as a sham. If the texts, for example, speak of relativity, but to cut corners in processing power the simulation’s programmers used the easier Newtonian formulas, we might simply look at the orbit of Mercury for an answer.

However, this line of investigation could only prove we are in a simulation, it could never prove we are not in a simulation.

But I offer one final potential option. In order to be a simulation, a real example of what is being simulated MUST exist. This means that humans too, must exist. And presumably they or their creations are the ones who created the simulation. Why, then, be so complete and complicated? Would it not have been easier to simulate our knowledge of the universe from the stand-point of a mere 200 years ago? No electricity, no internet, no immediate long distance communication. The universe was only our galaxy, and even that was poorly understood. No space travel. Only the easier Newtonian laws of motion. And a ubiquitous religion by which miraculous events, like the reset of a computer simulation sector, could be avoided by. Or at least the travel of such events couldn’t be captured on my iPhone’s video camera and broadcast on the internet for all to see?

Perhaps this clear and unneeded complication reduces the probability of our universe being an elaborate simulation.

Not to make any mention of reason. In the matrix humans are batteries. But you could not sustain humans on dead human protein alone. We don’t die fast enough. And the earth isn’t a closed system, so eventually, the energy would radiate out into space. No, humans would make terrible batteries. So why else? What reason could there be to even HAVE a simulation of this kind?

I entirely missed the point on my first read. Mea culpa. I don’t think I can add much more to this discussion except to repeat that I intuitively agree. But I don’t think theists have an easier time with the problem.

This reminds me a little of Al-Ghazali. He famously said that when fire and cotton come in contact it isn’t the fire that’s burning the cotton, it’s God. Therefore, no event in the universe is natural; absolutely everything is a miracle, done by God’s will. How does one go about refuting such a proposition, whether theist or atheist?

I should like to note that it is not difficult for all people everywhere to refute the proposition that we are living in a simulated reality. The matter depends upon one’s epistemic structure.

But toward a finer point, for atheists generally it is not merely difficult to refute. It is impossible. And this has everything to do with the epistemic structure that atheists generally have. They can reject the proposition or ignore it. But refuting it is beyond the capacity of their epistemology, the structure of which—as observed in the landscape of contemporary inquiry—is tightly governed by the controlling criteria of scientism.

Which is precisely how this thought experiment bears upon atheism. Not atheism in and of itself, of course, but specifically upon the intellectual bankruptcy inherent in the pervasive commitment to scientism that informs and governs contemporary atheistic epistemology, found nowhere more explicitly than the Richard Dawkins school of thought (which also includes Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, et al.).

At any rate, the proposition that reality is a Matrix-like simulation is simply the counterfactual setting which sharpens the force of the critical question being asked in bold text at the bottom of my article. It is that question I am seeking responses to, with the hope that the answers will cast a spotlight upon the intellectual insolvency of scientism (which goes toward demonstrating the inadequacy of atheistic world views).