A little over a month ago I discovered and joined a new atheist message board, which has been around for barely a year itself. It is called AtheistForums.org (a free plug for your site, Adrian)—and there I go by the name of Arcanus. That site will invariably become fodder for articles here, of course, as a source for either thought-provoking material like this article, or as comedic material for the new segment I will be creating and adding to over time called Fundy Atheists Say the Darndest Things (coming soon). Having disclosed the origins for what I am about to share, let me show you how to stump an atheist.

the-matrixA member there by the name of Dagda posed the following question [1]. There is no evidence that the world really exists the way we perceive it. For example, it could be nothing more than an elaborate Matrix-like simulation, and we have no means by which to determine otherwise. That is to say, we have no way to tell that the universe we perceive is the real world. For all we know, the world may indeed be an illusion.

I thought that was an extraordinarily good post. I have made the same argument myself countless times but never as a stand-alone point like Dagda had done. With a good measure of enthusiasm I scrolled through the responses to see how atheists would contend with it. Without any exceptions, all the atheists fell back on the sacrosanctity of scientific enterprise—completely oblivious to the eviscerating horns of Dagda’s argument!

For instance, Rhizomorph13 tried to argue that the reliability of his senses is proved by the consistency of empirical experience, such as a certain park always being in the same place. Dagda astutely noted that this does not necessarily prove that the world is real. It could simply be that the program has a memory. The argument did not imply "a randomly fluctuating illusion" at any rate, he replied. "Do not try to make more of the argument than there really is [just] so that your proofs can easily triumph."

Rhizomorph13 later tried to assert that the one making the assertion that we are indeed living in a computer simulation is the one who shoulders the burden of proof—totally missing the fact that the issue of how to meet such a burden was precisely Dagda’s point.

Kyuuketsuki tried to insinuate that no person could really believe such a thing, a point he felt could be proven by the fact that such a person would not live consistently under such a view; e.g., even that person would not step into the path of a fast-moving vehicle—likewise missing completely the precision of Dagda’s argument, who replied that such a foolish act would not disprove the Matrix.

"We assume that what we can detect is real," Kyuuketsuki said, "and the fact that everything holds together tends to support that assumption." It is at this point that I entered the conversation to clarify exactly what horn is mercilessly eviscerating these responses. Consistent empirical experience cannot prove anything against Dagda’s argument, I pointed out:

Wouldn’t the same result obtain if this world was a Matrix-like simulation whose programming was thorough and consistent? Someone who held this view certainly would not "step out in front of a fast moving vehicle"—not because they’re being inconsistent but, rather, because they’re being consistent. Even in the Matrix, the vehicle would critically injure them. In other words, I believe Dagda’s point would be, "Given that two competing conclusions are empirically equivalent (i.e., they rely on the exact same empirical data), by what means can you test them for truth?" Occam’s razor will not help here; given a Matrix scenario, the only thing Occam’s razor would do is keep you locked in to the simulation—i.e., it would not test for truth.

Is there an atheist this question does not stump? What about you, Håvard? What about atheists who stop by this site? I would love to hear how an atheist would answer that question. Between these two competing conclusions—(a) that reality consists of what our sensory apparatus perceives, and (b) that reality is a simulated complex that fools our sensory apparatus—we confront the fascinating circumstance of empirical equivalence. Within this thought experiment:

Given that these two competing conclusions are empirically equivalent (i.e., the empirical data for both is exactly the same), by what means can you test them for truth?

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