That  illogic in subsection (c)(3) well deserves highlighting. I dare say that there is no real firm basis for this clause, other than the conflicting ‘justification’ that a baby is only a baby when it is wanted by the mother (so if she wanted it, she wouldn’t have engaged in any action that would terminate her pregnancy). I think California—and I assume many other states as well—has some such clauses in their state law along the same lines. Absurd? Hell, yes.

On a related note, this cartoon seems relevant to your opening comments (courtesy of 2secondsfaster.com):

In the case of Hasan, the prosecution feels there is sufficient evidence of capital murder and, by provision of the state’s Prenatal Protection Act, the victim count should be 14. Moreover, by 18 USC 1841 the federal government has jurisdiction to also prosecute Hasan for 14 counts of murder in the first degree. With regard to mainstream media, they are an irrelevant distraction, in my opinion, because this is an inarguable legal fact which prosecuting attorneys should be giving attention to. As for the dual prosecution, “In cases where a murder involves both state and federal jurisdiction, the offender can be tried and punished separately for each crime without raising issues of double jeopardy” (Wikipedia).

Subsection (a)(1) states that the death of a child in utero qualifies as a separate offence, so under federal law the murder of a pregnant woman qualifies as two counts of murder. And subsection (a)(2) states that this separate offence carries the same punishment as that if it had been committed against the mother herself (i.e., the punishment due for murder is unmitigated by the child being inside the womb.) It further declares that it makes no difference whether the person knew the woman was pregnant or not, and that it makes no difference whether the person intended to cause the death of the unborn child or not. In other words, even if one has no idea the woman is pregnant and no intention of killing the child, it nevertheless counts as two separate offences. The possibility that a female of childbearing age may be pregnant is something that an assailant may not safely exclude.

Incidentally, subsection (c)(3) really pisses me off, though (q.v. “Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the prosecution of any woman with respect to her unborn child”) because, if I understand it correctly, it means that a pregnant woman can engage in a felony assault that results in the death of her unborn child and be safe from prosecution for first or second degree murder. What intelligent reason could there be for including this? Subsection (c)(1) and (c)(2) make sense to me and I can support them, but what the hell is the reason for (c)(3)?

But then reading through the Act you posted (18 USC 1841), it seems that section (a)(2)(B)(i) suggests that knowledge (or lack thereof) of the pregnancy is irrelevant:

An offense under this section does not require proof that the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant

Simply, if you kill a pregnant woman whose unborn in turn dies, then you are accountable for two deaths and not one. (At least, that’s what I think it means. It’s getting late in my part of the world for this legal speak!)

At any rate, a good pick up on the story! Although I think we both know that the mainstream media would not likely promote that 14 were killed instead of 13.

Interesting remark on the USC and the Constitution, but I’m not knowledgeable on either of these to comment on that regard (although I would not be at all surprised to find such an inconsistency).