Gratuitous Evil: Q&A (28/Feb/2010)
Posted by RyftMar 1
With regard to my following reasoning, I address some questions raised.
(1) To affirm that Gratuitous Evil has a probability greater than zero is to affirm that Gratuitous Evil is possible, by definition.
(2) To affirm that Gratuitous Evil is possible is to affirm that the Biblical God is impossible, by definition.
(3) To affirm that the Biblical God is impossible (implicitly or explicitly) within a premise of an argument against the existence thereof commits the fallacy of begging the question.
Well then the problem is that, under Christian presuppositions, gratuitous evil doesn’t exist; and your argument is sound under such presuppositions.
That being the case—and it is—one might notice that he forgot to mention who it is a ‘problem’ for. And if I may point out the obvious: “Not for Christians.” As a matter of fact, that is substantively the basis upon which the Christian can trust in the loving providence of God through painful or troubled times; i.e., given the God in whom we place our love, trust, and obedience, no evil that befalls us could ever be gratuitous (Eccl. 7:14; Rom. 8:28; Ps. 71:20; Heb. 12:7-11; 1 Pet. 5:7-10; and so forth).
However, in reality there are gratuitous evils—such as natural disasters.
Pointing to some natural disaster and asserting that it is a gratuitous evil is just that: an assertion; and according to generally accepted standards of sound reasoning, bare assertions are not rationally decisive. To possess rational merit, his assertion must be turned into a conclusion with premises that at least validly support it. We have his assertion that natural disasters are gratuitous evils but not any reason to think that is true, while under the Christian view we have an abundance of reason to think it false.
I have no sufficient reason to believe that [natural disasters] are the result of rebellion against God (cf. definition of evil). That being so, the Christian God then isn’t consistent with reality.
It is a stark error in reasoning to go from “I have no sufficient reason to believe X” and conclude that “therefore X is false” (i.e., contrary to reality). The fact that you do not have sufficient reason to believe X says something about your research diet but it says nothing about the truth or falsehood of X itself—for thinking that something is false or contrary to reality on the basis that it has not been proven true is the argumentum ad ignorantiam error. Remember, an absence of sufficient reason is good support for your not believing X, but it is bad support for you thinking that X is false (“isn’t consistent with reality”).
And perhaps just as important to note: the fact that you don’t have sufficient reason is a rather different matter from whether or not sufficient reason exists to be had. Do you have good reason? It seems not, if we take your word. Does that mean good reason does not exist? Non-sequitur; i.e., the one does not follow from the other. I can sympathize that you don’t have good reason, but remember: that’s autobiographical information. It does not mean that good reason doesn’t exist to be had. So then this is an opportune time to ask the easily neglected question: “Exactly what have you done to acquire that sufficient reason you need?” If little or nothing, then it would make sense why you do not have it.
Do you have evidence that natural disasters happen because of rebellions against God?
A fair amount, actually, yes. For example, the rebellion of Korah and his men, plus several thousand Israelites who had taken their side: an earthquake and fire destroyed Korah and his men, and a plague killed those who sided with their rebellion.
By having defined morality in reference to the nature and character of God, Ryft effectively precluded any possible existence of evil (by implying that everything God does is non-evil by definition). So then if God is the standard of morality, no evil can exist—gratuitous or otherwise.
Incorrect. The character and commands of God does not preclude the existence of evil by definition; on the contrary, it allows for and explains evil. However, it does preclude gratuitous evil by definition; given the God of Christian theism, it is impossible for any evil to be unwarranted or purposeless.
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2 comments
Comment by Duane on 1 Mar 2010 at 17:04
Would it also be fair to say that even under a strict atheistic framework, that nothing – including natural disasters, but also things such as murder and rape – can be considered evil in any sense? In fact Stalin is said to have claimed that killing a million people was no different from mowing a lawn. I think he was just being consistent.
Therefore, can discussions about evil have any real coherence beyond a theistic framework, especially a Christian one?
Comment by Ryft Braeloch on 3 Mar 2010 at 22:11
Not only is it fair, Duane, but it’s also spot on. Under atheistic world views (whatever that happens to be, e.g., secular humanism, nihilism, etc.) it is, at bottom, incoherent to speak of evil as being objectively real or absolutely true. There are atheists who are convinced that moral properties are objectively real and moral propositions are true absolutely (i.e., for all people in all places at all times), but they are at a loss to explain or account for this in a way that is consistent with their particular world view. They must endure the cognitive dissonance resulting from what they recognize as true and what they want to be true (if they dare to question their own beliefs).
Consider, for example, how under a godless evolutionary argument things like rape should in fact be morally good—since, under an evolutionary framework, rape is a form of sexual reproduction that evolved by selective forces as an advantageous behavioral adaptation within our species. Isn’t that how godless evolution-based ethics work? The further we spread our genetic material and reproduce offspring, the greater the benefit for our species, as population groups and in general. Since it exists as an advantageous behavioral adaptation and contributes beneficially to our species, it should follow that it’s morally good. Right? That it happens to produce a certain biochemical state in the limbic system of this or that mammalian brain is a non-issue, ethically speaking, for it would actually contradict evolutionary ethics to value the psychological health of a singular animal above the survival health of the population group. However, to say that “rape is good” cuts violently across the grain of our moral compass and common sense, so evolutionary arguments must not be right; the predictions of the model don’t square with the facts that it’s supposed to explain.
You are correct. Discussions about evil cannot have any real coherence outside the Christian world view, because non-Christian metaethics are unintelligible and result in conclusions that run contrary to the very ethics they mean to explain. Views that give us predictions which fail to explain the facts or outright contradict them are views we have good reason to abandon. The Christian world view easily accounts for objective morality and propositions which reflect such, while atheistic world views invest great effort in developing explanations which end up failing to square with how the world is.