Looking back at your initial post, you seem to be asking if real and exist are interchangeable terms.

X is true if it corresponds to reality according to the correspondence theory of truth. Could we not also say that X is true if it corresponds to existence according to that same correspondence theory of reality?

I think I can agree with true and real not being interchangeable and true and exist not being interchangeable. And I also think real and exist can be interchangeable.

So in answer to your initial question “So if correspondence to reality is what it means for X to be true, then what does it mean for X to be real? ” X is real if it conforms to the correspondence theory of truth. And X exists if it conforms to the correspondence theory of truth.

It might just be the wording of your initial challenge but if I have made an error of coherence or produced an empty tautology then I would like to know how I have done that. My iron is probably dull and needs sharpening.

I'm still trying to wrap my cranium around all this.

Ryft said: “You see, I am the guy who thinks it is intelligible to say 'God exists,' so I do not by any means think that ‘exist’ is restricted to the empirical realm.”

I completely agree with that. I differ on his last paragraph (I think)… at least for now.

Rick Baskett wrote:

I would rather discuss the laws that God created for our current existence then to try to make sure God fits into those laws.

As long as we are distinguishing between the laws of the physical world and the laws of the real world, wherein the former is part of, but distinct from, the latter. (To say that the physical world and real world are one and the same is metaphysical naturalism, which is the discredited prejudice that only physical things are real.)

For example, the laws of thermodynamics do not apply to God but the laws of logic do, insofar as logical order is grounded in the nature and character of God and expressed normatively in his revelations. Furthermore, if ‘real’ and ‘exist’ refer to more than just the physical realm, such that God is real, then how we understand and use these terms becomes important, especially in our defense of the faith.

But I’m not saying you should take time out of your day to concern yourself with these issues. I am just trying to show why they’re important in themselves.

Duane Proud wrote:

To say that something exists as the furniture of the mind; isn't that just a fancy way of saying that you're thinking about something?

I am known to be a logoleptic omnilegent who obfuscates perspicuity (i.e., “yes”). However, it is relevant and important to the issue being contemplated, which I shall explain just below.

Duane Proud wrote:

Do we really need to use the word “exist” here to describe the things we think about?

Maybe. See, that relates to the very question I’ve been posing. The whole matter seems to depend in an important way on whether or not they’re interchangeable terms. If our mental furniture is real but does not exist, it raises the question, “What does it mean to say that something is part of reality but has no existence?” And always at the front of my mind is how the answer to that question would impact our talk of God, in regard to both orthodoxy (by believers) and apologetics (to unbelievers).

I stumbled upon the importance of this issue one day while thinking on the incessant demand by atheists for evidence of anything that’s aired in their presence. Why are they asking for evidence? Because they refuse to believe (i.e., accept as true) something unless its truth can be demonstrated. (Or so they arbitrarily pretend because, in fact, they believe a host of things whose truth is not demonstrated, and in some cases cannot be demonstrated.) Well, that gets at the issue of what ‘true’ means. Most atheists that we encounter will subscribe to a correspondence view, and there we confront the issue of how reality is defined. Existence is an issue because typically the proposition being examined is “God exists.” But notice something very important here: (a) if the atheist holds that the terms ‘real’ and ‘exist’ are interchangeable, (b) that ‘true’ is defined as correspondence to reality, (c) and that reality consists strictly of natural things, then the atheist is assuming the truth of his view (question-begging fallacy) which denies us any means of ever meeting the burden of proof, all the while pretending that he is open to examining any evidence proffered (inadvertent lie).

In order to avoid that train wreck, the atheist has to admit that ‘real’ and ‘exist’ do not mean the same thing. So then we ask what it means for something to ‘exist’, because it does not make sense prima facie to say X exists but is not real. If reality is defined in terms of metaphysical naturalism, then the terms must be interchangeable and the logical train wreck is inescapable. And thus we have the question I had presented.

Adam Morgan wrote:

From my perspective, the issue became complex due to your definitions. These were: real = essence and exist = sense perception. I can see how if you accept these definitions then your dilemma arises. If exist = real then there is no dilemma.

First, those are not my definitions at all. (In fact, I haven’t proposed my view on what the definitions are, or should be, precisely because I am currently still mulling this over for myself.) You see, I am the guy who thinks it is intelligible to say “God exists,” so I do not by any means think that ‘exist’ is restricted to the empirical realm.

The way I look at the issue—at least for the time being—the terms ‘real’ and ‘exist’ are interchangeable; they both refer to the being of a thing (Gk. ousia, a thing which has attributes and modes [1]). So, for example, to say that numbers exist is the same as saying that numbers are real, and vice versa.

References:

1. ‘attributes’, that which is predicated of some thing, such as a property or relation; ‘modes’, that is, of being (particular vs. abstract, possible vs. actual, etc.).

This is just how it appears to me. This conversation started out very “high brow” and I'm just trying to understand it from a “low brow” perspective. I guess I'm in agreement with Duane on this one. Much seems to go over my head at times.

To say that something exists as the furniture of the mind; isn't that just a fancy way of saying that you're thinking about something, rather than attempting to attach an ontological label to the object of your thought? Do we really need to use the word “exist” here, to describe the things we think about?

Marshall Jones wrote:

I’d say that truth relates to existence, not reality [because] saying “X is real” means only that “X matters to me.” … I wonder if you could elaborate on the problems you see with these sorts of definitions.

I am not exactly clear on what your stance is here, but I will make an assumption and respond accordingly. If I have misunderstood, you can clarify in your next reply.

When you said that “truth relates to existence, not reality,” you did so as against the idea of reality being the predicate for truth; i.e., a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to some existent state of affairs. [1] And that is fine, of course, but it seems to suggest a unique definition of ‘existence’ (for I am unwilling to believe that you are working from a logical positivist view). Consider:

* A proposition is true if and only if it refers to some existent state of affairs.

Is that true? Only if there is some existent state of affairs to which it refers, under your view, but (a) what existent state of affairs would that be, and (b) what is the nature of the relation? (For instance, is it an identity relation)?

Marshall Jones wrote:

Truth is defined by God. Reality (the way I use the term) is defined by me.

You’re using the term ‘reality’ to mean “that which is accurate from my perspective and matters to me.” But how do you determine whether or not something is accurate from your perspective without reference to truth?

On my view, truth is defined by God—but so is reality and existence (being) and so on. When I assert, “Truth is that which corresponds to reality,” it is grounded in the view that reality is defined by God—necessarily with regard to his being, contingently with respect to all other being. God is the final reference point of all predication. And if I may be permitted a measure of audacity, I’d suggest that what matters to you is likewise defined by God, though the operations of his grace.

References:

1. The state of affairs must be existent or ‘actual’ because, by definition, ‘possible’ states of affairs do not exist. (Unless you are employing a unique definition of ‘exist’ that renders ‘possible’ semantics as meaningless.)

Rick Baskett wrote:

Does the monster exist? No. Does the monster exist as a delusion? Yes. Does the shadow exist as substance? No. Does the shadow exist as per the definition of a shadow? Yes.

If the monster exists as furniture of your mind, then it exists—otherwise what does it mean to say that it “exists as furniture of your mind”?

And a shadow does exist as a substance—under a philosophical definition of substance, that is, which is something that exists as itself in which properties inhere (i.e., “as per the definition of a shadow”). But if by substance you mean “composed of matter” then you’re right to say it doesn’t. Be careful of defining the word that way, however, as it would mean God has no substance (Gk. ousia)!

1. There is a difference between 'real' and 'exist.'
a. No, no X can be real but not exist.
b. Yes, some X can exist but not be real.

Real and reality (what's “accurate” and matters from my perspective) fit inside existence and truth (what's “accurate” from God's perspective). Truth is defined by God – reality (the way I use the term) is defined by me.

I'm curious about the implications this view might have on other matters. I think I've considered many of them (but don't we all think that?). If you see difficulties here, please let me know.

-Marshall Jones Jr.

You said: “We define truth as, 'that which corresponds to reality.' ” That's where I differ. I define truth as, “that which corresponds to God's beliefs.” My definition of truth is predicated on God.

You also said: “To imagine that He would create something that exists but is not real or create something that is real but does not really exist seems rather silly and pointless.” I'm not sure I follow the logic here, unless you begin with the assumption that “to exist” equals “to be real.”

(See my comment below yours for a hopefully clearer breakdown of my perspective as I tend to use the terms differently).

-Marshall Jones Jr.

Yes, you put my position nicely in that first part–'real' does not predicate 'true.' But for the last part, I'd say that truth relates to existence, not reality–saying 'X is real' means only that 'X matters to me.'

See my comment toward the bottom, the one that's not a reply. I gave a slightly more clear answer to the post's questions there. I wonder if you could elaborate on the problems you see with these sorts of definitions.

-Marshall Jones Jr.