Exist or real?
Posted by RyftFeb 3
So here is a two-part philosophical question I would like to survey your thoughts on. And it is a two-part question because I am not sure if—or even how—it can be separated into distinct questions, so I’ll ask them together. (And this is a vitally important question to contemplate, for it possesses very serious ramifications for both ontology and epistemology together.)
- Is there a difference between real and exist?
- Can something be real but not exist?
- Can something exist but not be real?
It almost seems as though there is no difference, that they are interchangeable terms; by saying that something is real we are saying that it exists, or by saying that it exists we are saying that it is real. That seems right. But is it? Is there no difference? What does it mean for X to be real?
Of course, we have to avoid the easy temptation of defining ‘real’ as correspondence to reality because, first of all, that would amount to an empty tautology which fails to impart any information and, more importantly, correspondence is widely recognized as a distinct theory of truth. (If reality is a predicate of truth, then ‘real’ and ‘true’ cannot be interchangeable terms. Think about it: if truth is that which corresponds to reality, and ‘real’ and ‘true’ both mean the same thing, then we are left with a theory that is not instructive. To say that “true is that which corresponds to truth” has about as much meaning as “real is that which corresponds to reality.”)
So if correspondence to reality is what it means for X to be true, then what does it mean for X to be real? Someone might suggest, “X is real when it has existence.” And therein lies the rub, calling upon the significance of my question. That statement seems to imply that if something does not exist then it is not real.
It’s an interesting question, and far deeper than it first appears. Should we understand that ‘real’ and ‘exist’ are two different things? But if ‘real’ and ‘exist’ don’t mean the same thing, then how can something be real but not exist, or exist but not be real?
If you have some insights or some probative questions that can help put this issue into gear, post your contribution in the Comments field. Or if you know a philosopher who has addressed this specific question, leave a recommendation.
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22 comments
Comment by Rick Baskett on 3 Feb 2010 at 22:55
What comes to mind is when something exists in a person’s mind, but it is not real. But the inverse could be when something is real in a person’s mind, but does not exist. It does indeed seem synonymous. hmm.. But then just because something “seems” real in a person’s mind, does not make it so. Oye.. hmm..
One definition of “real” is: “If something is real to someone, they experience it as though it really exists or happens, even though it does not.”
My question then is.. is it actually “real” then? Ok Ill have to ponder this some more, hopefully someone else will chime in. I have a headache.
Comment by Ryft on 3 Feb 2010 at 23:06
It would be great if someone could give me an example of something that is ‘real’ but does not ‘exist’, or something that ‘exists’ but is not ‘real’.
Someone once gave me the example of an amputee for whom the phantom itch in their missing limb is real, but doesn’t exist. I said they were confusing issues, saying the itch was ‘real’ even though the limb does not ‘exist’ (e.g., apples and oranges). The itch is real and the itch exists. The limb is neither real nor does it exist.
Comment by Duane on 4 Feb 2010 at 04:19
Great brain-buster Ryft.
Just to help me get a grasp on this concept and the way you’re thinking about it, which of the two terms (real/exist) if any, would you say applies to say, shadows, being that shadows are the result of a lack of something that is real and exists (i.e. light) rather than the imposition of a shadow-like substance?
Comment by Rick Baskett on 4 Feb 2010 at 18:37
Well since the definitely of a shadow is “A shadow is a dark shape on a surface that is made when something stands between a light and the surface.” then I would say it is real and exists by it's definition?
Comment by Mathew on 4 Feb 2010 at 19:30
Sounds like y'all confusing intangible/tangible with real and existing?
My thoughts are intangible, but surely are real and do exist – unfortunately, as you can't measure them or see them, you have to take my word for it, right?
Comment by Joshua Allen on 4 Feb 2010 at 21:33
Real is the opposite of fake, and fake exists
Comment by bondChristian on 6 Feb 2010 at 14:48
I tend to use “real” and “exist” similar to the way Rick brought up. I use “real” to mean something that matters to me. Something could exist but not be real because it doesn't matter to me.
For me, “real” is a sliding scale whereas “existence” is either/0r. Something either exists or it doesn't, but something can be more real or less real.
Let's consider a couple examples. I think Jupiter (the planet) exists, but how real is it to me? Reality depends on the intensity of the idea or experience in my mind. If I'm feeling like I'm drowning, drowning is very real to me in that moment, more real than Jupiter. In a different situation, perhaps when I'm hugging my mother after a fantastic Thanksgiving meal, she's way more real to me than the idea of drowning.
I tend to go with these definitions because they help in understanding the difference between modernism and post-modernism. Without getting too much more off topic, modernism is concerned with what exists, whether it matters to me or not. Post-modernism, on the other hand, is concerned with what's real, what really matters to me (it's experiential).
I think this is where some confusion comes about post-modernists being relativists. While in general that might be accurate, I lean toward post-modernism in my beliefs because I'm really only concerned with what matters to me even though I believe in absolute (i.e. defined by God) truths. I don't care about Jupiter – I care about drowning.
-Marshall Jones Jr.
Comment by Adam on 7 Feb 2010 at 17:47
Seems like you've taken what appears to be a simple concept and made it a lot more complex and confusing by thinking too much on it.
I think the meaning of those words (real, exist and true) depends on context and will be interpreted differently by different people depending on how they are expressed. Which then gets us on to the subjective / objective nature of those concepts. Once you throw a (diseased) human mind into the mix then real, exist and true can (and will) be interpreted differently.
I like to think that there is an objective reality which “just is”. As soon as human minds try to describe it using a language that often times seems bonkers when you think about it, then the waters become muddy and confusion and puzzled look ensue.
Adam
Comment by Ryft on 7 Feb 2010 at 23:04
If the term ‘exist’ regards any thing available to our sense perceptions (e.g., a shadow exists because we can see it), while the term ‘real’ regards the essence of the thing in itself (e.g., numbers are real but they are not available to our senses), then we can say that ‘exist’ and ‘real’ are distinct from each other. But then that would seem to imply a certain ontological hierarchy, where ‘real’ becomes at once both foundational and a predicate of ‘exist’—namely, it becomes meaningful to say that X is real but does not exist, such as numbers, while it would be nonsensical to say that X exists but is not real, such as shadows.
I raise this issue because it has profound ramifications on how we define and use two important areas of inquiry: truth and God. And any change to either of those has far reaching consequences that defy calculation.
If ‘real’ has a meaning like that described by Marshall Jones Jr. (i.e., “something that matters to me”), then it becomes a relative term subject to individual preferences and no longer available as a defining predicate of ‘true’—in other words, it turns out that saying “X is true” means only that “X matters to me.” But such a view would have extraordinary implications on what we understand ‘knowledge’ to be (where it is normally understood as warranted true belief), where not only ‘true’ but also ‘know’ becomes nothing more than biographical information that has nothing to say about the world independent of the person. In the final analysis, it is postmodernism run amuck, the logical conclusion of which cannot escape the kenotic force of Nihilism.
Also, if it is possible to say that X is real but does not exist, then arguments about the existence of God are insignificant since (a) his being real is the distinctly important issue and, (b) if ‘real’ means the essence of the thing in itself, then God cannot exist, for nothing about his essence is definable in terms available to our senses. But who would be willing to concede so much important ground to metaphysical naturalism against the centuries of biblical and church thought?
These concepts are not simple at all, Adam, which I hope you can see. I have not made them complex; they are already complex in themselves, by virtue of having such far reaching and extraordinary consequences.
Comment by Ryft Braeloch on 8 Feb 2010 at 02:06
If the term ‘exist’ regards any thing available to our sense perceptions (e.g., a shadow exists because we can see it), while the term ‘real’ regards the essence of the thing in itself (e.g., numbers are real but they are not available to our senses), then we can say that ‘exist’ and ‘real’ are distinct from each other. But then that would seem to imply a certain ontological hierarchy, where ‘real’ becomes at once both foundational and a predicate of ‘exist’—namely, it becomes meaningful to say that X is real but does not exist, such as numbers, while it would be nonsensical to say that X exists but is not real, such as shadows.
I raise this issue because it has profound ramifications on how we define and use two important areas of inquiry: truth and God. And any change to either of those has far reaching consequences that defy calculation.
If ‘real’ has a meaning like that described by Marshall Jones Jr. (i.e., “something that matters to me”), then it becomes a relative term subject to individual preferences and no longer available as a defining predicate of ‘true’—in other words, it turns out that saying “X is true” means only that “X matters to me.” But such a view would have extraordinary implications on what we understand ‘knowledge’ to be (where it is normally understood as warranted true belief), where not only ‘true’ but also ‘know’ becomes nothing more than biographical information that has nothing to say about the world independent of the person. In the final analysis, it is postmodernism run amuck, the logical conclusion of which cannot escape the kenotic force of Nihilism.
Also, if it is possible to say that X is real but does not exist, then arguments about the existence of God are insignificant since (a) his being real is the distinctly important issue and, (b) if ‘real’ means the essence of the thing in itself, then God cannot exist, for nothing about his essence is definable in terms available to our senses. But who would be willing to concede so much important ground to metaphysical naturalism against the centuries of biblical and church thought?
These concepts are not simple at all, Adam, which I hope you can see. I have not made them complex; they are already complex in themselves, by virtue of having such far reaching and extraordinary consequences.
Comment by Rick Baskett on 8 Feb 2010 at 05:33
Ok I've thought about this a bit more.
Anything that exists is real, but not everything that is real, exists.
If something exists then regardless of what I do, think, say, experience, etc it is real. But as in the example of my mind, let's get a little Matrix on you, something can be very real in my mind, yet it does not exist. For example, I can imagine a tiny little monster with glowing eyes following me everywhere I go, I start to get scared and I eventually claw a hole into my arm where the monster was biting me. Now it was very real to me, but it did not actually exist.
This goes back to Adam's comment, it depends on what we are talking about. It was a real figment of my imagination, but that figment does not exist. It's the nature of the subject that is important.
Philosophers have been debating this for ages, Im pretty sure that Im not going to shed any light on the subject :)
Comment by roycebuzz on 10 Feb 2010 at 15:47
Hi all. I love the new site.
It is my understanding that nothing unreal exists and nothing that does not exist is real.
The monster in Rick’s example does exist…. it just doesn’t exist as a monster (it exists as a very real delusion). If we occasionally make a mistake regarding the true nature of a thing the error lies with our own perception, not the thing itself.
In bondChristian’s contribution he seemed to equate the reality of a thing with its subjective importance to him at any given time. “….perhaps when I'm hugging my mother after a fantastic Thanksgiving meal, she's (of greater immediate importance) to me than the idea of drowning.” The way I read it this take on the word “real” falls outside the intent of your original question.
As believers I think we are uniquely qualified to answer these questions. We have the spirit of God living within us and, as such, possess the “mind of Christ”. We may not always fully comprehend His mysterious ways but we do know Him. When Jesus said “I am the Way, the Truth and the Life,” He didn’t say it just because it sounded cool (although it does). We define truth as, “that which corresponds to reality.” Jesus is the creator of all things and when He created them He did so in a manner that is perfectly consistent with His own character. He Himself is the basis of all reality which makes Him the living embodiment of what is true.
So what we know of God makes clear what we know of reality. God is supremely organized and divinely rational. Though He is grandiose in His generosity to us, He is neither wasteful nor arbitrary. Everything He does has a purpose and His purpose is always to the achievement of the greatest good. To imagine that He would create something that exists but is not real or create something that is real but does not really exist seems rather silly and pointless.
But I could be wrong….
Comment by bondChristian on 11 Feb 2010 at 00:47
You wrote: “If ‘real’ has a meaning like that described by Marshall Jones Jr. (i.e., 'something that matters to me'), then it becomes a relative term subject to individual preferences and no longer available as a defining predicate of ‘true’—in other words, it turns out that saying 'X is true' means only that 'X matters to me.' “
Yes, you put my position nicely in that first part–'real' does not predicate 'true.' But for the last part, I'd say that truth relates to existence, not reality–saying 'X is real' means only that 'X matters to me.'
See my comment toward the bottom, the one that's not a reply. I gave a slightly more clear answer to the post's questions there. I wonder if you could elaborate on the problems you see with these sorts of definitions.
-Marshall Jones Jr.
Comment by bondChristian on 11 Feb 2010 at 00:55
I completely agree that my definition of 'real' falls outside the intent of the post. Still, it answers the three questions posed at the beginning. Using my definitions, existence is not defined by reality.
You said: “We define truth as, 'that which corresponds to reality.' ” That's where I differ. I define truth as, “that which corresponds to God's beliefs.” My definition of truth is predicated on God.
You also said: “To imagine that He would create something that exists but is not real or create something that is real but does not really exist seems rather silly and pointless.” I'm not sure I follow the logic here, unless you begin with the assumption that “to exist” equals “to be real.”
(See my comment below yours for a hopefully clearer breakdown of my perspective as I tend to use the terms differently).
-Marshall Jones Jr.
Comment by bondChristian on 11 Feb 2010 at 00:56
Let me try to answer the original post's questions in a more straightforward way:
1. There is a difference between 'real' and 'exist.'
a. No, no X can be real but not exist.
b. Yes, some X can exist but not be real.
Real and reality (what's “accurate” and matters from my perspective) fit inside existence and truth (what's “accurate” from God's perspective). Truth is defined by God – reality (the way I use the term) is defined by me.
I'm curious about the implications this view might have on other matters. I think I've considered many of them (but don't we all think that?). If you see difficulties here, please let me know.
-Marshall Jones Jr.
Comment by Rick Baskett on 11 Feb 2010 at 01:54
That's my point though, it depends on what we are talking about. My monster does not exist as a monster, but it does exist as a delusion. We have to define what we are questioning the existence of before we can answer the question. Does the monster exist? No. Does the monster exist as a delusion? Yes. Does the shadow exist as substance? No. Does the shadow exist as per the definition of a shadow? Yes.
Comment by Ryft Braeloch on 11 Feb 2010 at 05:05
I am not exactly clear on what your stance is here, but I will make an assumption and respond accordingly. If I have misunderstood, you can clarify in your next reply.
When you said that “truth relates to existence, not reality,” you did so as against the idea of reality being the predicate for truth; i.e., a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to some existent state of affairs. [1] And that is fine, of course, but it seems to suggest a unique definition of ‘existence’ (for I am unwilling to believe that you are working from a logical positivist view). Consider:
* A proposition is true if and only if it refers to some existent state of affairs.
Is that true? Only if there is some existent state of affairs to which it refers, under your view, but (a) what existent state of affairs would that be, and (b) what is the nature of the relation? (For instance, is it an identity relation)?
You’re using the term ‘reality’ to mean “that which is accurate from my perspective and matters to me.” But how do you determine whether or not something is accurate from your perspective without reference to truth?
On my view, truth is defined by God—but so is reality and existence (being) and so on. When I assert, “Truth is that which corresponds to reality,” it is grounded in the view that reality is defined by God—necessarily with regard to his being, contingently with respect to all other being. God is the final reference point of all predication. And if I may be permitted a measure of audacity, I’d suggest that what matters to you is likewise defined by God, though the operations of his grace.
References:
1. The state of affairs must be existent or ‘actual’ because, by definition, ‘possible’ states of affairs do not exist. (Unless you are employing a unique definition of ‘exist’ that renders ‘possible’ semantics as meaningless.)
If the monster exists as furniture of your mind, then it exists—otherwise what does it mean to say that it “exists as furniture of your mind”?
And a shadow does exist as a substance—under a philosophical definition of substance, that is, which is something that exists as itself in which properties inhere (i.e., “as per the definition of a shadow”). But if by substance you mean “composed of matter” then you’re right to say it doesn’t. Be careful of defining the word that way, however, as it would mean God has no substance (Gk. ousia)!
Comment by Duane on 11 Feb 2010 at 14:38
I have to admit that I am still struggling to get my mind around this and I am not sure if this is due mainly to the inherent complexities of the idea or the semantics involved in even grounding the question. Some of the discussion that has ensued has only served to confuse me more to be honest.
To say that something exists as the furniture of the mind; isn't that just a fancy way of saying that you're thinking about something, rather than attempting to attach an ontological label to the object of your thought? Do we really need to use the word “exist” here, to describe the things we think about?
Comment by Adam on 11 Feb 2010 at 16:23
I can see what you're getting at Ryft. But from my perspective, the issue became complex due to your definitions. These were: If real = essence and exist = sense perception. I can see how if you accept these definitions then your dilemma arises. If exist = real then there is no dilemma. So I think a lot depends on your initial definitions of the terms.
This is just how it appears to me. This conversation started out very “high brow” and I'm just trying to understand it from a “low brow” perspective. I guess I'm in agreement with Duane on this one. Much seems to go over my head at times.
Comment by Ryft Braeloch on 11 Feb 2010 at 20:06
As long as we are distinguishing between the laws of the physical world and the laws of the real world, wherein the former is part of, but distinct from, the latter. (To say that the physical world and real world are one and the same is metaphysical naturalism, which is the discredited prejudice that only physical things are real.)
For example, the laws of thermodynamics do not apply to God but the laws of logic do, insofar as logical order is grounded in the nature and character of God and expressed normatively in his revelations. Furthermore, if ‘real’ and ‘exist’ refer to more than just the physical realm, such that God is real, then how we understand and use these terms becomes important, especially in our defense of the faith.
But I’m not saying you should take time out of your day to concern yourself with these issues. I am just trying to show why they’re important in themselves.
I am known to be a logoleptic omnilegent who obfuscates perspicuity (i.e., “yes”). However, it is relevant and important to the issue being contemplated, which I shall explain just below.
Maybe. See, that relates to the very question I’ve been posing. The whole matter seems to depend in an important way on whether or not they’re interchangeable terms. If our mental furniture is real but does not exist, it raises the question, “What does it mean to say that something is part of reality but has no existence?” And always at the front of my mind is how the answer to that question would impact our talk of God, in regard to both orthodoxy (by believers) and apologetics (to unbelievers).
I stumbled upon the importance of this issue one day while thinking on the incessant demand by atheists for evidence of anything that’s aired in their presence. Why are they asking for evidence? Because they refuse to believe (i.e., accept as true) something unless its truth can be demonstrated. (Or so they arbitrarily pretend because, in fact, they believe a host of things whose truth is not demonstrated, and in some cases cannot be demonstrated.) Well, that gets at the issue of what ‘true’ means. Most atheists that we encounter will subscribe to a correspondence view, and there we confront the issue of how reality is defined. Existence is an issue because typically the proposition being examined is “God exists.” But notice something very important here: (a) if the atheist holds that the terms ‘real’ and ‘exist’ are interchangeable, (b) that ‘true’ is defined as correspondence to reality, (c) and that reality consists strictly of natural things, then the atheist is assuming the truth of his view (question-begging fallacy) which denies us any means of ever meeting the burden of proof, all the while pretending that he is open to examining any evidence proffered (inadvertent lie).
In order to avoid that train wreck, the atheist has to admit that ‘real’ and ‘exist’ do not mean the same thing. So then we ask what it means for something to ‘exist’, because it does not make sense prima facie to say X exists but is not real. If reality is defined in terms of metaphysical naturalism, then the terms must be interchangeable and the logical train wreck is inescapable. And thus we have the question I had presented.
First, those are not my definitions at all. (In fact, I haven’t proposed my view on what the definitions are, or should be, precisely because I am currently still mulling this over for myself.) You see, I am the guy who thinks it is intelligible to say “God exists,” so I do not by any means think that ‘exist’ is restricted to the empirical realm.
The way I look at the issue—at least for the time being—the terms ‘real’ and ‘exist’ are interchangeable; they both refer to the being of a thing (Gk. ousia, a thing which has attributes and modes [1]). So, for example, to say that numbers exist is the same as saying that numbers are real, and vice versa.
References:
1. ‘attributes’, that which is predicated of some thing, such as a property or relation; ‘modes’, that is, of being (particular vs. abstract, possible vs. actual, etc.).
Comment by bondChristian on 11 Feb 2010 at 21:50
For all the muddiness, I apologize. My proposed definition of 'real' certainly isn't making any of this easy to understand.
I'm still trying to wrap my cranium around all this.
Ryft said: “You see, I am the guy who thinks it is intelligible to say 'God exists,' so I do not by any means think that ‘exist’ is restricted to the empirical realm.”
I completely agree with that. I differ on his last paragraph (I think)… at least for now.
Comment by Adam on 11 Feb 2010 at 23:21
I'm still trying to wrap my mind around this one. So I'm not sure if I should not be throwing my hands up in the air (like I just don't care) and giving up. But I'll give it another crack.
Looking back at your initial post, you seem to be asking if real and exist are interchangeable terms.
X is true if it corresponds to reality according to the correspondence theory of truth. Could we not also say that X is true if it corresponds to existence according to that same correspondence theory of reality?
I think I can agree with true and real not being interchangeable and true and exist not being interchangeable. And I also think real and exist can be interchangeable.
So in answer to your initial question “So if correspondence to reality is what it means for X to be true, then what does it mean for X to be real? ” X is real if it conforms to the correspondence theory of truth. And X exists if it conforms to the correspondence theory of truth.
It might just be the wording of your initial challenge but if I have made an error of coherence or produced an empty tautology then I would like to know how I have done that. My iron is probably dull and needs sharpening.