Introduction

PoE When it comes to arguments for atheism, that is, arguments for the non-existence of God, [1] none are considered so compelling as the Problem of Evil category of arguments—not only by atheists but for some reason also by many Christians. It is my contention that such a state of affairs exists for one overriding reason: that much of the general public (atheists and Christians alike) have not been taught how and therefore don’t know how to evaluate arguments critically. Starting around the turn of the last century and persisting to present day, as a society we all at once fell for the seductive allowances of postmodernism, shifted our obligations from family and society to radical individualism, and laid out a minefield of political correctness that a person dares trespass only on pain of being ostracized. “To argue for truth today is to stir an immediate debate,” noted Ravi Zacharias, “as if a heresy of devilish proportions has been invoked.”

So critical thinking skills, as instruments of evaluating truth claims and arguments, have incrementally lost value as items for our mental toolbox—especially since almost by definition they imply the existence of objective truths. If truth claims don’t or can’t describe reality objectively, always falling short of the task for one reason or another, then the tools for discerning objective truth claims grow rusty from disuse. Much more can be said on this, however I don’t wish to digress.

But for those who know what ‘validly’ means and how to reason accordingly, those who can tell the difference between an assumption and a conclusion, who are familiar with and can recognize errors in reasoning (fallacies), the more we interact with arguments for atheism the more we discover that none of them validly prove the non-existence of God, including the Problem of Evil versions. For a constellation of other reasons, I think this is why Greg Koukl, in his most recent Mentoring Letter, encouraged subscribers to engage criticisms head-on. “Sometimes it’s better to move towards an objection rather than away from it, to embrace a charge rather than run from it,” he writes. “In other words, don’t run from the problem; run towards it and defuse it. Don’t evade; invade.  Embrace it, undermine its relevance, and take the wind out of its sails.” [2]

In an effort to evaluate my position under the fire of critical scrutiny, I have recently begun engaging in a series of debates on Problem of Evil arguments for atheism, where my opponent is invited to defend whatever version thereof he or she feels best proves the non-existence of God. This article shall examine the first of these debates, which took place at the Debate.org web site. [3] As these debates conclude, at that site or some other location (e.g., message board, email, etc.), I will post another article here at the Aristophrenium evaluating the results thereof. Until it is defeated—assuming it even can be—I will continue to maintain my resolution, that “there are literally no versions of the Problem of Evil argument that succeed at proving the non-existence of God.”

Note: In all my arguments, on this and any other matter, the term ‘God’ always refers to God as revealed in Christian scripture canon (viz. the 39 books of the Old Testament and 27 books of the New Testament) and possessing all the commonly recognized attributes thereof (e.g., trinitarian, omnipotent, righteous, sovereign, etc.). I have no interest in defending, nor do I even recognize the legitimacy of, any deity other than the God of Christian theism.


The definitions

Since evil is a moral term (sin, wrong, bad, etc.) it calls upon biblical meta-ethics, [4] which holds that moral order is grounded in the very nature and character of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. [5] As a result, evil is therefore a privative term expressing a want of conformity thereto (i.e., being contrary to his character or against his commands). Evil has no ontological substance; it is not a thing in itself but a term describing a breach of relationship between some agent or circumstance and the character and prescriptive will of God.

Given that moral order is grounded in the nature and character of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands, the term all-good therefore refers to the immutable consistency of God, his character, and his commands. To say, then, that God is all-good or infinitely benevolent is to say that God possesses no malevolence—i.e., exhibiting or wishing malicious harm to others—against which his benevolence might compete; yet it leaves room for God to possess more attributes than just benevolence, such as his just wrath against sin. Consequently, he is all-good in the sense of his eternal, unchanging character (e.g., God is not sometimes just, he is always just). The goodness of God is described thus: “As exercised with respect to the miseries of his creatures, it is mercy, pity, compassion; and in the case of impenitent sinners, long-suffering patience; as exercised in communicating favour on the unworthy, it is grace.” [6] (It must always be remembered that God is not strictly good; he is also righteous and just, etc.)

The argument

In the first of these debates my opponent, TheSkeptic, chose to use “gratuitous evil” to defeat my resolution, defending that such an argument indeed does succeed at proving that God does not exist, but probabilistically—in other words, his non-existence is more probable than the alternative. And in this debate my opponent proposed an internal critique, which simply means that he intended to make his case using Christianity’s own terms, so terms such as ‘God’ and ‘evil’, etc., are as defined biblically.

Stated as a modus tollens, his argument amounted to:

1. If an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God exists, then gratuitous evil probably does not exist.

2. Gratuitous evil probably exists.

3. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God probably does not exist.

With respect to the first premise, he described gratuitous evil as being “incompatible” with the biblical God. Regarding the second premise, he described gratuitous evil as any evil that is “unwarranted or unjustified” or “pointless.”

The analysis

There are two problems with his argument, regarding each of the premises. First, it is incorrect to characterize gratuitous evil as being “incompatible” with God, insofar as that understates the matter tremendously. Given that the God at issue in this debate is defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good, the existence of gratuitous evil is not a matter of probability—because its probability is zero! In other words, ‘gratuitous evil’ and ‘God’ are mutually exclusive entities in the same way that an Immovable Object and an Irresistible Force are. Either gratuitous evil exists or God exists; it is logically impossible—by the very definition of the terms involved—for both to exist.

In order for any evils to be gratuitous God must lack one of the given attributes. He has insufficient power, or he is unaware, or he is inattentive, or he is indifferent, etc. But to assert such a God is to build a straw man, which is invalid, so he cannot do this. Ergo, his first premise fails because it defies the agreed-upon definitions of the debate.

Second, it is therefore question-begging for him to assert that gratuitous evils probably exist, never mind how he intended to support that particular premise (which cannot be done validly at any rate). Consider the following exposition:

(GE = gratuitous evil; BG = biblical God)

4. If GE has a probability greater than zero, then GE is logically possible.

5. GE has a probability greater than zero.

6. Therefore, GE is logically possible.

Here (4) is uncontroversial, since it follows necessarily or by definition, but (5) and (6) prove the question-begging fallacy being committed by his argument:

7. If BG exists, then GE is not logically possible.

8. GE is logically possible.

9. Therefore, BG does not exist.

Here (7) follows by definition of the terms, and (8) is a restatement from (6). However, (8) shows us clearly why his argument commits the question-begging fallacy. For him to assert gratuitous evil as logically possible (cf. (5) above and (2) earlier) is for him to assert the existence of God as logically impossible. But doing so within a premise of an argument intended to prove the non-existence of God is to render the whole argument invalid by having implicitly begged the very question! As a result, his argument has rendered itself invalid by reason of a logical fallacy.

There is also the matter of any evils being gratuitous in the first place. If we construct the argument for it as a modus ponens, it might look like this:

(E = some evil)

10. If E is without warrant or purpose, then E is gratuitous.

11. E is without warrant or purpose.

12. Therefore, E is gratuitous.

Of course (10) is true by definition, so the issue centers on (11). How did he support the truth of (11)? By pointing to the lack of evidence for its alternative. But it commits the argument from ignorance for him to assert that (11) is “true until proven otherwise” so he cannot do that. Yes, there are cases when the presumption of truth (or falsehood) is a valid move; but it is an invalid move if doing so would end up begging the question, as it does with respect to his argument (such that the existence of gratuitous evil is said to count against the existence of God). It is for this reason that (11) is disqualified from the presumption of truth. So then he must prove that (11) is true, rather than presume its truth until proven otherwise. And good luck doing that validly.

I should also point out another slight problem in his argument. Toward supporting (11) and its probability, he said that “even after careful inspection of an example in which evil has occurred, there would be no good reason to believe that God would have an adequate reason to allow [it].” The problem is that his being unable to believe that God has a justification or purpose for some evil is not the issue, but whether or not God does in fact have one—or for his case, that God does not have one. But rationally speaking, being unable to imagine or conceive of something does not constitute as evidence for or against anything. Such is an argument from personal incredulity, which is a fallacy.

Conclusion

As a PoE argument proving the non-existence of God, it seems that the ‘gratuitous evil’ version cannot avoid rendering itself invalid by reason of logical fallacy. And when we consider the definitions of the terms involved, we discover that this argument turns out to be a logical version of PoE arguments, which not only infuses it with tremendous potential strength but also tightly controls the rules for defending it—or, on the other hand, makes it very easy to defeat. With a mental toolbox equipped to understand and recognize errors in reasoning (fallacies), we discover that no arguments attempting to prove the non-existence of God are valid, including the Problem of Evil versions.

References

  1. Problem of Evil arguments can do one of two things: either demonstrate the non-existence of God or present a strong demand for a coherent theodicy. Though I’m interested in both, in this series I am concerning myself strictly with atheism and the PoE arguments used to defend it. Demonstrating the need for a coherent theodicy is not the same thing as proving the non-existence of God.
  2. Greg Koukl. “Why It’s Smart to Agree With an Atheist… Sometimes.” Mentoring Letter, Stand to Reason. 1 February 2010. Print.
  3. “The ‘Problem of Evil’ never succeeds (Attempt 1).” Debate.org. February 2010.
  4. The term meta-ethics refers to the branch of philosophy that concerns itself with identifying and understanding the origin and meaning of ethical concepts, properties, statements, and attitudes, etc. While ethics deals with what is moral, meta-ethics deals with what morality is.
  5. Scott B. Rae. Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995. p. 32.
  6. "Goodness of God." Easton’s Bible Dictionary.

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