Answering questions and objections

Posted by Ryft

May 10

Due to the word-count restriction in the comments area, I have chosen to address in a blog post many of the questions and objections being submitted in response to my posts on the Genesis creation account, since it takes more words to answer a controversial question than it does to ask it—and there are several being asked. I will not identify to whom each question or objection belongs; I am confident that people will recognize the substance of their question or objection in what follows. (I have also chosen to reframe each question or objection in my own words.)

The scriptural analysis you supplied does not disqualify the view that the earth or the universe is relatively young, that creation happened relatively recently.

The scriptural analysis being provided here is doing two things. First, it is establishing through an historical and grammatical exegesis that the view of Genesis as a cosmic temple text understood through a function-oriented ontology is strongly supported. Second, it is exposing that young-earth creationism not only fails to support its view exegetically but also has to admit its eisegetical foundation. In other words, it is being shown that young-earth creationism disqualifies itself under its own terms.

Young-earth creationism stands on two legs, as it were. What this analysis has done is expose how young-earth creationism has cut one of its own legs out from under itself. They have long proclaimed that their view interprets the Genesis creation account literally but, in a twist of exquisite irony, it turns out that the emperor has no clothes. Ponder this. If a literal interpretation involves understanding the text as the original prophet and audience would have understood it, but nowhere in our interpretation do we take that into account or make that case, then in fact we have not interpreted it literally at all.

The most critical of the two legs that young-earth creationism stands on is Scripture. Specifically, they think creation is young because they calculate backwards through the biblical genealogies to conclude that Adam lived roughly 10,000 years ago or less; since God created Adam on the sixth day of creation week, during which he brought everything into material existence, the whole of creation is therefore roughly six days older than Adam; that is, it is likewise roughly 10,000 years old.

But therein lies the rub: this interpretation of the Genesis creation account depends on a material ontology, that creation is to be understood as bringing something into existence in material terms. But where is that conclusion drawn from? Not from the text, for every analysis of the text in young-earth creationist literature presupposes a material ontology prior to the analysis. It is just plainly obvious that creation is about bringing something into existence in material terms. But that is the question never asked: To whom is it obvious? Did the Israelites of the ancient Near East view existence and thus creation in such material terms?

And so what do we have? We have the young-earth creationist view which interprets creation in Genesis through the lens of material ontology without a shred of historical and grammatical exegesis supporting that. As a matter of fact, when we look at the historical record of the people and that period we discover that they did not view existence and thus creation in material terms. Consequently young-earth creationists are not interpreting Genesis literally after all, despite themselves. That is to say, they cut the scriptural leg out from under their own view with the chainsaw of eisegesis.

So they have one leg left: science. However, that leg splinters into a million pieces the moment they put any pressure on it. Why? Because young-earth creationists have never bothered to establish their view scientifically. All of their efforts have targeted either the scientific plausibility and explanatory power of a worldwide flood, which does not tell us how old the universe is, or the faults and problems they find with the scientific evidence for an old universe (e.g., radiometric dating, the velocity of light, and so forth). Some do attempt to propose scientific ideas to support design, but that likewise has nothing to do with how old the universe is. But nowhere have they ever provided any scientific theories for a young universe. So by their eisegesis they have cut out one leg from under their own view, and by never establishing their view as a testable scientific theory they have cut out the other leg.

It was never the point to disqualify view Y by proposing view X. Rather, by proposing view X it is easier to notice how view Y disqualifies itself.

Of those occurrences of bara’ elsewhere in the Old Testament, how many of them point back to creation in Genesis? For this seems like circular logic to me, to argue that bara’ in Genesis is a functional activity because in these other places it is, yet these other places are themselves referring to Genesis.

Almost none of the roughly 50 Old Testament occurrences of bara’ (in the Qal voice) examined by Walton in his exegesis were referring to creation in Genesis. And I agree that your example argument is horribly circular, but it does not in any way reflect the exegesis Walton performed. Thus I have no idea why you mentioned it. At any rate, some of the contexts of bara’ elsewhere in the Old Testament include Exodus 34:10 (“Before all your people I will do wonders never before done in any nation in all the world.”), Numbers 16:30 (“But if the LORD brings about something totally new, and the earth opens its mouth and swallows them …”), Psalm 51:10 (“Create in me a pure heart, O God …”), Isa 43:7 (“… everyone who is called by my name, whom I created for my glory, whom I formed and made.”), and so forth. Since all of these occurrences of bara’ were not speaking about creation as defined by a material ontology (bringing things into material existence) but rather as defined by a functional ontology (the activity occupies material already existing), we have good reason to question why we would suddenly change the grammatical rule in favour of a contrived exception when it comes to Genesis. What Walton does, essentially, is insist that we not engage in the special pleading fallacy anymore.

As I said previously, Walton’s exegesis demonstrates that relevant contexts of bara’ involve numerous examples where a function-oriented ontology is clearly in view, several examples where the ontology in view is not clear, and zero examples where a material-oriented ontology is clearly in view. Thus the functional understanding is strongly supported grammatically (and historically, elsewhere in the book) while the material understanding is left wanting for support.

Showing from Old Testament uses of bara’ that a material-oriented ontology is not in view may help your view but it does not eliminate mine. My view might still be supported at some point, but its lack of support presently does not somehow eliminate it.

I already agreed that using a material ontology to interpret bara’ is not refuted by this exegesis (although it is undermined by it). However, it is interesting how you almost seem to miss the very stark point being made; that is, if on the one hand view X is drawn from historical and grammatical exegesis of the text, while on the other hand view Y is not, then which view is interpreting the text literally? Therein lies the exquisite irony of the matter.

And it raises a rather serious question: If since I first started writing about this issue you have consequently examined the young-earth creationism literature and found that indeed a material ontology is consistently presupposed, never being drawn from the text itself exegetically, then as someone who takes seriously the word of God as authoritative, what shall you do now? I know what I did.

So many words used in the creation account appear to imply material work, not functional work.

Here is the question you need to answer for yourself: They appear to imply that to whom? By attempting to answer, you will begin to see the eisegesis-versus-exegesis conflict I keep pointing at.

I think you would not have gone looking for an alternative view if you had not already been convinced that the young-earth creationist view must be wrong for scientific reasons. Personally I am unconvinced by this science.

First, it is true that I had to let go of young-earth creationism because it contradicted reality. Nature has a substantive role to play in how we interpret Scripture, which is exhibited by the fact that people who take God and his word seriously do not subscribe to the view that our heart is the organ with which we think and feel; I am pretty sure you likewise do not subscribe to that view. People who take God and his word seriously also do not subscribe to the geocentric view of the solar system; I am sure you also do not subscribe to that view. Even though Scripture refers to our heart as the seat of affections and thoughts, we do not interpret that as meaning that our thoughts and feelings are generated somewhere in the myocardium or the coronary arteries of our blood pump. Why not? Because nature tells us what that organ is responsible for, and that cognitive and conative activity takes place in our brain. Thus nature serves as a corrective in how we interpret and understand such references. But that should make sense if we accept that God is the author of both Scripture and nature; thus nature should not contradict Scripture, nor should Scripture contradict nature, for God is the author of both. If there is a contradiction between the two, then our interpretation of one or the other is at fault.

As Gerald Runkle wrote (1981, p. 271), “It is the mark of stubborn and dogmatic persons to be oblivious to the need either to test their own beliefs or to recognize the successful tests that opposing beliefs have undergone. Copernicus caused widespread consternation when he suggested that the earth revolved around the sun. Though he had impressive evidence for his theory, it was received in ill humor by most religious groups. Martin Luther complained: ‘People give ear to an upstart astrologer who strove to show that the earth revolved, not the heavens or the firmament, the sun and the moon. … This fool wishes to reverse the entire science of astronomy; but the sacred Scripture tells us that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still and not the earth’.”

Second, it is unclear how you being “not convinced by this science” is relevant in any way to either the scientific reasons behind my rejection of young-earth creationism or the exegesis by which Walton argues that Genesis 1 is a temple text.

I have to wonder why Walton is trying to wrestle a function-oriented ontology out of bara’ when it is not really apparent, rather than follow its normal understanding. Perhaps you provide the reason: that it is to allow the so-called certainty of long age dating to set a foot into the discussion and allow the biblical text to be commensurate with such ‘findings’. In that case, it would seem Walton is being entirely disingenuous. While you’re not, it certainly took some time before you admitted that this was your major reason for rejecting YEC.

This could not be further from the truth, and on several points. First of all, it does not take any sort of wrestling or squeezing to find a function-oriented ontology predicated by what bara’ (in the Qal voice) meant to the ancient Israelites. As soon as we set aside our modern language and categories and enter their culture authentically through historical and grammatical exegesis of their texts, the function-oriented ontology just about leaps off the page.

Second, you say it is “not really apparent,” but to whom? The English reader of our era and cultural categories? If we want to follow its normal understanding, then we must enter the language and culture of the text; that is, the proper biblical hermeneutic of historical and grammatical exegesis. The text of Genesis 1 was revealed by God to the Israelites of the ancient Near East, “people who lived in a different place, in a very different culture, at a different time and period of history, and who spoke different languages,” as Kulikovksy noted. Thus, following the normal understanding is about discovering “the original intended meaning of a passage” through understanding it “the way the original audience understood it.”

Third, after the numerous pages Walton spent exposing the bankruptcy of concordist attempts at interpreting Genesis—of both the young-earth and old-earth varieties, including that of Hugh Ross and his Reasons to Believe ministry—attempts to accuse him of trying to accommodate “long age dating” are utterly indefensible. In order to make that accusation one has to completely ignore what he wrote.

Fourth, I admitted a very long time ago that science played a role in my rejection of young-earth creationism. Maybe you have seen it only recently, but that hardly has any bearing on the fact that I have admitted it for years, including right here on this web site. As I had said before, I reject young-earth creationism for both scriptural and scientific reasons, and old-earth creationism for just scriptural reasons.

When are you going to pass comment on the T. rex blood issue?

I began writing a response to that almost immediately, but after receiving an email from Mathew (sent to all Aristophrenium staff) expressing his opinion that the staff here should be sparing in how often they rebut each others views, I put the article on hold. I aim to continue working on it when I have time available but I likely will not post it for a while, out of respect for Mathew’s opinion.