Gratuitous Evil: Q&A (28/Feb/2010)
Posted by RyftMar 1
With regard to my following reasoning, I address some questions raised.
(1) To affirm that Gratuitous Evil has a probability greater than zero is to affirm that Gratuitous Evil is possible, by definition.
(2) To affirm that Gratuitous Evil is possible is to affirm that the Biblical God is impossible, by definition.
(3) To affirm that the Biblical God is impossible (implicitly or explicitly) within a premise of an argument against the existence thereof commits the fallacy of begging the question.
Well then the problem is that, under Christian presuppositions, gratuitous evil doesn’t exist; and your argument is sound under such presuppositions.
That being the case—and it is—one might notice that he forgot to mention who it is a ‘problem’ for. And if I may point out the obvious: “Not for Christians.” As a matter of fact, that is substantively the basis upon which the Christian can trust in the loving providence of God through painful or troubled times; i.e., given the God in whom we place our love, trust, and obedience, no evil that befalls us could ever be gratuitous (Eccl. 7:14; Rom. 8:28; Ps. 71:20; Heb. 12:7-11; 1 Pet. 5:7-10; and so forth).
However, in reality there are gratuitous evils—such as natural disasters.
Pointing to some natural disaster and asserting that it is a gratuitous evil is just that: an assertion; and according to generally accepted standards of sound reasoning, bare assertions are not rationally decisive. To possess rational merit, his assertion must be turned into a conclusion with premises that at least validly support it. We have his assertion that natural disasters are gratuitous evils but not any reason to think that is true, while under the Christian view we have an abundance of reason to think it false.
I have no sufficient reason to believe that [natural disasters] are the result of rebellion against God (cf. definition of evil). That being so, the Christian God then isn’t consistent with reality.
It is a stark error in reasoning to go from “I have no sufficient reason to believe X” and conclude that “therefore X is false” (i.e., contrary to reality). The fact that you do not have sufficient reason to believe X says something about your research diet but it says nothing about the truth or falsehood of X itself—for thinking that something is false or contrary to reality on the basis that it has not been proven true is the argumentum ad ignorantiam error. Remember, an absence of sufficient reason is good support for your not believing X, but it is bad support for you thinking that X is false (“isn’t consistent with reality”).
And perhaps just as important to note: the fact that you don’t have sufficient reason is a rather different matter from whether or not sufficient reason exists to be had. Do you have good reason? It seems not, if we take your word. Does that mean good reason does not exist? Non-sequitur; i.e., the one does not follow from the other. I can sympathize that you don’t have good reason, but remember: that’s autobiographical information. It does not mean that good reason doesn’t exist to be had. So then this is an opportune time to ask the easily neglected question: “Exactly what have you done to acquire that sufficient reason you need?” If little or nothing, then it would make sense why you do not have it.
Do you have evidence that natural disasters happen because of rebellions against God?
A fair amount, actually, yes. For example, the rebellion of Korah and his men, plus several thousand Israelites who had taken their side: an earthquake and fire destroyed Korah and his men, and a plague killed those who sided with their rebellion.
By having defined morality in reference to the nature and character of God, Ryft effectively precluded any possible existence of evil (by implying that everything God does is non-evil by definition). So then if God is the standard of morality, no evil can exist—gratuitous or otherwise.
Incorrect. The character and commands of God does not preclude the existence of evil by definition; on the contrary, it allows for and explains evil. However, it does preclude gratuitous evil by definition; given the God of Christian theism, it is impossible for any evil to be unwarranted or purposeless.

When it comes to arguments for atheism, that is, arguments for the non-existence of God, [1] none are considered so compelling as the Problem of Evil category of arguments—not only by atheists but for some reason also by many Christians. It is my contention that such a state of affairs exists for one overriding reason: that much of the general public (atheists and Christians alike) have not been taught how and therefore don’t know how to evaluate arguments critically. Starting around the turn of the last century and persisting to present day, as a society we all at once fell for the seductive allowances of postmodernism, shifted our obligations from family and society to radical individualism, and laid out a minefield of political correctness that a person dares trespass only on pain of being ostracized. “To argue for truth today is to stir an immediate debate,” noted Ravi Zacharias, “as if a heresy of devilish proportions has been invoked.”
Hans Küng, On Being a Christian (1974), p. 119.
Student refuses assignment on Devil
