It gets worse. In addition, an omnipresent and omniscient (all-observing) God, as bound into his creation as his creation is bound into him, must be able to observe everything. We know from quantum mechanics that observation collapses the wave-function of photons, leading to no superposition. But we know superposition exists, therefore this God with those attributes cannot.

Since I speak English and not mathematics I tend to avoid delving into quantum mechanics. This subject loses its precision when translated into English, and I am simply not fluent in mathematics. But I will indulge your point briefly in order to show how it fails to achieve the ends to which you put it.

First, we do not “know” that the wave-function collapses, much less due to observation. Although that is consistent with the familiar Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, it does not feature in the many-worlds interpretation, for example, nor the de Broglie-Bohm theory (in which the universal wave-function never collapses, only the conditional wave-function of a subsystem and is strictly an epiphenomenon) and so forth. As such, unless you are unfamiliar with epistemology, which is possible, it is disingenuous of you to pretend we “know” something that is theoretical—especially when it does not exist in competing theories.

Second, even granting you the Copenhagen interpretation, the observer effect in quantum mechanics is predicated on the ‘observer’ being constituted by matter—even if it is only a single electron. Thus the God of Scripture necessarily fails to represent the problem your point attempted to construct, for he is transcendent and immaterial.

One of the theological debates that takes place between orthodox Trinitarian Christians and heretical cultists and other non-Trinitarians of various stripes is whether the Old Testament confirms or contradicts Trinitarian doctrines such as the existence of plurality within the Godhead and the reality of the incarnation. A full treatment of this subject is outside the purview of this article, partly because there are already plenty of excellent articles that tackle this topic (Such as this and this), and partly because there are too many verses that are relevant to this, that we will only be focusing on one. In particular, there is one verse in 1 Kings that contains a statement by King Solomon which is sometimes cited by non-Trinitarians (particularly Muslims) against the idea that God could enter into His creation:

But will God indeed dwell on the earth? Behold, heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain you; how much less this house that I have built! (1 Kings 8:27).

As the argument goes, if God cannot be contained by heaven and earth, then it is impossible for God to enter into His own creation, since that would limit Him to a specific point in time and space.

Read the rest of this entry

Aaron from the Apologetic Junkie blog, and an associate in the Christian Apologetics Alliance, recently offered some thoughts on the question of whether or not all sin is the same, and I think it is well worth a read. He tells how the answer is both yes and no, depending on the context of the question. In the legal context of our guilt before a most holy God, the answer is yes. In the existential context of the damage sin does to others and the church and to our relationship with God, the answer is no.

Click here to read more from Aaron.

In the comments field to one of Adam’s recent posts, [1] a visitor called Trolando asked the following question regarding John MacArthur’s explanation of the word boulomai with respect to its appearance in 2 Peter 3:9.

Then what do you make of 2 Peter 3:9? … Not only is it stating that God wants (boulomai) all to be saved, but also no one to be lost, which makes an even stronger case for universalism. [2]

Since I know that I have addressed this passage before, [3] I went looking to see if I had published it anywhere on this web site. But I could not find it so perhaps I never have published it here. So allow me to correct that and simultaneously answer Trolando’s question. My comment at the Duane’s Mind blog was answering the question posed to me by Marc Kay, “What do you think 2 Peter 3:9 means?”

~*~

Very simply, 2 Peter 3:9 means precisely what it says. Every time this passage is brought into question, the problem hinges less upon what it means and more importantly upon what it says. You see, most people don’t even know what it says because they have become accustomed to using the passage as a proof-text, reading it in isolation rather than interpreting it in context, as though Peter’s second epistle was not actually a complete letter but a collection of pithy sayings. When you start asking relevant questions about Peter’s second letter, like who he was writing to, you move beyond proof-texting errors into responsible exegesis and consequently discover what it says…

…and therefore what it means.

But before we get into that, let us first assume that it means what you think it does, that God does not want anyone whatsoever to perish. And let us further assume along with you that there are no distinctions in what God wills, that he has but one will. If we understand his singular will here in the decretive sense (i.e., that which God decrees or ordains shall happen), then we discover a violent contradiction between this understanding and what the Bible declares elsewhere, in so many places, about the enduring force of God’s will, about how his purposes cannot be thwarted, about how God is able to do whatever he pleases in all his creation for he is almighty and sovereign over all things. If this passage means that it is God’s holy decree that no one whatsoever perish, then the fact that so many ultimately end up perishing means that God can—and does—fail, that his purposes can be thwarted, that he sometimes cannot do as he pleases, that he is neither almighty nor sovereign. It shipwrecks countless scriptures.

In every case I have observed, the fundamental reason people give for God’s inability to accomplish what he ordains (in this case, the redemption of literally all mankind) is the notion that God is either unable or unwilling to violate man’s free will, a notion for which there is not a single shred of scriptural evidence. That is bad enough in itself, but it is made all the worse by the wealth of scriptural evidence of God not only being able to violate man’s free will but his precisely doing so, from Genesis clear through to Revelation (cf. Exo. 21:13; Gen. 20:6, Rev. 17:17). So the fact that this interpretation of 2 Peter 3:9 creates such violent contradictions, plus the fact that its underlying assumption is without scriptural support at best and contradicted by numerous biblical passages at worse, we have ample, solid reason to consider such an interpretation as highly improbable.

If we understand his singular will here in the prescriptive sense (i.e., that which God prescribes or commands should happen), then we find no overt contradictions with other scriptures. But it does create a problematic dissonance in the context of the passage, for it seems out of harmony with not only the text itself but the context of the letter overall. It does not exactly make sense to understand it as saying, “God is patient with you, not commanding anyone to perish but everyone to come to repentance.” While it is certainly true that God commands everyone to come to repentance, it is nonsensical to think Peter is reminding his readers that God does not command anyone to perish. That creates a monkey wrench in the flow of the text that gives us reason to think it is a rather improbable reading.

So if God’s will here is in neither a decretive nor prescriptive sense, what other sense is there for us to take it in? Well, that is a conclusion I do not feel we have reached yet. This passage certainly is referring to God’s will in its decretive sense, but the question is less theological and more exegetical; in other words, the issue is not about the nature of God’s will so much as the identity of who Peter is talking about. Many people like you use this as a proof-text that God’s purpose was to save literally all mankind without discrimination, an easy and tempting instinct when this verse is isolated from its context—the chapter, the letter overall, and the letter that preceded it. But the passage itself is clear about who is being referred to. First of all, the complete verse reads:

“The Lord is not slow to fulfill his promise as some count slowness, but is patient toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance.”

And that is the vital key so many people overlook, “toward you.” Peter has a specific group of hearers; the context of “anyone” and “everyone” that Peter is referring to is defined by the “you” he is writing to. That direct relationship is important to note. Consider the following illustration.

Imagine that you have called a staff meeting. As you stand looking over the people gathered in the board room, you announce, “We cannot afford to have anyone miss this information, so before I get to what I have to tell you, I need to know if everyone is here.” Obviously you are not asking if all six billion people on the planet are present in the board room; moreover, you are certainly not asking if all people who have existed, do exist, and will ever exist are present. The “anyone” and “everyone” are directly related to the “you” being addressed—your staff members.

The Lord is patient toward you, Peter said. That is a vital key too often missed. The Lord does not want anyone (of those he is patient toward) to perish; he wants everyone (of those he is patient toward) to come to repentance. So then who is this “you” that Peter is addressing in his letter? All mankind indiscriminately?

Back up to the first verse. We find Peter saying, “This is now the second letter that I am writing to you, beloved.” So those he is speaking to in this letter are not all mankind without discrimination but rather his beloved who he has already written to once before. Moreover, the beginning of the letter (2 Peter 1:1) is addressed even more clearly still; Peter is writing to “those who have obtained a faith of equal standing with ours by the righteousness of our God and Savior Jesus Christ.” Obviously what Peter has to say is not addressed to all mankind because not all mankind has obtained a faith of equal standing with the apostles by the righteousness of Christ. He is addressing the faithful flock of Christ. Peter had a specific mission with a specific message.

There is further importance to the fact that this message is being addressed to friends that he has written to before. What will we find out about these people from that first letter of his? We will find out that they are (1 Peter 1:1-5) “elect exiles of the dispersion in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, in the sanctification of the Spirit, for obedience to Jesus Christ and for sprinkling with his blood” whom God has mercifully caused “to be born again to a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance that is imperishable, undefiled, and unfading, kept in heaven for you, who by God’s power are being guarded through faith for a salvation ready to be revealed in the last time.”

That is who God is patient with in 2 Peter 3:9, who he will not have perish but have come to repentance. God is patient toward you, my beloved, to whom I have written before, God’s faithful elect, chosen by the Father through the Spirit for the Son. God is patient with you, such that every single one will be redeemed.

This understanding gains even further support still when you read elsewhere in the Scriptures that God has a select remnant of Israel chosen by grace and a select number of Gentiles. God is not slow in keeping his promise; he is being patient, waiting until that full number of God’s chosen has been fulfilled (cf. 2 Pet. 3:15). In other words, the day of the Lord will not come until all those he has chosen have been brought forth and redeemed. Believers must not be impatient with God and his timetable, but faithful and praising the glory of his plan set from eternity, humbled and giving thanks to his incomprehensible mercy. Not only does this interpretation make sense, it is the only one that does.

Under an unbiblical understanding, 2 Peter 3:9 makes very little sense because it holds that God’s plan gets thwarted quite routinely. He does not want anyone at all to perish, yet untold masses have and will. He wants literally everyone to come to repentance, yet untold masses have not and will not. On this view the sinful desires of mankind is more important to God than his own righteous glory.

Under a biblical understanding, 2 Peter 3:9 makes perfect sense—within the context of that verse itself, the chapter, the letter overall, the previous letter, letters written by other apostles, and so forth. God’s own righteous glory is more important to God than the sinful desires of mankind. As John Piper has said: for God to deny the infinite worth of his own glory, “he would imply that there is something more valuable outside himself. He would commit idolatry … Where will we find a Rock of integrity in the universe when the heart of God has ceased to value supremely the supremely valuable?”

1. Morgan (2011).
2. Trolando (2011, August 1). Comment to Morgan (2011).
3. Smart (2009, November 3). Comment to Proud (2009).

References:

• Morgan, Adam (2011, July 20). “It is God’s will that all men be saved.” Aristophrenium. [Blog]
  http://aristophrenium.com
• Proud, Duane (2009, October 1). “God Saves! (Or, Jesus is not a rope).” Duane’s Mind. [Blog].
  http://home.people.net.au/~DuanesMind/

In the comments section of Fisher’s post John Calvin on Fatalism, the conversation seemed to have found its way to 1 Tim 2:4. And since this verse seems to generate a lot of debate these days, at least from my perspective, I thought it would be a good idea to explore 1 Tim 2:4 a little bit more thoroughly.

1 Tim 2:3-4 “For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour; who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth”

The key part is “who will have all men to be saved” (KJV). Other versions state it as “who desires all men to be saved” (NASB) and “who wants all men to be saved” (NIV) but it essentially means the same thing.

The first thing we need to do is look at the context of this verse. According to John MacArthur (from whom I’m getting this explanation), this verse falls in the middle of a section of scripture addressing Evangelistic Prayer (verses 1 through 8). So given the context of this section, we should remember that Paul is addressing how we, as believers, should be praying for the lost to be saved as this lines up with Gods desire. It is Gods desire that all be saved so therefore it should also be our desire that all be saved.

The full explanation can be found here, but I just want to look at the words will, desire and want as used in verse 4 of the various english translations. In each case we find it has been translated from the Greek word “thelo” into will, desire, or want. Now, working back to the Greek from will (KJV). There are two basic Greek words for will and they are “thelo” and “boulomai”. So what does each of these words mean? “Thelo” reflects the will of desire springing from feeling and inclination while “boulomai” speaks of a will that comes from precise determination.

So the will/desire/want used in 1 Tim 2:4 is not the will/desire/want in the “boulomai” sense; that God has precisely determined the salvation of all men. It is not a sovereignly ordained fact that everyone is going to be saved. 1 Tim 2:4 is not talking about that kind of will but that of “thelo” which is the word used in the original Greek text.

It’s not simply a “What God wants he gets” in some sort of universalistic salvation or that we have some sort of impotent God who is unable to fulfil His will. There’s a distinction between God’s sovereign will and His moral will.

To put it another way, we would all agree without equivocation that God does not desire people to sin. Could we agree with that? We do not believe that God desires people to do evil, to sin, to be disobedient, to be unholy, to fail to give Him glory. No, we would all agree with that. In fact the spectrum of evangelical theology would agree to that. We know God desires men not to sin. We do not for a moment advocate anything different than that. So turn the table a bit. Would we would all agree then that God desires all men to be holy? No one would argue against that, right? God desires all men to be righteous. God desires all men to be sinless. God desires all men to give Him glory and give Him honour and give Him respect. God desires all men to be obedient. I mean, He commands men over and over and over and over to be obedient. He calls for righteousness. He calls for holiness. He calls for sinlessness. He calls for everyone on the face of the earth to give Him honour and give Him glory. He calls for all men everywhere to repent. Nobody debates that. We all know God wants men to be holy.

Therefore, we conclude that people sin though God does not want them to. That’s obvious. People are unholy though God does not want them that way. People do not give God glory though God does not want them not to give Him glory. Then why is it such a hard thing for some people to realise that people also go to hell though God does not want them to? God wants all men to be saved. That is the desire of God.

Men sin and they go to hell, not because it is God’s express sovereign purpose for them. They go to hell because they denied God’s moral will for their life. He calls them to repent. He calls them to be saved. If anyone goes to hell, they go there not because of the predetermined choice of God, but because of the rejection of Jesus Christ. That’s what He’s saying. He wants all men saved.

In the exact words of John MacArthur;

I believe in the sovereignty of God, I believe in election, I believe in predestination, beloved, I also believe that God wills men to be saved and by their choice they are not saved and that is their responsibility not God’s. And if you ask me how those two things harmonize, I say I’ll tell you our first day in heaven, I’ll explain the whole thing. But I know this, God has a broken heart because He desires salvation from the ends of the earth, why else would Jesus weep over Jerusalem. “O how often I would, I willed to gather you together but you would not.” He said that. You wouldn’t do it. Why will you die? Why will you reject?

So in tying this with the challenge in the comments of Fishers post, I believe the will of God espoused by John Calvin, Ryft and Fisher with regard to the issue of choice, election and predestination is the will of “boulomai.” It is not the will of “thelo” that we find in 1 Tim 2:4.

One of the most common accusation that is hurled by Arminians and other non-Calvinists against Reformed theology is that it promotes fatalism. It is not uncommon to hear an Arminian charge that we teach that God “hinders people from coming to repentance when they really want to” and that believers are “forced to love God.”[1] Of course, nobody who actually knows what the doctrines of grace entail would actually make such statements. The Bible is clear enough on how people become saved: Men are by nature sinful and in rebellion against God (Genesis 6:5, 8:21, Psalm 51:5, Jeremiah 17:9), and are rendered incapable of even desiring to come to Him because of this inclination (John 6:44, 65, Romans 3:10-12, 8:5-8), which is why it is necessary for Him to change their hearts and minds (Ezekiel 36:25-27). It is only after this change of heart takes places that a person becomes willing to come to Christ.

That being said, statements such as “whosoever will may come” are totally compatible with a Reformed understanding of salvation. In fact, John Calvin himself made a statement similar to this in his commentaries. He writes:

Therefore, forasmuch as no man is excluded from calling upon God, the gate of salvation is set open unto all men; neither is there any other thing which keepeth us back from entering in, save only our own unbelief. I speak of all unto whom God doth make himself manifest by the gospel. But like as those which call upon the name of the Lord are sure of salvation, so we must think that, without the same, we are thrice miserable and undone. And when as our salvation is placed in calling upon God, there is nothing in the mean season taken from faith, forasmuch as this invocation is grounded on faith alone.[2]

Not only this, but he refutes the very idea of fatalism. In his Institutes, he points out that the belief that people are forced by necessity to worship God is a heathenistic doctrine that has nothing to do with Christianity in any way:

To this fault they [i.e. the heathen] add a second—viz. that when they do think of God it is against their will; never approaching him without being dragged into his presence, and when there, instead of the voluntary fear flowing from reverence of the divine majesty, feeling only that forced and servile fear which divine Judgment extorts Judgment which, from the impossibility of escape, they are compelled to dread, but which, while they dread, they at the same time also hate. To impiety, and to it alone, the saying of Statius properly applies: “Fear first brought gods into the world,” (Theb. lib. 1).[3]

When one takes the time to study the writings of Reformed theologians, one will quickly find that there is nothing fatalistic about the doctrines that are being propounded. Nobody should ever accuse the doctrine of predestination with fatalism, for the simple reason that the former is accomplished according to God’s eternal purposes and takes into account the man’s will and responsibility, whereas the latter teaches that whatever men become happen simply by virtue of blind, purposeless chance, and that their wills and desires are ultimately irrelevant, if not non-existent. Loraine Boettner said it best in his section on fatalism in The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, so I shall end this note with a quote from there:

According to the doctrine of Predestination the freedom and responsibility of man are fully preserved. In the midst of certainty God has ordained human liberty. But Fatalism allows no power of choice, no self-determination. It makes the acts of man to be as utterly beyond his control as are the laws of nature. Fatalism, with its idea of irresistable, impersonal, abstract power, has no room for moral ideas, while Predestination makes these the rule of action for God and man. Fatalism has no place for and offers no incentives to religion, love, mercy, holiness, justice, or wisdom, while Predestination gives these the strongest conceivable basis. And lastly, Fatalism leads to skepticism and despair, while Predestination sets forth the glories of God and of His kingdom in all their splendor and gives an assurance which nothing can shake.[4]

End Notes

1. These are, of course, statements that I have personally heard from Arminians at some point or another, so I can personally testify that these accusations are regularly hurled against Calvinists.
2. Calvin, John. Commentary on Acts – Volume 1. 2:14-21. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/calcom36.ix.iii.html.
3. Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. I:4:4. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iii.v.html.
4. Boettner, Loraine. The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. III:1. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/boettner/predest.v.i.html.

See Also

• Fisher – Refuting Lou Ruggiero on Calvinism

Among the various threads I participate in at AtheistForums.org was one started by a Muslim user who had a particular question for Christians. I thought I would share my response to him here at the Aristophrenium.

I’d like to hear from Christians what original sin is, because I can never understand why God would allow the sin of a father (Adam) to be committed to the son (humanity). I’ve heard reasons from others to believe why this is wrong, but can anyone prove why it is right?

The question of original sin is somewhat difficult to discuss with non-Christians because it is a theological issue that is settled exegetically (i.e., study of the biblical texts); if one denies the Scriptures as divine revelation, the whole matter becomes rather moot (but their denial is a product of original sin). Outside of the biblical texts I suppose one could define original sin however they like, although the fact that such a person is talking about original sin at all would be quite odd, since it is quintessentially a biblical concept. While the term itself is not found in the Scriptures—it was actually coined by Augustine of Hippo—the concept is deeply biblical, rooted in the theology of salvation (soteriology).

There is an aphorism penned by Paul E. Little that captures the essence of original sin: “We are not sinners because we sin; we sin because we are sinners.” Original sin means quite simply sin derived from our origin; biblically and theologically that origin is “in Adam,” who is the federal representative of all mankind as imago Dei. It is not so much that we are all held accountable for Adam’s sin, as your question alluded to, as that all mankind is fallen as sinners because Adam, our federal head in the economy of salvation, fell into sin; i.e., from a sinful origin comes a sinful lineage, a condition which produces in man every sort of sin. In this same theology of salvation we have Jesus Christ, described in this context as the “last Adam” (cf. the theological dichotomy revealed in the New Testament gospels and epistles); that is, all mankind is represented in one of two camps, such that those who are not “in Christ” thus remain “in Adam,” each being the federal head of those they represent. So that is the meaning of original sin: sin derived from our origin, condemned “in Adam” as sinners until we are justified “in Christ” as redeemed.

As a small number of you may be aware, I have been engaging in discussions with some visitors at The Gospel Coalition in the comments section of Pastor Tim Keller’s recent article, “Sinned in a literal Adam, raised in a literal Christ.” While I disagree with Dr. Keller’s view of the creation account in Genesis, I fully agree with him that belief in a literal, historical Adam is vitally important to a biblical theology of salvation, so the point of this article is not to respond to Dr. Keller. But neither is it to respond to the young-earth creationists who have lit up the comments section at the audacity (or heresy) of Dr. Keller not believing in young-earth creationism.

Rather, the point of this article is to respond to Sola Ratione (the internet moniker of a person who does not reveal a name, gender, location, or anything else) who proposed that since the scientific evidence for evolution is overwhelming Christians are forced to contend with “a serious problem of evil.” [1] His argument is that if both Christianity and evolution are true then a serious problem of evil is generated by the evidence of hundreds of millions of years worth of suffering. Since an omniscient God know that such suffering would take place, an all-loving and benevolent God would have been repulsed by it, and an all-powerful or omnipotent God could have used a different method, “the evidence for evolution renders Christian theism highly unlikely.”

An interesting problem of evil argument, but no different than any other and just as intellectually bankrupt.

First let us get a trivial point out of the way. Whether God created the world millions of years ago through natural processes (theistic evolutionism) or thousands of years ago through special creation (young-earth creationism), the very same problem exists either way. When it comes to the nature of God (who is perfect in knowledge, power, and love), there is no meaningful difference between millions or thousands of years worth of suffering; namely, it is not as though millions of years worth of suffering is inconsistent with God’s nature but thousands of years of suffering is fine. So whether the Christian is a flat-earth geocentrist young-earth creationist on one end of the spectrum or a theistic evolutionist who is practically deistic on the other or anywhere in between those two, the same problem of gratuitous suffering exists. In other words, contrary to Sola Ratione’s point, the truth or falsehood of evolution is quite irrelevant to the problem he proposes. Whether millions or thousands of years the alleged problem remains the same: the existence of God versus the existence of suffering.

As I pointed out to Sola Ratione, his argument holds only if suffering is gratuitous. And by gratuitous we mean unwarranted or without a just purpose. In other words, suffering is not inconsistent with God’s nature if it is warranted or has a just purpose. So in order for his argument to hold, he must prove that suffering is gratuitous.

It is illegitimate for him to ask Christians to assume for the sake of argument that it is gratuitous, for that commits the fallacy of begging the question; that is, it asks us to assume the very thing to be proved, that the biblical God does not exist. It is invalid for an argument to assume in one of its premises the very conclusion it aims to prove. So how does it beg the question? Quite simply: since gratuitous suffering and the biblical God are mutually contradictory states of affairs, assuming one as possible necessarily involves the other being impossible; for example, in a world where an Immoveable Object is possible, in that world an Irresistible Force is impossible (and vice versa). So then if the question before us regards the possible existence of the biblical God, it is question-begging to enter the question assuming that it is not possible.

Therefore reason prohibits Sola Ratione from assuming arguendo that suffering is gratuitous; that is, reason demands that he prove it is gratuitous. And we should note that pointing to cases of suffering does not by itself prove that it is gratuitous. Both he and Christians agree that suffering exists; where we disagree is that it is gratuitous. So by pointing to cases of suffering he has not somehow made his case. To do that he must prove it is gratuitous.

He might try contending that we are justified in assuming that suffering is gratuitous until proven otherwise, shifting the burden of proof onto the Christian, by pointing out that in some cases the presumption of truth is a valid move. To this we may respond by noting that it is an invalid move if doing so ends up begging the question—as it does here with his argument. So reason denies him this avenue, persisting in its demand that he prove that gratuitous suffering exists.

So by reason alone Sola Ratione must prove that gratuitous suffering exists. It cannot be either assumed for the sake of argument nor assumed until proven otherwise, since either is a case of begging the question. So he must shoulder this burden of proof that his argument demands of him. Or he can dismiss the whole matter with a wave of his hand, describing it as “flogging a dead horse,” and go about his business thinking that he has won the day. Since it leaves Christianity entirely unscathed, we may let him enjoy that cookie. It does not reflect well on him, but that matters little to us.

Suffering exists, but given the God we worship we know it is never gratuitous; by the very nature and word of God we are promised that. And people like Sola Ratione have yet to make a coherent and rational case to the contrary, their every attempt being denied by the very logic they supposedly esteem.

As a final remark I want to address a point he raised in his closing comment. I had said to him that if the biblical God is the “open question” before us, then it begs the very question to assume arguendo that the biblical God is impossible (which is exactly what the assumption of gratuitous suffering does and why he must instead prove it). To this he replied that the possible existence of God being the open question before us means that “God may or may not exist” (emphasis his). What he does not seem to realize is that this is not any kind of rebuttal, since that is precisely what “possible” means in the first place! In other words, the question is not God’s necessary existence but rather his possible existence. I think biblical Christianity firmly establishes that the existence of God is necessary, not merely possible, but I have to be willing to set that aside in order to enter the question Sola Ratione proposed. And I did. However, my criticism still stands: assuming arguendo that any suffering is gratuitous assumes necessarily that the biblical God is impossible, which is question-begging when the possible existence of God is the very question. I think Sola Ratione should be grateful for this allowance, since if I were to confront his argument on the grounds of real biblical Christianity his case would be even worse. What I am showing is that even in its weakest case biblical Christianity has nothing to worry about from such problem of evil arguments.

[1] Sola Ratione (2011, June 10). Comment to Keller’s article. See also his own article “An evolutionary problem of evil.”

References:

Sola Ratione (2011, January). “An evolutionary problem of evil.” Sola Ratione [blog].
http://rationesola.blogspot.com

Tim Keller (2011, June 6). “Sinned in a literal Adam, raised in a literal Christ.” The Gospel Coalition [blog].
http://thegospelcoalition.org

[The following article was paraphrased and summarised from an interview with John MacArthur entitled “When believers stop believing: Portrait of an Apostate”¹]

No.

If you once professed faith and now don’t, then you were never saved to begin with.

People who believe it is possible to lose your salvation are usually brought to that position because of people like Charles Templeton. It isn’t because they find it in the Scriptures. It’s because they’re trying to explain how someone could be a Christian one day and not the next day. There are massive amounts of Christians around the world who think you can lose your salvation and they’ve got people to prove you can. We need to look at this issue Biblically to try to help those people who might be drawn to that conclusion because of people they know who denied the faith. Read the rest of this entry

In the comments section of my article “Answering questions and objections,” [1] one of our regular visitors here at the Aristophrenium posed a question to me regarding how the universe and this world operate with respect to God (particularly with a view toward Walton’s exegesis of the Genesis creation account). And once again the depth that I wanted to invest my response with came up against the word-count restriction imposed on comments. Like I said previously, it takes few words to ask a controversial question but far more words to answer it appropriately.

His question itself smacked of deism, I thought, and he seemed to be wondering how it would play out under Walton’s view. Essentially what he wanted to know was whether or not interpreting Genesis under a function-oriented ontology would allow for God’s material creation “to ‘function’ according to the mechanics He devised for it.”

So my question, then: Wouldn’t this also allow for evolution? Life functions according to the mechanics that God has devised for it? That is why, as Adam [Morgan] pointed out, God created ‘kinds’ of animals in Genesis. Then it would be a simple matter to let them ‘expand’ in number based on how He made them. I have heard that Walton is a rather staunch anti-evolutionist, but how can this not fit? [2]

And he wanted an answer deeper than simply “God didn’t create life that way,” but rather an answer with some kind of support for it. So here then is my answer to our intrepid visitor, posted where I have a little more room to write.

Still looking at Genesis for material origins

So first things first: God certainly did bring “every individual species” into material existence (more on this in a moment); however, the point being made here is that the Genesis account is not a record of that. As Walton explained, there is a distinction between building a temple and creating a temple; the former regards the construction phase, but upon completion we do not yet have a “temple.” Without establishing its functions and functionaries and God coming to rest in it during the inauguration ceremony, it is nothing more than an ornate stone and wooden edifice; the “temple” does not exist yet. Your question regards the construction phase, the evolution of kinds and species over billions of years, but Genesis regards the inauguration phase so it is wrongheaded to mine the text for insight on that. The Genesis account presupposes the building phase in its disclosure of the inauguration phase, where God establishes the functions and functionaries and comes to rest in the newly created cosmic temple. Again, Genesis is an account of this seven-day inauguration ceremony, an account that begins with a non-existent temple, not non-existent material. With the building ready, the ceremony can now usher in the creation of the temple.

Scriptures are clear that God brings everything into material existence, but Genesis is not that story. It is an account of the beginning of redemptive history, which is an anthropocentric story rooted in the sovereign purposes of God who tabernacles with his image-bearers, set in motion during the creation of this cosmic temple which God prepared over a seven-day inauguration ceremony and came to rest in, and from which he providentially ordains redemptive history according to his purposes. The beginning of redemptive history is found in God preparing and entering this cosmic temple, with Adam and Eve established as his image-bearers and stewards. And we know how the story plays out thereafter. This temple motif saturates Scriptures; even our own bodies are described in temple terms. No less is the cosmic order itself a temple, from which God tabernacles with his image-bearers through redemptive history, beginning with Adam and Eve as detailed in Genesis.

Deism: winding up the clock and letting it go

The construction phase of this temple is not accounted for in Genesis; it presupposes the material elements (i.e., the building is already erected). But by no means was God uninvolved in the material phase of construction. The notion that you presented, that God created the universe and then left it to operate according to the laws of nature that he designed, is not only foreign to Walton’s exegesis but also to Scriptures as a whole. Such a notion presupposes an interventionist dichotomy between ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ which cannot be found in Scriptures, a notion the origin of which is found in the deistic views of the Enlightenment. Scriptures (and Walton) strongly oppose that sort of view, rejecting that God is ever ‘hands-off’ with creation, only intervening here and there ‘supernaturally’, nor does such a view even find any correspondence in the cultures of the ancient Near East. (And I would note that this would be the sense in which Walton is a “rather staunch anti-evolutionist;” namely, Walton is steadfast against both atheistic and deistic notions of evolution since, contrary to atheism, God exists and, contrary to deism, he is never unplugged from creation that way. Moreover, because I understand his view on theistic evolution I am able to articulate it, although I do not myself subscribe to it.)

Consider for example the conception and fetal development of a human. It is obvious that we understand embryology scientifically; the ovum, the sperm, fertilization, genetics, cell signaling and so on, from zygote to blastocyst to embryo to fetus and so forth. It is a broad and well attested scientific field. We understand fairly well how all this works ‘naturally’. And yet what does the Bible say? “For you created my inmost being; you knit me together in my mother’s womb” (Psa. 139:13); “The word of the LORD came to me, saying, ‘Before I formed you in the womb I knew you” (Jer. 1:4-5). An interventionist dichotomy between ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ does not exist in Scriptures; that is, God is not hands-off with respect to nature, intervening here and there. Identifying and understanding the material means by which something happens does not preclude the agency of God in those means. This applies to your question about evolution: we may understand, to one degree or another, how evolution works, the material means by which evolution occurs (like with embryology) but this does not allow us to preclude the agency of God in those means, to think he is hands-off and letting nature work on its own (again, like with embryology). God is definitively and providentially hands-on in the universe. “For in him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together” (Col. 1:16-17; notice that last clause in particular).

This is yet another problem inherent with young-earth creationism, which tends to assume the same sort of dichotomy: they say that God resting on the seventh-day indicates that henceforth he ceased his work of material creation. But such Scriptures as Psalm 139:13-15 for example defies such a view! See especially verse 15, where the psalmist characterizes his development in his mother’s womb in terms that harken the mind to Genesis. For them to think that God specially created Adam and Eve but not Cain or Abel or anyone or anything else because he ceased specially creating on day seven, letting the laws of nature take it from there, simply defies the biblical witness. From one issue to the next their interpretation of Genesis (under its own terms), shoulders noteworthy problems—which by contrast underscores the strength, coherence, and consistency of Walton’s exegesis of Genesis (under its own terms.)

Not only is God the one who brings all things into material existence but he is also the one who continually sustains all of creation. The idea that God got everything running and then stood back to let nature do its thing “would have been laughable in the ancient world because it was not even conceivable,” Walton notes. “The ancients would never dream of addressing how things might have come into being without God or what ‘natural’ processes he might have used.” If God were to unplug himself from creation the way deists think, Walton observed, everything would immediately cease to exist. [3] Quite frankly, God’s agency is manifest in the formation of every creature of every species of every kind in every age. There is no such thing as God-of-the-gaps; in other words, science does not push God out of creation, but rather discovers the means of his creative agency—like with embryology.

References:

1. Smart, D. (2011, May 10). “Answering questions and objections.” Aristophrenium. [Blog]. http://aristophrenium.com, 17/May/2011.
2. Joe (2011, May 16). Comment to Smart (2011), para. 2.
3. Walton, J. (2009). The Lost World of Genesis One. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press; pp. 20-21.