What a big question. A question that I wager almost all of us have struggled with at some time. I certainly do not intend to probe the full depth of this question here – at least not in one article. And nor do I think I would be capable of doing it justice, as to study this question only raises a multitude of others that need to be addressed – Who/What is bad? Who/What is good? Why should we expect only good things to happen to good people? Is suffering bad? Is there an objective purpose to our existence? And the list goes on.

Instead, my goal here is far more modest. To share with you a reflection that was motivated by a brief conversation with a friend of mine. A non-Christian as far as I know – yet not someone who I have any reason to think is at all averse to a Christian world view – who, due to some recent personal events, found herself asking, “Why do terrible things happen to the very best of people?”

And I thought, what a question! And then I thought, what an opportunity! And so I began to wonder, if I’m going to respond to that, I don’t merely want to sympathise with her or provide shallow comfort – I suck at that anyway. Instead, I wanted her to think about the question she asked in a deeper way. I don’t know if this is the best way to put it, but as Christians, I think we do have deeper answers to these questions than non-believers. We have a way of looking at the world that many others haven’t considered.

So I rephrased her question from a broader perspective. “Or, why do bad things happen, at all?” I suggested.

“Too true,” she agreed.

At this point another of her friend’s weighed in. “I completely agree. There’s no rhyme or reason,” she said. “The jails are full of much better candidates for some of this stuff. It seems unfair.”

I took this as an opportunity to offer some deeper observations.

“To reflect on events as being good or bad kind of implies that there’s a purpose to life, I think. So when we despair over bad things happening to nice people, we are implying that their purpose is not being fulfilled. In other words, we have an idea that life does have an objective purpose and that death or suffering unfairly prevents us from achieving that purpose. And that, to me, is quite an interesting reflection to explore.”

But I didn’t want to leave it at that. And so I continued. “Do human beings actually have an objective purpose in life, one that is marred by suffering and death? Or is our purpose merely subjective or illusory?”

Presupposing a certain discomfort with the questions, I apologised. “Sorry, I didn’t mean to get all deep on you guys. I just find these natural intuitions that human beings have to be a curious thing, and yet many of us are unable to make sense of them.”

At this point I think the gig was up. Duane was getting all religious again. Well, I wasn’t really. But I didn’t quite know how else to interpret the silence. Perhaps they were concerned where I was heading with this. I’d like to think it was because of the gravity of their thoughts. But I let it rest at that, praying for another opportunity to take every thought captive, in the hope that they may be put into service to point the way to our Lord and Saviour.

Approximately 24 hours ago Ray Comfort and his Living Waters Ministry released the short 180 Movie regarding the subject of abortion, which has not only exploded across social media but also reignited conversations all over North America over the moral question about abortion. A bit skeptical about the film, given the hype and build up to its release, I decided to give it a viewing, mostly because I knew I would encounter conversations about it in my circles and wanted to be properly informed. And good thing, too, for the conversations have been plenty. While many of those conversations have regarded the biblical and theological integrity of the Way of the Master gospel witnessing techniques, one of them tonight regarded the issue for which the film was made in the first place, which I want to share with you here. While I have changed the young man’s name to protect his identity, the following is the conversation that we had tonight over the moral question about abortion. He did not explicitly state his position on the subject but I gathered that for him the issue remains a somewhat open question (due to things he had said prior to the part I am sharing here), having not settled definitively on one side or the other. He is a Christian but converted quite recently, a matter of a few months ago. We pick up the conversation mid-stream, where he is critically evaluating the merits of defining life in the womb as human.

~ * ~

JOHN: I don’t think the biological distinction between “human” and “non-human” is the morally relevant question.

DAVID: What then is the morally relevant question as it pertains to valuing human life?

JOHN: It’s like I said: “persons” are afforded full dignity and value. In fact, we already know that not all persons are human beings anyway.

DAVID: Who or what defines personhood?

JOHN: Oh, well God, I should think.

DAVID: Does Scripture give any indication at which point such personhood becomes morally relevant?

JOHN: I have looked and, actually, I don’t think it’s very clear.

DAVID: So the Bible is unclear about human life in the womb?

JOHN: It doesn’t seem to be very clear on that issue.

DAVID: Are you familiar with Psalm 139:13-15 and Jeremiah 1:5?

JOHN: Yes.

DAVID: What is unclear about the moral relevance question in those passages?

JOHN: “Before I formed you in the womb I knew you.” I don’t see how that is going to make your case.

DAVID: That rather clinches it, I should think. Not only does God knit together the human life in the womb, but that life belongs and is known to him before that life is even conceived. Does that not indicate fairly clearly the moral relevance pertaining to the value of human life?

JOHN: It seems to be a statement of God’s foreknowledge, more than anything. I don’t think you can extrapolate anything else from that, particularly not anything helpful about dealing with a full-fledged person in the womb.

DAVID: That bothers me somewhat, that you don’t think anything beyond God’s foreknowledge can be extrapolated from that—such as, for example, his purpose for that human life, to which it is already set apart (consecrated) before it is even formed in the womb. The text rather explicitly states this. Ergo, you certainly can extrapolate more than God’s foreknowledge from this—not to mention what can be understood from this text and Psalm 139 about human life belonging to God.

JOHN: But the verse isn’t about that. It’s about God’s purpose for Jeremiah and foreknowing his destiny. I’d be more convinced if that verse was combined with more explicit statements about the topic, but that seems to be as good as it gets.

DAVID: How is what you said essentially different from what I said (vis-a-vis God’s foreknowledge and purpose for that human life)? You repeated what I said as if it was different from what I said.

JOHN: So, God making statements about foreknowing Jeremiah’s destiny implies that human life begins at conception? Non-sequitur.

DAVID: God foreknows Jeremiah’s destiny because he ordained it; before he was born God knew him, God consecrated him, God appointed him to a particular purpose.

JOHN: Yeah, right. So?

DAVID: What it implies, again, is that God not only knits together the human life in the womb but that human life belongs and is known to God before it is even conceived. That indicates rather clearly the moral relevance vis-a-vis the value of human life.

JOHN: Right, and God also foreknew that his parents would get together in the first place. I don’t think any relevant conclusion could be drawn from that, could it?

DAVID: John, that life is knit together in the womb by God; that life belongs and is known to God before it is even conceived. That life does not belong to itself, or to the mother or the father. It belongs to God. That is the morally relevant question as it pertains to human life.

JOHN: Yes, before he was even conceived God knew him. Obviously before he was conceived he wasn’t actually a person.

DAVID: Indeed. And yet even then that life belongs to God—because he is the one who brings it forth, knitting it together, having a purpose for it. If that life belongs and is known to God before conception, what about at conception or thereafter? You see what I mean?

JOHN: Okay, but in the situation outlined by the verse itself, God states that before Jeremiah was conceived God knew him. I think the “before” part is actually a problem to the argument.

DAVID: I cannot imagine how.

JOHN: Because if God knew Jeremiah even before he was conceived, then it must be that his parents had to get together or they’d be doing something wrong, frustrating God’s plans, not forming the life which is properly his, etc. And that seems highly implausible.

DAVID: That is an interesting and separate question from the one we are looking at.

JOHN: Well, I am arguing that perhaps the verse should not be taken in that direction, at the risk of implausible conclusions.

DAVID: Okay, let me address that. First, this subsequent issue you are raising pertains to the parents and their coming together, whereas our question pertains to the issue of moral relevance with respect to the value of human life. Therefore, it is a fallacious avenue to pursue (ignoratio elenchi). Second, we can certainly pursue that question if you like, but not until after the present question is settled. Third, your objection, at any rate, carries the implicit assumption that it is possible the parents could fail to come together (and thus do something ‘wrong’).

JOHN: I’m employing what I understand to be an analogous argument to yours about the nature of the verse, to demonstrate a reductio.

DAVID: See the second point.

JOHN: Yeah, I realize you think they are separate issues. But it strikes me as the same sort of reasoning being applied to different parts of the verse.

DAVID: Let us assume for the sake of argument that the verse carries the implication that I am arguing for. Let us continue in that vain. So, if that verse carries the implication I am arguing for, then what does that tell us about the moral relevance pertaining to the value of human life?

JOHN: That’s a loaded question (which is, by the way, what I think Ray Comfort was doing).

DAVID: An ‘arguendo’ does not a loaded question make.

JOHN: No, that’s not it. It’s the term “human life.” But setting that aside for a moment…

DAVID: Do we need to get into imago Dei? I would point to Psa 139:15 (cf. Job 10:9–11) as answering that question with its implicit reference to Genesis.

[A pause in the conversation for a few moments.]

JOHN: I think I lost track of what exactly I should answer—what the consequence would be of agreeing the verse implies that God directed the development of Jeremiah in the womb, or of agreeing that God directs the development of everyone in the womb? Sorry, I’m getting tired.

DAVID: You raised the issue of what the morally relevant question is with respect to valuing human life (with respect to the abortion issue in the context of The 180 Movie). My answer, calling upon those two texts from Scripture, seeks to answer you on that score, showing that the morally relevant question is answered by the fact that all human life belongs to God—not only in the womb but even prior to that. That is, abortion is wrong because that life belongs to God. Not to itself, nor to its mother, but to God. That answers what the morally relevant question is.

JOHN: Right, okay, which to me seems to leave us precisely where we started—namely, what counts as “human life.” The fact that God knew Jeremiah even before he was conceived (when obviously Jeremiah the person, the human life, was not around) doesn’t help to settle that question.

DAVID: If that person belongs and is known to God before it is a human life, would that not also apply to when it is a human life?

JOHN: If I accepted your interpretation of the verse for the sake of argument, that God knitting Jeremiah in the womb suggests that any developing embryo, fetus, etc., belongs to God and therefore only God has the right to direct what will or will not happen to that (developing) life, then yeah, I could see how that could apply to the morality of abortion. But I would suggest that that is a different argument than relying on defining a blastocyst as a human person or life or whatever. And I think that is a lot of weight for a single verse to carry, when the verse isn’t explicitly about that.

DAVID: Answer that question I asked you, please: “If that person belongs and is known to God before it is a human life, would that not also apply to when it is a human life?”

JOHN: You are assuming it all counts as human life. That is precisely what I question.

DAVID: I am getting to that.

JOHN: Okay. Then yeah, I granted that with my previous comment. (Also, I need to get going soon, after your next point.)

DAVID: All right, now observe the following. If that person belongs and is known to God before it is a human life (which answers the question of moral relevance), and if that person constitutes a human life upon being born (infant), then the moral relevance of abortion is answered at every stage in between—from conception to infancy.

JOHN: Right, which I just granted.

DAVID: At what point you happen to consider it a human life is irrelevant if that person belongs and is known to God even before it is a human life.

JOHN: Well, it wouldn’t be a person. But yes, I granted that.

DAVID: It would not be a person according to who or what?

JOHN: If the issue is that the (developing) human life or person “belongs to God” and therefore only God has the moral right to direct its progress or non-progress, then okay. That is an argument different from arguing that it is wrong because the blastocyst is a human life or person.

DAVID: Right. Whether it is a person, a human life, a potential human, etc., all of those points are irrelevant, given the answer to the moral relevance question.

JOHN: Okay. And I did explicitly state in the other conversation that a different argument could be advanced using a different morally relevant fact. So I think I will tentatively agree that, if I grant that interpretation of the verse, the argument could then follow.

DAVID: There are countless ways to answer this question. I have simply advanced two.

JOHN: Sure.

DAVID: The prior one I never actually got to finish because our conversation was hijacked.

JOHN: Yeah, the topic can rile people up.

DAVID: Are you too tired to argue for how that interpretation creates a problem for my argument?

JOHN: I think so. I am supposed to get up fairly early tomorrow. But, if you’d like, I’m game to pick it up another time.

DAVID: Sure thing.

JOHN: Okay, cool.

~ * ~

Have you watched The 180 Movie? Has it sparked conversations in your life about the moral issue of abortion? Do you have any positive encounters to share?

It gets worse. In addition, an omnipresent and omniscient (all-observing) God, as bound into his creation as his creation is bound into him, must be able to observe everything. We know from quantum mechanics that observation collapses the wave-function of photons, leading to no superposition. But we know superposition exists, therefore this God with those attributes cannot.

Since I speak English and not mathematics I tend to avoid delving into quantum mechanics. This subject loses its precision when translated into English, and I am simply not fluent in mathematics. But I will indulge your point briefly in order to show how it fails to achieve the ends to which you put it.

First, we do not “know” that the wave-function collapses, much less due to observation. Although that is consistent with the familiar Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, it does not feature in the many-worlds interpretation, for example, nor the de Broglie-Bohm theory (in which the universal wave-function never collapses, only the conditional wave-function of a subsystem and is strictly an epiphenomenon) and so forth. As such, unless you are unfamiliar with epistemology, which is possible, it is disingenuous of you to pretend we “know” something that is theoretical—especially when it does not exist in competing theories.

Second, even granting you the Copenhagen interpretation, the observer effect in quantum mechanics is predicated on the ‘observer’ being constituted by matter—even if it is only a single electron. Thus the God of Scripture necessarily fails to represent the problem your point attempted to construct, for he is transcendent and immaterial.

Justin Taylor yesterday at The Gospel Coalition offered some comments about the issue of “angry Calvinists.” It may be due to the fact that I am not plugged in with any particular inner circle of blogs or online ministries or what have you but quite frankly I was not aware that there exists an issue of angry Calvinists. Either that or the term “angry” may be less than accurate, such that the issue is more about Calvinists who are aggressive or insensitive in their passion for the doctrines of grace—in which case the stereotype as such is an inaccurate caricature. And I think that Taylor could probably agree that it is more about being aggressive or insensitive than it is about being angry, for he invokes terms like “mocking, rude, sarcastic, and nasty,” which is not necessarily from anger but is certainly aggressive and insensitive.

Now, he suggests that one will see this sort of attitude from people of varying traditions in the posts and comments area of blogs that discuss issues of theological significance or “ultimate things”—and we have certainly witnessed that here—but he almost seems to imply that this is a tempting excuse, a feeble tu quoque fallacy, and spends the rest of the article offering suggestions for how Calvinists can not only own up to this problem but also how to be self-conscious about it and correct it. I am particularly drawn to the thoughts shared by Joe Thorn in his interview with Ed Stetzer on that point.

And I am certainly not denying that this perception exists out there, nor even the reality that the inaccurate caricature draws upon. Just last week several of us from church met at the beach for fellowship late Sunday afternoon and joining us were some people from another local Baptist church, including their new pastor. Someone pointed to the book that I had with me—James White, The Sovereign Grace of God—and asked that pastor what he thought of the author. (A strange question when removed from its original context but it was relevant to preexisting conversation.) He said that although he really appreciates the doctrines that White firmly believes and defends he did not really care for the aggressive and combative personality White has. And that is something I have heard more than once so I cannot deny that this perception exists.

But I have to go back to Taylor’s implication that this problem is not at all unique to Calvinists—as anyone who is a Calvinist can invariably attest! There are so many examples I could draw upon to make this point, but what better example could I use than my own self? When I was converted to Christianity it was upon hearing for the first time the gospel of Christ presented to me by a gentleman whose anti-Calvinism would later rub off on me. Through our doctrinal studies he had me convinced that Calvinism was practically blasphemous, and for years I had that attitude. And in those rare occasions when I would confront a Calvinist I was very harsh about the teaching. Aggressive, insensitive, nasty; these words were applicable. That is how I treated Calvinists and their doctrines for many years. So I can well attest that this problem is by no means unique to Calvinists. And even now, holding to Reformed theology as I do, I get confronted by people who have the same attitude I once did, getting called all sorts of rather unpleasant things (to put it lightly).

I do agree that Calvinists need to own up to their failings and strive to be self-conscious about them and work to correct them—but it is not just Calvinists, as those people who are rigorously anti-Calvinist routinely demonstrate, just as I once did too. This is a problem that anyone who is part of the family of God needs to address in their own lives, if and where applicable. I think Thorn’s final remarks bear repeating, and with a note that it should apply to all Christians:

Anger is sometimes very appropriate. We see that in the prophets and Apostles, and even in Jesus. But when dealing with brothers and sisters in Christ it’s important to do more than “set the record straight,” or prove one wrong and point to the truth. We need to do that, but we need to do it in a way that bears fruit, and biblically that means doing such work carefully. Sometimes it does mean we need to drop bombs, but more often it means we need to sit down with a brother (literally or figuratively) and reason with him. … [There are people who] need some counsel on being more gracious, humble, and gentle. We all do. At the very least, we all need to learn to be better teachers and physicians of the soul when it comes to correcting each other.

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• Justin Taylor, “The problem of ‘angry Calvinists,” The Gospel Coalition (2011, September 16).
  http://thegospelcoalition.org
• Ed Stetzer, “Joe Thorn and angry (fake) Calvinists,” The LifeWay Research Blog (2011, September 14).
  http://www.edstetzer.com
• John Piper, “Why are Calvinists so negative?” DesiringGod (2008, May 21).
  http://www.desiringgod.org

Dear Dr. Esposito,

I just recently read through your article New Narrative for 9-11 and Muslim Americans. It is an interesting piece of writing, and I am always looking for people who are willing to give an apologetic for their viewpoint. In your article, you try to make the case that fears of Islamic extremism in the Muslim American community are unfounded, and that Muslims in America as a whole are well integrated into the rest of western society. I must confess that I am not convinced of your article’s thesis, and I would like to explain why. Read the rest of this entry

One of the theological debates that takes place between orthodox Trinitarian Christians and heretical cultists and other non-Trinitarians of various stripes is whether the Old Testament confirms or contradicts Trinitarian doctrines such as the existence of plurality within the Godhead and the reality of the incarnation. A full treatment of this subject is outside the purview of this article, partly because there are already plenty of excellent articles that tackle this topic (Such as this and this), and partly because there are too many verses that are relevant to this, that we will only be focusing on one. In particular, there is one verse in 1 Kings that contains a statement by King Solomon which is sometimes cited by non-Trinitarians (particularly Muslims) against the idea that God could enter into His creation:

But will God indeed dwell on the earth? Behold, heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain you; how much less this house that I have built! (1 Kings 8:27).

As the argument goes, if God cannot be contained by heaven and earth, then it is impossible for God to enter into His own creation, since that would limit Him to a specific point in time and space.

Read the rest of this entry