Michael Horton, The Gospel-Driven Life, pg. 34

If the concept of the modern self was that of a master of all it surveyed, the postmodern self is best described as a tourist. There is no destination; just personal journeys from nowhere to nowhere in particular.

Mitchell LeBlanc, owner of UrbanPhilosophy.net and Philosophy of Religion student at University of Toronto, has recently proposed “A Possible Disproof of God’s Existence,” which is basically a slight reformulation of an argument presented by Michael Martin about twenty years ago, [1] wherein LeBlanc simply replaces all instances of “omniscient” with “triune” instead. In this argument he attempts to prove that God does not exist—indeed cannot exist—by reason of a logical contradiction. Whether or not his argument achieves its aim shall be the subject of this brief article.

Although I will not be analyzing Martin’s argument directly here, I will be doing so indirectly since LeBlanc’s argument is essentially identical to it; therefore, any criticism that applies to one will apply to the other. The argument LeBlanc constructs is as follows:

(1) If God exists, then God is necessarily omnipotent and necessarily triune.

(2) If God is necessarily omnipotent, then God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

(3) If God necessarily can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, then God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune.

(4) If God necessarily can bring about a state of affairs that is brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune, then God is not necessarily triune.

(5) Therefore, God does not and cannot exist

What LeBlanc is attempting to argue for here is that God possesses attributes which logically contradict each other. To fashion an argument which proves that God cannot exist is something of a Holy Grail to many atheists, and continues to be every bit as elusive as that mysterious chalice. In this argument LeBlanc reaches out to grasp it but finds only air, for his argument commits a substantial error in reasoning.

Given the first two premises (which must be given, as we are confronting orthodox Christian theism), his third premise ought never obtain; i.e., in order to obtain (3) LeBlanc is forced to contradict (1) and (2)!

How so? Consider what it is that (3) asserts: that God necessarily can bring about some X such that it was brought about by a being that is not necessarily triune. But given (2) which defines omnipotence as being able to “bring about any logically possible state of affairs,” and given (1) which defines God as “necessarily triune” (it is not logically possible for God to not be triune), we therefore observe that (3) contradicts these very premises—so that it is not God who vanishes in a puff of contradiction but rather LeBlanc’s argument.

[1] Martin, Michael. Atheism: A philosophical justification (1990), pg. 310, as cited by LeBlanc.

Since David’s essay was a response to mine, I thought that this response back to him should take the form of several responses to selected excerpts. Without further ado:

“He was simply repudiating as personally irrelevant various reasons anecdotally given for why a person would be an atheist.”

Yes, that’s a succinct and correct way of saying it. My short essay was perhaps bordering on a rant, with little content into which one could sink one’s intellectual teeth. However, David makes a valiant effort, and succeeds. I hope I can satisfactorily explain the points of contention.

“And this world view of his, which we may grant is atheistic, in fact is much more than a mere absence of belief that God exists.”

My world view is scientific. Let me qualify this. I’m not a practicing scientist by any stretch of the imagination, but I love reading about and learning about science. In the field of competing ideas, I’m on the sideline, cheering science on and waving my banner. My atheism has little to do with my world view, except insofar as it describes my stance on the question of the existence of gods.

“So biographically Havard believes that God is not required to explain the intelligibility of the human experience, but that raises the epistemological question as to whether or not he has good reasons for that belief. Unfortunately, he did not get into this; but since it was not the point of his article in the first place, he cannot be faulted for it. However, it is hoped that this encourages him to perhaps write more on this point.”

I have, on occasion, confessed that my reasons for being an atheist might not be entirely based on reason, and I stand by that. Asimov, struggling for years on whether to call himself an atheist or not, said, “I finally decided that I’m a creature of emotion as well as of reason. Emotionally, I am an atheist. I don’t have the evidence to prove that God doesn’t exist, but I so strongly suspect he doesn’t that I don’t want to waste my time.” This has become a favorite quote of mine. The only positive evidence that I can point to is the apparent lack of evidence for His existence. Now, I say “apparent” because naturally, I am only one person and may be missing vital evidence that, if provided me, would convince me. It sounds trite because of the repetition, but for me at least, it really is true: There are lots of things whose existence I don’t believe in, gods included (I trust I don’t have to reproduce the list).

“The nature of rebellion is made evident by other atheists who have stated quite frankly that, even if the existence of God were made conclusively evident to them, such that they would have to believe he exists by force of the evidence, they nevertheless would still refuse to obey or glorify him.”

This is an interesting observation. If God’s existence was made conclusively evident to me, I would certainly have no choice but to accept that He exists (naturally). Whether or not I would obey or glorify Him depends on His nature. Would I obey Him if He commanded me to slay the unbelieving tribe living down the valley? I would hope that I had the courage to refuse. Would I obey Him if He commanded me to love my neighbor? Yes. Would I glorify Him? Well, would He want to be glorified?

In a similar vein, David asks:

“Even if the existence of God were made indisputably evident to him, fully satisfying whatever criteria he might posit, would obedience to God depend upon Havard’s own personal evaluation of his commands?”

This is an extremely tricky question. Again, it utterly depends on the commands. But you specifically restricted the evidence to show only His existence, not necessarily His omnipotence or His omnibenevolence. Suppose he was an evil God with limited knowledge? In that case, I would certainly trust my own reasoning above His. But if His superior knowledge and goodness could also be made indisputably evident to me in some way, then I would have no choice but to obey, since I would then know perfectly well that it all works out for the greater good. In truth, I’m extremely unsure about how to answer this question.

“Every moment in which, and every means by which, they knew that God exists will be exposed and inescapable. They can get away with it before man, but they won’t before God. That is the eternal gamble they make of their lives.”

This strikes me as a veiled accusation of dishonesty. If it isn’t, then I apologize, but if it is, I can do nothing more than (yet again) repudiate it. I honestly don’t believe in any god. If all the facets of my inner life were laid bare to me and it could be shown that, yes indeed, here, here, and here is where I know God exists, then I would simply be baffled and then have to come to accept it. Maybe I just lack the requisite introspection?

“In other words, he actually does not find meaning in his personal life, because there is no meaning to be found; rather, he experiences a certain biochemical state of affairs when placed in particular circumstances. [...] If someone were to ask Havard how he can bear living under the view that there is no objective purpose or intrinsic value to life—i.e., how he escapes the joylessness that haunts nihilism—he would evidently shrug his shoulders and disclaim ‘I just do.’”

Thankfully, then, I am no nihilist. And in any case, if the universe turns out not to have an overall purpose, well, that certainly should not (and in my case, does not) put a lid on my jar of joy. I live on a wonderfully rich, lush planet, with people whom I love very much, and friendships that run deep. I value and cherish these things, and my knowledge that all things must die (as Tennyson put it) does nothing to dampen that. (Tangentially, that Tennyson poem should really be all that needs to be said on the subjects of death, in my opinion.)

“I should like to understand how it would be a ‘waste of time’ any different from, say, playing video games or reading a book (which I know Havard rather enjoys).”

Maybe I was a bit too glib in that remark of mine. I retract it. What I meant by it, anyway, was that it’s a waste of time if there turns out to be no one listening. Of course, prayer and church-going are by no means a waste of time—or at least no more a waste of time than playing video games—for the comfort of the individual doing it. I would not be so crass as to suggest that prayer has no benefits for the believer. It just isn’t for me, you know?

Over at UrbanPhilosophy.net is a Philosophy of Religion student from the University of Toronto, Mitchell LeBlanc, who has been endeavouring to make a case against presuppositional apologetics. Coursing a new direction from his original first three drafts, [1] perhaps due to the daunting scope of such a task or perhaps due to the criticisms from Chris Bolt and others at ChoosingHats.com, [2] the final draft version of the article [3] targets the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) as argued for by the late philosopher Greg L. Bahnsen from Covenant Media Foundation.

As did his mentor Cornelius Van Til, Bahnsen defended the transcendental argument as singularly the only cogent and self-consistent Christian apologetic method by virtue of being uniquely grounded upon the distinctive presuppositions of revelational epistemology. [4] Van Til’s extensive work is considered by some to be a contribution to Christian philosophy of Copernican dimensions, [5] wherein he demonstrated by indirect proof the existence of God as the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of reality and the human experience thereof, such that God, as affirmed by Christian orthodoxy, is not a conclusion drawn from rational argument (evidentialism) but is logically prior to any reasoning at all (presuppositionalism). [6] As Van Til framed the matter in his An Introduction to Systematic Theology, “Unless God exists as ultimate [and] self-subsistent, we could not even know anything; we could not even reason that God must exist, nor could we even ask a question about God.” [7]

LeBlanc at this point holds a considered view that the TAG is not merely debatable but in fact false, taking as his point of evaluation the fundamental laws of logic, concluding that they “cannot depend on the Christian God” and therefore the TAG “is not sound”—and must remain so “pending further defense” thereof. His bold conclusion notwithstanding, we may inquire with skepticism whether or not LeBlanc really has successfully defeated the TAG as it already stands, never mind its further defense.

Read the rest of this entry

On Tuesday of last week I had posted on Twitter the following introspection:

“Atheism is conceit in ignorance. Christianity is humility in knowledge.”

Now it seems that an atheist named Roger Sinasohn, who I do not know, discovered my post and decided it deserved a critical response, and soon we were engaged in what can be called my first Twitter debate. (Let me tell you, nothing can force you to articulate and defend your position with succinct clarity like a 140-characters restriction!) The following is the material content of that debate. I hope you enjoy it. It will be updated until completed.

8 December 2009 — Present (updated 16/Dec/09)

Sinasohn: Thinking that the entire universe was created just for you is humility? Wow. I’m sure glad you’re not conceited.

davidinbc: God did not create the universe for the universe (‘we’ are part of it). He created it for himself.

Sinasohn: I see. You’re saying god is the conceited one. All this is just his playground & we’re one of his toys. Makes sense.

davidinbc: Given the word’s definition, God can’t be conceited. Still waiting for a reply that can stand rationally.

Sinasohn: You believe in an all-powerful god. You think he likes you (humans/christians) best. You think that makes you humble.

Sinasohn: I don’t believe in god. I think the universe is huge and that I am not even as important (in the grand scheme of things)…

Sinasohn: …not even as important as bellybutton lint. And you say that atheism is conceited. See No. 1: http://bit.ly/8gXjPr

davidinbc: Christianity confesses that mankind are sinners deserving of God’s wrath, the antithesis of that definition you cited. Next?

davidinbc: (P.S., That you don’t believe in God proves the conceit, not refutes it.)

Sinasohn: I am no sinner; I’ve done nothing wrong. What did you do? And why do you think god cares?

Sinasohn: There are billions of people on this planet alone — what makes you so special that god gives a rat’s ass about you?

Sinasohn: Do you believe in Thor? Zeus? Ra? Ganesh? No? Does that make you conceited?

davidinbc: The definition of ‘sinner’ is one who disobeys God’s commands; ergo, you are a sinner by definition. We all are, including me.

davidinbc: And there is nothing special about me. God’s love is in the context of Christ alone, about whom much is special.

davidinbc: And my disbelief in idols has nothing to do with my self-estimation. A brutal non-sequitur, there.

Sinasohn: But you are claiming it is my disbelief in idols that makes me conceited. How is your god any different from anyone else’s god?

Sinasohn: So you’re are saying that god knows nothing of you, cares nothing about you, doesn’t even notice you, tiny speck in the universe?

Sinasohn: If that’s the case, why notice him? Why care about, let alone worship god? Or are you saying that god does pay attention to you?

Sinasohn: If you think god cares about you, then you are conceited, like an obsessed fan thinking a rockstar notices them in the crowd.

davidinbc: God cares about me because of who Christ is and what he did, not because of who I am or anything I’ve done (not conceited).

davidinbc: Either God is the authority over human reason (not conceited), or human reason is the authority over God (conceited). So, next?

Sinasohn: You’re saying that god (or his kid) cares about you personally out of the billions on this planet, not to mention elsewhere?

Sinasohn: Again, that’s like being in the crowd as the president drives by and thinking he’s smiling at you specifically. That’s conceit.

Sinasohn: And if you’re going to say god (all-powerful, ‘member?) can care about everyone, then I’ll ask why doesn’t he?

Sinasohn: god is auth over humans or humans over god… or god don’t exist. I’ll take door no. 3.

davidinbc: It’s conceit only if God’s caring has to do with who I am or what I’ve done, which it doesn’t. Look at the definition again.

davidinbc: And he sent his only Son to justify the ungodly, even though we deserved condemnation. How much more caring do you need?

davidinbc: Door 3: human reason is the authority over God, by assuming him out of every category.

Sinasohn: god sent his son to be killed just to absolve you? Wow. He likes you more than his own kid. You both sure think a lot of you.

davidinbc: God’s love for anyone is BECAUSE of Christ. He thinks highly of the Son, in whom sinners are saved because of it.

Introduction

The purpose of this web site, at least in principle, is to facilitate meaningful dialogue between individuals who represent uniquely different world views, for the sake of the readers to compare and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of views that compete in the marketplace of ideas. That being the case, it has been somewhat of a dereliction of my duties to not publish a response to Havard’s article “Not Why I Am an Atheist” and for that I apologize. My failure to submit a response was perhaps due in part to the very nature of his article, in that he was not actually making a case for atheism in any sense, nor demonstrating the strengths of the atheist position on some matter, nor critically evaluating some theistic position, and so forth. He was simply repudiating as personally irrelevant various reasons anecdotally given for why a person would be an atheist.

And I had thought that we must grant him that, for he would know why he repudiates one thing or another. But maybe not. Maybe each of these are points at which I can engage his position, if by no means other than a critical analysis of each to see if the repudiation sufficiently stands.

Atheist

Havard begins his piece with a look at what the term ‘atheist’ itself means, drawing upon an etymological defense. I do not contend with him on this point, as far as it goes—which, as I will contend, is not far enough. While it is true that the term is derived from the negating of the Greek theos, such that atheos means “without God” or godless, I very much doubt that his position is adequately characterized as the mere absence of theistic beliefs. And the reason I doubt this is almost too simple: Havard stands in conscious relation to the world on a daily basis, which is another way of saying that he has a world view by which he functions intellectually and practically. And this world view of his, which we may grant is atheistic, in fact is much more than a mere absence of belief that God exists.

Atheism, held to whatever degree of personal conviction and despite the Kool-Aid twaddle of many, is actually a positive belief that in every expression amounts to “God is not required.” For explaining things such as the origins of the universe, the nature and intelligibility of truth, the functional grounding of scientific enterprise, how we can know what it is we know, the nature and meaning of moral statements, the curious recognition and pursuit of meaning in life, etc.—under every category and in every respect, God is not required. Atheism is the positive belief that the human experience is intelligible without any reference to God.

So we should observe that Havard does indeed have a very particular connection to atheism, if he makes his stand with those who hold that the human experience and reality on the whole is intelligible without any reference to God. And so now consider: what we believe is not nearly as important as why we believe it. With respect to the question of what, the answer is atheism. But it is quickly followed by the question of why, to which the answer is not a vacuous absence of God-belief, but a very pregnant belief that God is not required to explain anything. This is the salient point of concern. As Nicholas Everitt noted in The Non-Existence of God: An Introduction (2004),

We need to distinguish between a biographical or sociological enquiry into why some people have believed or disbelieved in God, and an epistemological enquiry into whether there are any good reasons for either belief or unbelief … We are interested in the question of what good reasons there are for or against God’s existence, and no light is thrown on that question by discovering people who hold their beliefs without having good reasons for them.

So biographically Havard believes that God is not required to explain the intelligibility of the human experience, but that raises the epistemological question as to whether or not he has good reasons for that belief. Unfortunately, he did not get into this; but since it was not the point of his article in the first place, he cannot be faulted for it. However, it is hoped that this encourages him to perhaps write more on this point.

Rebellion

Here we find him arguing that rebellion against God is necessarily predicated on knowing there is a God, which is to say that rebellion means the obstinate refusal to acknowledge the existence of God. While that is somewhat true, I should like to point out that it is not very accurate. Rebellion is primarily a moral indictment, which regards one’s refusal to obey God and glorify him. Havard possesses both the intellectual capacity to understand what God commands and the physical ability to do so; his rebellion consists, then, of his refusal to do that which he has the physical and intellectual capacity to. (The nature of rebellion is made evident by other atheists who have stated quite frankly that, even if the existence of God were made conclusively evident to them, such that they would have to believe he exists by force of the evidence, they nevertheless would still refuse to obey or glorify him.)

Rebellion is not indicative of an epistemological condition, as Havard suggests, although that is surely symptomatic. Rather, it is a moral indictment and an empirically verifiable reality of the human condition as old as the narrative of Adam and Eve—which is to say that from across the millennia to this very day, mankind, in and of himself, still refuses to subject himself to the supreme authority of God. Even if the existence of God were made indisputably evident to him, fully satisfying whatever criteria he might posit, would obedience to God depend upon Havard’s own personal evaluation of his commands? If so, rebellion is further proved.

Incidentally, Havard does know that God exists. However, that is practically impossible for anyone to prove since no human has access to his inner thought life, by which one could say to him, “See? From this here and that over there, it is shown that you did actually know God exists.” But God himself faces no such obstacles. Every person who rejected God will stand before his throne on the day of judgment and have the entire scope of their inner thought life laid bare, making it impossible for them to sustain their denials. Every moment in which, and every means by which, they knew that God exists will be exposed and inescapable. They can get away with it before man, but they won’t before God. That is the eternal gamble they make of their lives.

Nihilism

Havard understands this charge to mean that “an atheist must necessarily be a nihilist,” which he then characterizes as “someone who thinks life is without meaning.” And he rejects this characterization as being not personally relevant because “I find lots of meaning in my personal life,” he says, which would suggest that he missed the apodictic force of the word ‘necessarily’, which underscores that self-consistent atheism must reduce to nihilism. An inconsistent atheist can avoid this peril easily enough—but at the expense of being inconsistent. If nihilism argues that life is without objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value, as Dr. Pratt describes (“Nihilism,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy), then surely this is the logical conclusion of atheism held with consistency in every category of thought, which can be seen in the reflections of such consistent atheists as Nietzsche, Sartre, and Rorty. And nihilism has a pernicious tendency to corrupt not just values but also epistemology and metaphysics; out the window goes truth, reason, knowledge, science, morals, etc.

Consider Havard’s statement that he finds lots of meaning in his personal life. This raises the question, “What is he expressing by the term ‘meaning’ here that is consistent with atheism?” Since he must view the world in godless terms, he is left having to explain the world in terms of something else. I suspect that it is metaphysical naturalism, which in turn must lead inexorably to a reductionist view of things. Given a reductionist view of metaphysical naturalism, what else could the term ‘meaning’ express but biographical information about some particular biochemical state of his mammalian brain? In other words, he actually does not find meaning in his personal life, because there is no meaning to be found; rather, he experiences a certain biochemical state of affairs when placed in particular circumstances. This is the logical conclusion of an atheistic world view described as nihilism.

As C.S. Lewis noted in Mere Christianity (1948), “If the universe has no meaning, then we never should have found out it had no meaning.” Unlike an atheistic world view, the Christian does find much meaning in life because ‘meaning’ has an objective quality, i.e., outside of the inquiring mind, which can be rightly found by him. For the world was created by a triune God who is personally invested in mankind, who he created as Imago Dei (in the image of God), and the world overall which is guided by his eternal sovereign plan. We find meaning because there is meaning to be found. That is the logical conclusion of the Christian world view when held with consistency, unlike an atheistic world view which leads to nihilism when held with consistency.

Joylessness

If someone were to ask Havard how he can bear living under the view that there is no objective purpose or intrinsic value to life—i.e., how he escapes the joylessness that haunts nihilism—he would evidently shrug his shoulders and disclaim “I just do.” In other words, he does not bother attempting to answer it. Although he seems lucid and clear about what he believes, he seems unconcerned about rationally confronting the inconsistencies thereof, almost as though he were complacent  about them, a strange attitude for someone committed to logic and reason—which he has never claimed to be, but I have always assumed he is.

But again, under a consistent atheistic world view, ‘joyfulness’ like ‘meaning’ is nothing more than a given biochemical state of a mammalian brain when placed in particular circumstances, incapable of being viewed as having any objective quality or intrinsic value—the very tenets of nihilism. Joy is not something that can be found, for biochemical states are predicated of mammalian brains, not circumstances of environment. Since neurological terms cannot describe circumstances, it is inconsistent to describe joy as something to be found.

Look, I know this seems like mere semantics but it is actually something far more important. Atheists routinely express their human experience of the world in terms that betray the truth they inherently know. Like Havard does, they speak in terms expressing intrinsic values and objective truths, not because of their atheistic world view but despite it. Their world view does not, and indeed cannot, produce the intellectual currency that they routinely use; in other words, it is coming from elsewhere, a curious fact never examined. Even worse, when their world view is evaluated critically and honestly, it collapses under the weight of its own terms into unintelligible nihilism. Consider as an example the highly touted Problem of Evil argument: under an atheistic world view, the problem cannot even be expressed! They must borrow intellectual currency from the Christian world view—in that case, moral terms—to even formulate an argument against it, which is a brutal self-defeat that speaks volumes.

Yet these things get deliberately obscured by evasive tactics, if they are even examined at all. And after it gets swept under the rug, they go back to espousing logic and reason and hope no one noticed—which those of like mind are only too ready to pretend they didn’t notice. But for the person who is authentically and honestly rational and committed to sound reason, these curiosities are like a splinter in the mind that cannot go unexamined; they must be explored and evaluated, with a decision to make once the logical conclusions are reached—the mark of the truly rational skeptic.

Arrogance

This one is more properly characterized as the fallacious argumentum ad ignorantiam (which might be what Havard was fishing for when attempting to describe it)—i.e., drawing a conclusion from an argument that does not support it. And this does not accurately characterize his position at any rate because, as he noted, he neither does nor ever has claimed that God does not exist. “I simply don’t believe in Him,” he says—about which I would direct one’s attention back to the ‘Atheist’ heading near the beginning of this present article.

But then he says something I find interesting: “I would hate to waste my precious time in worship of something which, it might turn out, doesn’t exist.” I should like to understand how it would be a “waste of time” any different from, say, playing video games or reading a book (which I know Havard rather enjoys). Perhaps he might argue that such things are not a waste of time because they are something he enjoys doing. While I will not argue the value system at work in such a statement—although an important argument could be had—I will suggest that worshipping God might likewise fall under the category of things one enjoys doing, and so therefore would not be a waste of time any more than those other activities that have the same qualitative state. If he does not hate wasting his precious time playing a video game or reading a good book, why would he hate wasting his time worshipping God? It does not add up, on the face of it.

And finally, he says that probability indicates God as non-existent, a conclusion he asserts without any indication of how it was reached. I would really like to examine the factors involved in determining that probability, subjecting the argument to a critical analysis and observing whether or not it produces what Havard believes it does.

Conclusion

First, while it is true that Havard’s world view is “without God” or godless, his atheism is much more than the mere absence of theistic beliefs; it is a positive belief that the human experience is intelligible without any reference to God. Second, the sense in which he is living in rebellion against God is not an epistemic indictment but a moral one, and can be positively attested with a frank admission of his relationship to God’s commands. Third, he can reject the tenets of nihilism only by being inconsistent in his atheism. Fourth, although he may not realize it himself, under a consistent atheism joylessness is a term that only describes a certain biochemical state of a mammalian brain placed in particular circumstances and has zero intrinsic value. Fifth, while he realizes the intellectual folly of claiming that God does not exist, he affirms the non-existence thereof in probabilistic terms without any argument that can be analyzed to see whether it actually follows validly or not.

And finally, not one of these criticisms finds a home in a self-consistent Christian world view.

‘Twas the night before Jesus came, and all through the house
Not a creature was praying, not one in the house.
Their Bibles were lain on the shelf without a care
In hopes that Jesus would not come there.

The children were dressing to crawl into bed,
Not once ever kneeling or bowing a head.
And mom in her rocker with baby on her lap
Was watching the Late Show while I took a nap.

When out of the east there arose such a clatter,
I sprang to my feet to see what was the matter.
Away to the window I flew like a flash,
Tore open the shutters and threw up the sash.

When what to my wondering eyes should appear
But angels proclaiming that Jesus was here.
With a light like the sun sending forth a bright ray
I knew in a moment this must be The Day!

The light of his face made me cover my head.
It was Jesus, returning just like he had said.
And though I possessed worldly wisdom and wealth,
I cried when I saw Him in spite of myself.

In the Book of Life, which he held in his hand,
Was written the name of every saved man.
He spoke not a word as he searched for my name.
When He said, “It’s not here,” my head hung in shame.

The people whose names had been written with love
He gathered to take to his Father above.
With those who were ready, he rose without a sound,
While all the rest were left standing around.

I fell to my knees, but it was too late;
I had waited too long and thus sealed my fate.
I stood and I cried as they rose out of sight.
Oh if only I had been ready tonight.

In the words of this poem the meaning is clear;
The coming of Jesus is drawing near.
There’s only one life and, when comes the last call,
We’ll find that the Bible was true after all.

— Audrey Patricia Woolverton